This is another thread on Imperial Japanese radar countermeasures in WW2.
This thread will also include the US inter-service intelligence/classification/budget wars between the Joint Chiefs & MacArthur's Section 22 radar hunters. 1/
The information in this thread is coming from a 28 May 1945 training document from Boca Raton Army Air Field.
William Cahill of the Sec 22 Special Interest Group found it in Late Feb 2021. 2/
What Cahill found in RCM Digest 14 was yet another bit of Japanese radar countermeasures.
One utterly unique in the history of electronic warfare. 3/
It was an air dropped radar dipole reflector that was neither window, nor rope.
It was a wire corner reflector assembly. It had a parachute to slow and stabilize the assembly while a hydrogen gas generator filled a balloon that would keep the decoy airborne for a 1/4 hour(+) 4/
I mentioned the Japanese use of balloon born dipole reflectors in Section 22 Week. This wasn't that. (See photo)
It was aircraft dropped to inflate & was not released from the ground.
The Kriegsmarine, USN & Royal Navy had nothing like it. 5/
The US Navy's "NAVTECHJAP" investigative mission said nothing about it after the WW2.
This willful exclusion of Japanese RCM technology was par for the WW2 US Navy's course under COMINCH Adm. King. 6/
What stood out about this bit of RCM kit was there is no record of its existence in Section 22 records.
The US Navy held back information on IJN doxing Allied IFF signals starting in March 1944 to Sept 1944 & on IJN airborne radar after Iwo Jima to the end of WW2. 7/
In fact, the USN was holding out on itself on Japanese RCM tactics in WW2. See pg 248 of 328, paragraph 35, in the attached document "Report on the Capture of the Marianas" below.
Enemy RCM tactics were a step below sigint, but above that ships crews were authorized to know. 8/
This lack of intelligence information made things rather difficult for US Navy and USMC radar operators. 9/
The 1st use I can find of this IJN para-balloon corner reflector was in a "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" AAR.
It was not recognized for what it was because the balloon failed to inflate and the device fell into the ocean. 10/
It was used extensively by the IJN in the Okinawa campaign and was seen by picket destroyers, who termed them "kites" because of their duration.
The CVE's South East of Okinawa reported their use on 12 April 1945. 11/
What is shocking here is that the Boca Raton Radar & RCM facility of the USAAF was not telling Sec. 22, which was supporting the Fighter Commands of 5th & 13th Air Forces, about this Japanese radar decoy.
This was a massive change in the relationship between Sec. 22 & Boca Raton
A direction to Boca Raton to not support US Army Air Forces in combat could only have come from USAAF Headquarters in Washington D.C.
The post-war internal budget wars came early for the USAAF Bomber Mafia.
General Kenny would not be allowed to be CoS USAF...at any cost.
/End
and in September, 1,202 KIA and 649 WIA, i.e. 1.85:1.
These numbers strongly exceed any previous campaigns dating back to the Crimean War, and do not include non-combat deaths due to disease or exposure."
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Late 20th Century combat saw one dead for every four wounded.
Russia is suffering between one and 3/4 to one to something like one and 4/5ths to one killed to wounded at Povrovsk.
Gosh, remember all those 2023 US Navalist accounts that denied - DENIED, I tell you - that drones from containerships would ever, ever, be a threat and that I personally was delusional for saying so publicly.
One in every five US Naval vessels are defenseless to Chinese drones, surprise launched from Chinese merchant & fishing vessels, because the
every CNO since 1989 didn't want USN logistical officers to get a captaincy and compete for flag ranks.
Instead of dealing with reality, the USN flags send out minions on X to say "de-lu-lu" things like this⬇️
Because the USN Flags from the Aviation, Surface and Sub communities don't want to have logistical officers get flag ranks and spotlight their professional delusions🤮🤮 3/3
The missile is currently active aboard Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers, Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, Wasp-class amphibious assault ships, America-class amphibious assault ships, San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ships,
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Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships, Harpers Ferry-class dock landing ships, and littoral combat ships (LCS).[6]"
This was a US Navy procurement disaster in the age of drones.
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"Western Experts" on X who claim drones are a "Ukraine War unique fad" are complete fools⬇️
"Among the sensitive targets of September 2025:
• 1,895 ‼️ enemy wings of the Orlan, Zala, SuperCam, Lancet types, Molniya kamikaze wing, Shahed, Gerbera.
• 455 enemy pilot launch points and 738 crew antenna units.
• 150 mobile EW systems and 9 self-propelled EW systems.
• 2,124 self-propelled vehicles (armor, logistics, rocket artillery, auto-moto vehicles, MLRS).
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• 394 cannons and howitzers.
• and much more weaponry, assets, depots, shelters, etc."
The #1 counter-battery weapon on the 2025 battlefield isn't ballistic or rocket artillery.
The Russian Legioner armored vehicle is an interesting reinvention of the 1940's Red Army BTR-152 or US M3 Scout car.
It says a great deal about the defense industrial infrastructure limitations of the Russian Federation.
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The three 6x6 BTR-152 photos and drawings and one 4x4 M3 scout car photo will give you an idea of what is available to the 2025 Russian defense industrial base.