This is another thread on Imperial Japanese radar countermeasures in WW2.
This thread will also include the US inter-service intelligence/classification/budget wars between the Joint Chiefs & MacArthur's Section 22 radar hunters. 1/
The information in this thread is coming from a 28 May 1945 training document from Boca Raton Army Air Field.
William Cahill of the Sec 22 Special Interest Group found it in Late Feb 2021. 2/
What Cahill found in RCM Digest 14 was yet another bit of Japanese radar countermeasures.
One utterly unique in the history of electronic warfare. 3/
It was an air dropped radar dipole reflector that was neither window, nor rope.
It was a wire corner reflector assembly. It had a parachute to slow and stabilize the assembly while a hydrogen gas generator filled a balloon that would keep the decoy airborne for a 1/4 hour(+) 4/
I mentioned the Japanese use of balloon born dipole reflectors in Section 22 Week. This wasn't that. (See photo)
It was aircraft dropped to inflate & was not released from the ground.
The Kriegsmarine, USN & Royal Navy had nothing like it. 5/
The US Navy's "NAVTECHJAP" investigative mission said nothing about it after the WW2.
This willful exclusion of Japanese RCM technology was par for the WW2 US Navy's course under COMINCH Adm. King. 6/
What stood out about this bit of RCM kit was there is no record of its existence in Section 22 records.
The US Navy held back information on IJN doxing Allied IFF signals starting in March 1944 to Sept 1944 & on IJN airborne radar after Iwo Jima to the end of WW2. 7/
In fact, the USN was holding out on itself on Japanese RCM tactics in WW2. See pg 248 of 328, paragraph 35, in the attached document "Report on the Capture of the Marianas" below.
Enemy RCM tactics were a step below sigint, but above that ships crews were authorized to know. 8/
This lack of intelligence information made things rather difficult for US Navy and USMC radar operators. 9/
The 1st use I can find of this IJN para-balloon corner reflector was in a "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" AAR.
It was not recognized for what it was because the balloon failed to inflate and the device fell into the ocean. 10/
It was used extensively by the IJN in the Okinawa campaign and was seen by picket destroyers, who termed them "kites" because of their duration.
The CVE's South East of Okinawa reported their use on 12 April 1945. 11/
What is shocking here is that the Boca Raton Radar & RCM facility of the USAAF was not telling Sec. 22, which was supporting the Fighter Commands of 5th & 13th Air Forces, about this Japanese radar decoy.
This was a massive change in the relationship between Sec. 22 & Boca Raton
A direction to Boca Raton to not support US Army Air Forces in combat could only have come from USAAF Headquarters in Washington D.C.
The post-war internal budget wars came early for the USAAF Bomber Mafia.
General Kenny would not be allowed to be CoS USAF...at any cost.
/End
The "intact & seemingly undamaged" planes at Belbek airfield in that MAXAR satellite imagery could and likely are looking like this Russian helicopter.
What Ms. Tchakarova is referring to here Russian Reflexive Control information warfare techniques.
I've talked about it quite a bit during the Russo-Ukrainian War and how adherents of "Escalation Management" like @jacksullivan46 and Chancellor Scholz have been captured by it 1/
This particular passage from Timothy L. Thomas 2004 paper on the subject shows how Russia's Reflexive control infowar mapped & fed to each specific US tribal & professional demographic the data to get the message Russian wants those groups to believe. 3/
This explains the "Imperial Japanese Army at Saipan" behavior of wounded Russian soldiers killing themselves with grenades to prevent capture by Ukrainians.
Russian Mobiks are being ideologically conditioned to kill themselves, like IJA troopers were in WW2.
Russian Death Cult🧵
1/
There are multiple videos like this Russian ideological self-harm conditioned behavior surfacing.
There are still Western military officers -- including most flag ranks -- watching videos like the one below and denying FPV and other cheap DJI drones have fundamentally changed the way wars on the ground are fought.
In some forward areas there are now as many Ukrainian drone operators as infantry because FPV drones have all but replaced crew served infantry weapons.
The people on X saying Ukraine couldn't use ATACMS in the counter-battery role against Russian tactical ballistic missiles were shills, toadies, and trolls.
No one who was at all reality-based would have said anything so stupid.
2016 article at the link titled in english "WHEN THE GODS OF ARTILLERY MAKE A POINT" makes clear Ukraine had a very tight intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance kill chain between its Spetsnaz and it's Tochka-U TBM & 300mm MLRS batteries.
These Spetsnaz teams spotted 120km Tochka-U & 90 km Smersh fire strikes to clear a "Fire corredor" maneuver lane for these OMG operations during the 2014-2015 ATO.
This was pre-ATO (2014) Ukrainian military doctrine used during the ATO.