Thread by @LizaGoitein

This statement by two PCLOB members suggests that PCLOB decided to abandon its original plan to conduct oversight of EO 12333 apart from its three "deep dives." In other words, they're not pretending the April 2 report constitutes EO 12333 oversight. 1/5 documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents…

https://twitter.com/LizaGoitein/status/1378076141127368705

I suppose it's good that they recognize that. But why did only two members join this statement? The report itself should clearly state that PCLOB decided against pursuing a general EO 12333 oversight project, and the report is intended merely as an explainer for laypersons. 2/5

Moreover, PCLOB apparently concluded that a "very broad oversight review" of EO 12333 would be too resource-intensive. That might be true. But there are certainly discrete questions PCLOB could have explored (and still could!) that would produce enormous value... 3/5

For instance, under what circumstances, if any, do intel agencies obtain ("incidentally" or otherwise) US persons' electronic communications, communications metatada, geolocation information, or web browsing info on U.S. soil under EO 12333 rather than statutory authority? 4/5

I was disappointed that PCLOB considered the 4/2 report "oversight." It turns out, they don't. Now I'm disappointed that they decided not to do any public oversight. I hope they change their minds and turn to pressing questions, like the one above, that need public answers. 5/5