1/8

This article has been pretty widely circulated, which is why I want to point out why I disagree with it. It complains that by creating demand for commodities, China’s investment binge is making Joe Biden's infrastructure investment program more...

bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/8

expensive, and that, to make matters worse, Beijing has been very cleverly racing ahead of the US by stocking up on commodities last year when it didn't yet need them.

But aside from the fact that China’s investment binge is no more making Joe Biden's stimulus more ...
3/8

expensive than Joe Biden's stimulus is making China's investment binge more expensive, it isn't really true. In fact Chinese investment surged last year, accounting for nearly 200% of the country's GDP growth. This is the main reason China bought large amounts of...
4/8

commodities, and by the way they also a lot of trucks and construction equipment. All of this has been widely reported.

What's more, regular China watchers know that commodity buyers have no better a track record on China when it comes to stockpiling commodities than in...
5/8

other countries, tending to panic about rising prices nearer the top of the market than the bottom. This doesn't tell us whether or not this time they are wrong, but even if it is true that they are again stockpiling commodities, on past form it tells us little about ...
6/8

future commodity prices except that Chinese demand will be a little lower than otherwise.

Over the longer term I am also skeptical about the new "commodity supercycle" thesis. China accounts for over 50% of global commodity demand only because for three decades Chinese...
7/8

growth has been powered by investment, but Beijing has with increasing urgency over the past decade tried to shift growth from investment to consumption in order to get its explosive debt under control, with no success at all, as of yet. It hasn't been able to do so...
8/8

because it hasn't been able to boost consumption sufficiently. Until it does, it cannot afford to allow investment to slow. To assume China can keep investment growth as high for another 5-10 years as it has in the past is also to assume no limit to China's debt capacity.

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More from @michaelxpettis

3 Apr
1/4

Interesting and important article by @KeithBradsher about new rules that limit how much money foreign banks can transfer into China from overseas and that require them to tighten their balance sheets. While some see these measures as designed...

nytimes.com/2021/04/02/bus…
2/4

to limit the ability of foreign banks to operate in China, I suspect they have much more to do with worries about the impact of foreign financial institutions on domestic financial stability.

That is why I disagree with those who propose that measures like these...
3/4

are likely soon to be reversed as China continues opening up. As I have long argued, in spite of its extremely fragile financial balance sheets, China was never likely to have a financial crisis in part because as long as its banking system was closed it could easily...
Read 4 tweets
3 Apr
1/6

By now it should be pretty clear how much of a problem debt is in China, how much risk there is embedded in the financial system, and just how worried the regulators are. We should have been able to see this well over...

cnb.cx/3dnfslD
2/6

a decade ago, but economists are not very good at understanding the dynamics of debt and how balance sheet structures condition economic behavior. It is only once debt has become unmanageable that we begin to worry that we may have a a problem with debt.
3/6

For the same reasons what seems to be much less clear to most analysts is the relationship between these risks and the underlying performance of the Chinese economy. The problems of soaring debt and increasing financial fragility are not just incidental, in other words.
Read 6 tweets
3 Apr
1/7

While Rogoff is right that a large economy like that of China's should have independent monetary policy, in which case its currency should not be managed against other currencies, it is unlikely that Beijing will let the currency float freely until...
theguardian.com/business/2021/…
2/7

it has substantially cleaned up and reformed its banking system, something that could take decades at best.

Given China's extremely high debt levels and the economy's reliance on soaring debt for growth, the insolvency of the banking system, and the structural inability...
3/7

of the banks to make economic decisions, Beijing has been extremely reluctant to risk administering any shock to the economy, or even to reduce its control over the financial system – in fact many would argue that in recent years Beijing has actually increased its control...
Read 7 tweets
1 Apr
1/5

"He added the trade tensions are long-standing and they will continue to exist as China’s economy becomes increasingly competitive across every part of the value chain."

This suggests substantial confusion over basic trade dynamics. Trade tensions...
scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/5

are not caused by economies becoming more productive, because in that case their export success is rewarded with rising imports.

Trade tensions are caused by economies that achieve "competitiveness" by keeping wages, relative to productivity, lower than that of their...
3/5

trade partners. It is only because of lower relative wages that surplus countries cannot convert export success into imports, and instead convert them into persistent trade surpluses.

Countries like Germany, Japan, China, etc. don't run persistent surpluses because...
Read 5 tweets
1 Apr
1/3

Last year China reported its first financial account deficit in four years, which I assume was driven mainly by a very counterintuitive (to put it politely) surge in the net dollar position of large banks. This has led inexorably to huge losses...

caixinglobal.com/2021-03-31/chi…
2/4

both from the negative carry and on the currency position, but the banks seem not only willing to take the losses but even to increase their positions.

While the yuan has been quite stable against the CFETs basket during the past four years, technically the PBoC has not...
3/4

intervened at all, but then thanks to the intervention of these big banks, which (coincidence?) has risen and fallen in lockstep with the net inflow every year for the past four years, there was no need for it to do so.
Read 4 tweets
31 Mar
1/4

It’s a little absurd that we're still discussing “the belief that government can drive growth” as if it were a matter of religion, which we must either accept on faith, or deny. While there certainly are legitimate discussions we can have about...

wsj.com/articles/behin…
2/4

the kinds of social and political institutions we want – for example the tradeoff between government efficiency and constraints on government power – there can be no question at all that government intervention can indeed promote growth, sometimes spectacularly, just as...
3/4

it can hamper growth, depending on the underlying conditions and the specific policies. Anyone who cannot easily point to cases of either knows next to nothing about economic history. To object to government intervention, as Kevin Hassett seems to in this article, on...
Read 4 tweets

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