Thread by @becca_wasser

Altering the US footprint in Middle East and freeing up high-demand, low density assets is necessary if DoD is serious about focusing on the Indo-Pacific to counter the China threat. But the US has done this song and dance before—what could make it different this time? [THREAD]

https://twitter.com/glubold/status/1377599169297321988

Removing Patriot missiles from KSA, reducing carrier presence, and shifting ISR assets to other theaters are all part of the Biden admin’s plan to rightsize the bloated US posture in the ME, previewed in the interim NSS guidance.
whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…

DoD is undertaking a global force posture review intended to identify further ways to alter the US footprint in the Middle East and shift assets to the Indo-Pacific. It builds off of a CCMD-level posture review. On paper, it looks like things are moving in the right direction.

But it’s worth remembering previous efforts to shift capabilities from the Middle East to Asia and Europe have failed. In 2018, DoD removed four patriot batteries from the Middle East, in recognition of the emphasis placed on China and Russia in the NDS.

wsj.com/articles/u-s-p…

Almost a year later, those Patriots--already in demand and overstretched--were back in the region with additional IAMD systems, aircraft, and a sizable number of U.S. troops to deter Iran, following regional provocations and heightened tensions. defense.gov/Explore/News/A…

The reported changes to US force posture in the Middle East are a step in the right direction. But they are resetting the footprint back to a pre-2019 baseline, rather than changing it significantly. So how could the administration get these changes--and likely more--to stick?

1. Change the CCMD demand signal. Regional commanders get the forces and assets they want if they elevate a threat and tie it to the NDS, or a particular crisis/contingency. It's a bad feedback loop and it results force structure and posture choices that don't make sense.

2. Combat bureaucratic inertia. Too often posture choices are baked into the system. Why is there a continuous carrier presence in the Middle East? Mainly because that's the way it has always been and service equities. But that doesn't mean it is right.

3. Build partner capacity in the areas they actually need. Too often security cooperation activities are focused on areas regional partners want, rather than what they need. Identify areas that promote complementarity with the US and enhance security, and build those.

If the Biden administration is truly serious about changing the US military footprint in the Middle East and focusing on China in the Indo-Pacific, it has a lot more changes to make. Not just forces and capabilities within the Middle East, but also how DoD does business.