I have nothing but respect for the @WSJ reporting team - @laurnorman, @SuneEngel and others are among the best in the game.
But goodness me does the Ed Board get it wrong. [thread 🧵] on.wsj.com/2PTerKs
2/ From day US left JCPOA, few major papers have as loudly & consistently banged max pressure drum.
"Prudence... suggests a wait-and-see attitude toward Mr Trump’s reversal", they said that May. "A year from now, the world may be safer without it".
Narrator: It wasn't.
3/ From the outset, today's editorial predictably uses the JCPOA critics' adjectives of choice - flawed, bad - to say we're going "back to the future of 2015-16".
I dunno, from a non-proliferation standpoint, that's not so shabby.
4/ News of the Natanz op rightly noted, strangely explained: it's not the deal that failed to stop Iran from making progress, it's the *absence* of the deal that's resulted in the escalation. Otherwise Natanz today would have <300kg uranium stockpiled at <4%.
5/ Then we have a tried & tested criticism of JCPOA: not covering other issues of concern. It was a valid critique in 2015, but clear lesson of 2018-present is that max pressure didn't just fail to fix on missiles and malign behavior - it also undid nuclear restrictions.
6/ As proof of "concessionary courtship" by Biden admin, journal says WH "ended fight on snapback" and hasn't rejected Iran's IMF loan.
a) Fight on snapback was over last year. Trump administration got KO'd bigly.
b) Iran's IMF loan still nowhere to be seen.
7/7 I could go on, but bottom line is this: JCPOA has been in place for 5 years, 4 of which were under Trump, 3 of which have been under max pressure. And critics still haven't delivered a serious, realistic plan to better it.
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Iran's nuclear program is at the most advanced point its ever been. Breakout time is under a week. Transparency is limited.
Yet we're still debating dismantlement vs rollback/restrictions as though it's not an issue with a pretty conclusive track record.🧵
2/ Successive U.S. administrations have all agreed on one thing: The Islamic Republic having a nuclear weapon is bad for U.S. national security interests.
That premise leads to two possible approaches: Dismantle it, or work to minimize the proliferation risk.
3/ The former has an unblemished record of failure over a period of decades. The possibility of that record changing now is nil.
This week, the Trump administration issued NSPM-2, laying out the economic and diplomatic tools of a renewed "Maximum Pressure" campaign, while POTUS @realDonaldTrump called for a "Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement" with Iran.
🧵 on reading the early tea leaves.
2/ In 2018-20, "Max Pressure" post-U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA put a massive dent in Iran's economy. Iran retaliated with a two-pronged counter-pressure campaign: nuclear escalation and regional provocation. There was little substantive engagement/diplomacy between the two sides.
3/ Under the Biden admin, talks in 2021-22 to revive the JCPOA came to naught. De-escalatory understandings in 2023 collapsed after Hamas's 7 October attack against Israel. U.S. focus turned to avoiding widening of conflict, and defending allies and interests.
When President @realDonaldTrump takes office in January 2025, the #Iran his administration will face will be, relative to four years earlier, weaker on several fronts, and changed on several others. 🧵
2/ Domestically, absence of major protests for ~2 years cannot obscure deep gap between state and society.
Social, cultural, political and economic discontent persist, while government's default remains repression over any meaningful reform to address them.
3/ Regionally, setbacks to Hamas & Hezbollah have weakened parts of IRI "Axis of Resistance", though others continue to pose a threat to Israel/U.S. interests. Meanwhile, prospect of retaliation for Israel's 26 Oct attacks - and counter-strikes in response - remain significant.
With the killing of Hizbollah's leader, Iran & its "Axis of Resistance" have suffered the biggest in a series of setbacks that began mounting late last year. And for the third time since April, what was seen as IRI's regional strengths underscore its strategic vulnerabilities. 🧵
2/ After Hamas's attack on 7 October and the start of Israel's military campaign in Gaza, the "Ring of Fire" approach of mobilizing against Israel on multiple fronts - notably from the north - we started to see a more concerted counter-Axis campaign that had three main elements.
3/ The first was an uptick in operations against IRGC personnel, especially in Syria. That culminated in April with the killing of several senior IRGC commanders, to which Iran responded with an overt and direct military attack against Israel.
For 10 months, the specter of a regional conflict has loomed over the Middle East. Haniyeh's killing in Tehran now threatens to realize a scenario all sides have worked assiduously to avoid: A major multifront showdown b/w the Axis of Resistance and Israel/U.S. 🧵👇
2| Iran likely sees Haniyeh's killing a worse affront than the April strike in Damascus that prompted it to launch a direct aerial assault on Israel. It once again exposed intel lapses, took place on home soil, and targeted a high-level visitor on @drpezeshkian's inauguration.
3| Moreover, it upended any notion of the April exchange having deterred Israel from targeting Iran directly (at the time, Israel responded with a pinpoint strike near a nuclear facility, more to signal vulnerability than inflict damage).
The first round of #Iran's presidential elections created a lose-lose-lose dynamic.
Here is how: 🧵👇🏼
1. The establishment was hoping that by allowing a slightly more competitive election, it could boost turnout and claim that its wounded legitimacy has recovered. The participation rate fell by 8% compared to 2021, marking a real embarrassment for the leadership.
2. The reformists brought out the big guns and tried their best to mobilize their base. Pezeshkian adopted a non-confrontational and traditionalist approach to grab votes from the conservatives. Yes, he ended up leading, but it simply was insufficient.