Over 600,000 people have been displaced and over 4000 killed since 2017 in the conflict between Mozambique government and insurgent forces that is consuming Cabo Delgado in Mozambique. The recent attack on Palma should not have happened. A twitter thread follows... 
Last week insurgents attacked and overran a hotel outside Palma where a number of foreigners were trapped and an unknown killed when attempting to escape into the surrounding bush or when their convoy was ambushed.
As @Jasminechic00 Africa analyst at @ACLEDINFO has tweeted, “Why in God’s name was no action taken in response to early warning intelligence. It’s a disgrace.”
It is not hindsight to say that the only feasible way to supply the increasing number of internally displaced people with aid, and keep open the best available means of escape, is to gain and keep control of the coast and help communities from sea bases – that was common sense.
Access and mobility via overland routes were always going to be challenging once cyclones and annual torrential rains washed away bridges and turned those dirt roads that were not in insurgent hands into quagmires.
@PFabric in the @dailymaverick quotes a ship-watcher called Quinn who tweeted “A modern-day #dunkirk moment” was happening in Palma. dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-0…
He added that “Ships and boats of all types small and big, oil tankers and ferries to tug boats and small pleasure craft are taking people to safety risking themselves.”
According to the BBC, the “beach [is] strewn with headless bodies”. bbc.com/news/world-afr…
Many had already fled by perilous maritime routes in ragtag flotillas to refuges in coastal towns elsewhere in Mozambique or over the border into Tanzania.
Tragedies are common. For instance, in October 2020, at over 40 people, many of them children, drowned after an overcrowded vessel sank while seeking refuge in Pemba. theguardian.com/global-develop…
Insurgents had demonstrated an adeptness at incorporating limited maritime operational capabilities in some of its attacks in 2020. Attacks from the sea were therefore proving viable, as there was a low risk of being stopped by Mozambique or fellow SADC maritime security actors.
The consequences of Cabo Delgado maritime security issues being left unanswered by Southern African states are far-reaching and will affect every country in the region - coastal and landlocked.
The unique nexus of counter-piracy, counter-terrorism/insurgency, and counter-narcotic initiatives has been in existence in the northern Mozambique Channel and onshore in the Cabo Delgado province for the best part of the last decade. These are global concerns too.
The once largely localised insurgency, rooted in grievances towards the Mozambique state, is escalating into an alarming and complex regional maritime problem. It will have profound socio-economic, security, and political implications for Southern Africa.
Continued regional inertia and deadlock is not going to cut the mustard with the international community anymore, especially as an emergent competition for regional influence in the name of maritime security is underway.
The failure to tackle maritime crimes through enhanced law enforcement or collaborative capacity-building severely impacts regional ability to create the preconditions necessary for sustainable security and development.
The wider geopolitical consequences of continued inaction if they do not act promptly is going to fundamentally alter the maritime geostrategic environment of Southern Africa.
I have said this before but it bears repeating - once the region is perceived as ambivalent and seablind about the consequences of the ongoing insurgency then it is no longer a 'backwater', it is everyone's 'backyard'.
Many eyes are looking at South Africa – as the only African naval power with the necessary capability in the vicinity – to see what it is going to do?
Somali Piracy is no longer a threat, yet South Africa recently renewed the 2011 decision to redeploy the navy in the name of anti-piracy duties, yet no vessel is on station.
South Africa should deploy a frigate to the area too with the Maritime Reaction Squadron onboard too. There is no alternative.
By my interpretation, the only thing stopping it from sending what it can of its fleet to assist the Mozambique government secure the coast is a lack of political will – legally, politically, economically and militarily it ostensibly has everything needed to deploy
SADC and the AU must urgently take, and be seen to take action – for instance my suggestions are that the situation in Cabo Delgado should be immediately tabled at the AU Peace and Security Council for discussion.
These are not novel or unfeasible suggestions – they are precisely what the PSC is supposed to do and what the South African Navy has been intermittently doing so since 2011…
I will either add to this thread or start another one once more information and insights come to light. Stay safe everyone #ISSMaritime
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