CW: Suicide and self-harm
Last week we published a report on self-harm policies on internet platforms. We gave Reddit a low rating, as we could not find any policies that referenced self-harm or suicide. cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/self-harm-p…
Reddit reached out on this, sending us a link to a blog post outlining their approach to self-harm. It is very thoughtful:  redditblog.com/2020/03/04/red…
In our ratings, we only counted policies that appeared in the platforms' main policy documents. For example, we did not give Instagram credit for a similarly thoughtful policy outlined in a blog post, as we worried users might not come across it. about.instagram.com/blog/announcem…
While we had come across Instagram's blog post in our research, we had not come across Reddit's. Two researchers looked for policies for each platform we covered.
The fact that we did not see Reddit's blog post suggests a user or self-harm prevention group may not either. While we are impressed with Reddit's blog post, we encourage Reddit to include all of their policy language in one place.
Reddit also pointed us to their policy on violent content. We recommend Reddit clarify that this policy applies to self-harm, as it was not clear to us when we came across it. Most platforms separate their violent content and self-harm content policies. reddithelp.com/hc/en-us/artic…
We have updated our report to reference Reddit's blog post, but have not changed our ratings.
We all want the same thing: platforms that are safe for users. We applaud Reddit's activities on this front and simultaneously encourage all platforms to consolidate policy language in one place so researchers and advocacy groups can find it and understand what the policies are.

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More from @shelbygrossman

6 Nov 20
🇮🇷🇦🇫 Tonight Facebook announced that they suspended a network that originated in Afghanistan and Iran and targeted Farsi/Dari speakers in Afghanistan. My Stanford Internet Observatory team has a report on this network here: cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/novemb…
This network was suspended not due to the content of its posts, but rather for coordinated inauthentic behavior; fake profiles were central to the operation.
This operation was novel in that it was oriented toward women, including promoting women’s rights. 53% percent of the Instagram accounts had profile photos of women (compared to 11% with photos of men), and the network shared stories about the educational success of women.
Read 8 tweets
6 Nov 20
📑 Today Facebook announced the takedown of a Muslim Brotherhood-linked network. With so many disinfo ops linked to Saudi Arabia/UAE/Egypt, it’s interesting to have a network from the other side. Here is SIO’s report, co-authored with @maffsyy & @k_ramali cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/novemb…
This network was suspended not due to the content of its posts, but rather for coordinated inauthentic behavior; fake profiles were central to the operation.
This was a complex cross-platform operation with a substantial audience. The Facebook Pages we looked at had almost 1.5 million followers. There were Twitter accounts & YouTube & Telegram channels. Here are accounts linked to one anti-UAE Page:
Read 10 tweets
8 Oct 20
🇸🇦Today Twitter announced the takedown of 33 accounts linked to the government of Saudi Arabia. Buckle up for this one 🎢 it’s not your standard “Qatar is the worst” Saudi disinfo operation. Here’s our report: cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/news/twitter-t…
The network had “Royal Sockpuppets”, 👑🧦 fake accounts for real dissident Qatari Royals living in Saudi. The biggest account, pretending to be Fahad bin Abdullah Al-Thani, had >1mil followers. There were also accounts pretending to be an exiled Qatari interim govt. Image
How did these accounts get such big followings? It’s hard to say, for two reasons. First, many of the accounts engaged in handle switching. The now-suspended @QtrGov was not always @QtrGov - its mentions only go back a few months even though it has existed for years.
Read 9 tweets
8 Oct 20
🇳🇬Today Facebook announced the removal of a network of accounts run by the Islamic Movement in Nigeria. My Stanford Internet Observatory team analyzed the network before it was taken down. Our report: cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/news/islamic-m…
The network was suspended not because of the content of the posts, but rather because the Facebook Pages and Groups were run by fake accounts. Facebook calls this coordinated inauthentic behavior.
The Facebook Pages and Groups advocated for the release of IMN leader Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky.
Read 10 tweets
1 Sep 20
🇵🇰Today Facebook announced the suspension of a big network of accounts in Pakistan for coordinated inauthentic behavior. My Internet Observatory team analyzed the network before it came down. The most interesting part of the network? Mass reporting. cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/report…
The network found accounts they perceived to be critical of Islam or Pakistan & pushed links to Groups & Pages that took users directly to Facebook’s site to report an account. They even included instructions on how to open dozens of tabs simultaneously to expedite reporting. 💻
They boasted of successes frequently, but we can’t confirm whether these accounts were taken down due to reporting. Some targeted accounts had intentionally insulting fake names which were clearly in violation of Facebook's policies.
Read 9 tweets
11 Jun 20
🌟📝 Today Twitter announced the takedown of 7,340 accounts linked to the youth wing of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey’s ruling party 🇹🇷. My SIO team, w/ @akis_alp, @makrevis, @JoshAGoldstein, and Katie Jonsson, analyzed the network cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/june-2…
Takeaways: 1) this was a prolific operation; there were 37 million tweets, mostly in Turkish. Dozens of accounts were managers of retweet 🔄 rings, which worked to artificially amplify pro-AKP hashtags and the accounts of AKP politicians.
2) There was a centrally managed set of compromised accounts that were also used for AKP cheerleading.
Read 9 tweets

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