Ten years and ten weeks after the adoption of UNSCR 2231, the implementation of snapback completes the paperwork for burying the JCPOA.

It's a milestone confirming, legally and bureaucratically, what has for 3 years been a diplomatic and technical reality. 🧵 2/ @CrisisGroup has been following this file for 20+ years. The 6 resolutions that return at midnight GMT are the revived legacy of the first decade of the nuclear crisis - an era of deepening standoff between Iran and the (somewhat but not always aligned) P5+1 powers.

Iran's nuclear program is at the most advanced point its ever been. Breakout time is under a week. Transparency is limited.

Yet we're still debating dismantlement vs rollback/restrictions as though it's not an issue with a pretty conclusive track record.🧵 2/ Successive U.S. administrations have all agreed on one thing: The Islamic Republic having a nuclear weapon is bad for U.S. national security interests.

That premise leads to two possible approaches: Dismantle it, or work to minimize the proliferation risk.

This week, the Trump administration issued NSPM-2, laying out the economic and diplomatic tools of a renewed "Maximum Pressure" campaign, while POTUS @realDonaldTrump called for a "Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement" with Iran. 

🧵 on reading the early tea leaves.
2/ In 2018-20, "Max Pressure" post-U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA put a massive dent in Iran's economy. Iran retaliated with a two-pronged counter-pressure campaign: nuclear escalation and regional provocation. There was little substantive engagement/diplomacy between the two sides.

When President @realDonaldTrump takes office in January 2025, the #Iran his administration will face will be, relative to four years earlier, weaker on several fronts, and changed on several others. 🧵 2/ Domestically, absence of major protests for ~2 years cannot obscure deep gap between state and society.

Social, cultural, political and economic discontent persist, while government's default remains repression over any meaningful reform to address them.

With the killing of Hizbollah's leader, Iran & its "Axis of Resistance" have suffered the biggest in a series of setbacks that began mounting late last year. And for the third time since April, what was seen as IRI's regional strengths underscore its strategic vulnerabilities. 🧵 2/ After Hamas's attack on 7 October and the start of Israel's military campaign in Gaza, the "Ring of Fire" approach of mobilizing against Israel on multiple fronts - notably from the north - we started to see a more concerted counter-Axis campaign that had three main elements.

For 10 months, the specter of a regional conflict has loomed over the Middle East. Haniyeh's killing in Tehran now threatens to realize a scenario all sides have worked assiduously to avoid: A major multifront showdown b/w the Axis of Resistance and Israel/U.S. 🧵👇 2| Iran likely sees Haniyeh's killing a worse affront than the April strike in Damascus that prompted it to launch a direct aerial assault on Israel. It once again exposed intel lapses, took place on home soil, and targeted a high-level visitor on @drpezeshkian's inauguration.

The first round of #Iran's presidential elections created a lose-lose-lose dynamic.

Here is how: 🧵👇🏼 1. The establishment was hoping that by allowing a slightly more competitive election, it could boost turnout and claim that its wounded legitimacy has recovered. The participation rate fell by 8% compared to 2021, marking a real embarrassment for the leadership.

در دهه گذشته من با اتهامات متعدد و متناقضی روبرو شده‌ام. از دست نشانده آمریکا تا حامی جمهوری اسلامی تا آلت دست انگلیس. من عموماً به تهمت‌های بی‌اساس که هدفی جز تخریب شخصیت ندارند واکنش نشان نمی‌دهم.
اما این بار پاسخ می‌دهم چراکه با سطح سخیفی از روزنامه‌نگاری مواجه هستیم.

https://twitter.com/AliVaez/status/1706746875485864175

2| من در سال 2012، زمانی که مذاکرات هسته‌ای در حال شکل گیری بود، به گروه بحران پیوستم. آن دوران مصادف شد با فشرده‌ترین و مستمرترین تعاملات دیپلماتیک بین ایران و ایالات متحده در سه دهه گذشته. حضور 5 کشور دیگر و مجموعه‌ای از مسائل بسیار فنی را هم به پیچیدگی قضیه می‌افزود.

Over the past decade, I've been called an American agent, an Iranian regime sympathizer and a British stooge.

I usually choose to dismiss such defamatory nonsense.

But on this occasion, I'm going to respond, because this is straight up hatchet journalism.

2 | When I joined @CrisisGroup in 2012, it was just as the nuclear negotiations were taking shape - the most sustained, intensive diplomatic engagement between the US & Iran in over three decades. Add to that 5 other nations and a highly technical set of issues.

🚩 به تازگی انتشار اخبار (بعضاً نادرست یا نادقیق) در مورد «توافق با ایران» یک سرگردانی در افکار عمومی ایجاد کرده.
اما حقیقت ماجرا چیست؟ به صورت کلی در سه حوزه تحولاتی در جریان است:

- گفتگوهای هسته‌ای/امنیتی
- زندانیان دوتابعیتی
- پرونده‌های پادمانی

#رشتو ۲/ مذاکرات هسته‌ای-امنیتی بین ایران و آمریکا: گفتگو بر سر توافق موقتی که مستلزم رفع تحریم باشد مطرح نیست. چراکه چنین توافقی، با توجه به فضای سیاسی قدرتمندی که علیه ج.ا در واشنگتن ایجاد شده، ۱.با مخالفت کنگره مواجه خواهد شد ۲.به بایدن از نظر سیاسی در آستانه انتخابات ضربه خواهد زد.

در ۶ سال گذشته، امسال اولین سالی است که گروه بین‌المللی بحران در تاریخ ۱۶ ژانویه، روز اجرای برجام، گزارشی از وضعیت اجرای این توافق منتشر نخواهد کرد چراکه چیزی از برجام باقی نمانده و مذاکرات احیای آن نیز از سپتامبر متوقف شده‌اند. 🧵👇 در همان زمان گروه بحران گزارشی منتشر کرد و هشدار داد که گذر زمان به نفع احیای برجام نیست: «اقدامات تنش‌زا و یا اتفاقات غیرمنتظره» به راحتی می‌توانستند تیر خلاص به توافق هسته‌ای باشند که در شرایط بسیار متزلزلی قرار داشت. و همین اتفاق هم افتاد. ۲/
crisisgroup.org/fa/b87-middle-…

گزارش جدید گروه بحران از مذاکرات هسته‌ای منتشر شد.

تلاش‌های اخیر برای احیای برجام از مرز توافق تا مرز فروپاشی در نوسان بوده است. الان به نقطه‌ای رسیده‌ایم که باید پرسید: آیا اصلاً برجام قابل احیاست؟ اگر بله، چگونه؟ و اگر خیر، جایگزین چیست؟ ۱/

crisisgroup.org/fa/b87-middle-… مذاکرات احیای برجام به نوبه خود تجربه بسیار منحصربه‌فردی بوده است: دو طرف اصلی ماجرا، بدون گفتگوی مستقیم و با حضور اعضا و میانجی‌های متعدد، بر سر بازگشت به توافقی مذاکره می‌کنند که آن را چند سال قبل امضا کرده بودند. ۲/

From near-conclusion to near-collapse, back to near-conclusion, now edging again toward collapse: New @CrisisGroup report on the #Iran nuclear negotiations, which have had more twists than a telenovela and higher stakes than ever.🧵👇
crisisgroup.org/b87-middle-eas… 2| Talks to revive the JCPOA have been a peculiar, even sui generis exercise: 2 central protagonists with no direct engagement, negotiating a return to a deal they've already agreed to, with multiple parties engaged directly or indirectly as participants or mediators.

"It is important to stop and remember that we are not debating between excellent and ideal alternatives, but between alternatives that are currently on the table – which are a situation with an agreement versus a situation without an agreement." 1/ bit.ly/3wXiEiv 2/ "As much as we at @INSSIsrael have analyzed the scenario of a lack of an agreement, we have consistently come to the same result – significant progress by Iran in its nuclear program, which will bring it to a nuclear threshold."

If Iran is so adamant on closing @IAEAOrg safeguards investigation once and for all, best thing it could do is acknowledge past undeclared activities instead of making up excuses about fabricated/planted evidence and politicized probes. It's easy: Here's a statement. 🧵 2/ "In the late 90s and early 2000s, we were pretty worried about what Saddam was up to with his WMD program. We know the rest of the world was too, because the Americans started a war over it. So yes maybe we did look into a bit of R&D and forgot to disclose it. Busy times".

جنگ روسیه و بحران انرژی در اروپا برای کشورهای دارای ذخائر نفت و گاز فرصتی طلایی ایجاد کرده. ۵ماه است که نه ایران و نه غرب نتوانسته اند از این موقعیت منتفع شوند. این بازی باخت-باخت، با احیای برجام می تواند به بازی برد-برد تبدیل شود.👇 ۲/ اروپا برای گرامایش اساساً به گاز احتیاج دارد. ایران به علت نداشتن زیرساخت‌های لازم (که تحریم در آن نقش بسزا داشته) نمی‌تواند به اروپا گاز صادر کند. بنابراین استیصال اروپا در زمستان به تقویت اهرم فشار تهران در مذاکرات نمی‌انجامد. اما فرصت برای ایران کجاست؟

How would Donald Trump, “master”salesman, be pitching the nuclear deal with Iran?

A thought experiment [thread] 2/ "We've just finished restoring what many people call the best nuclear deal ever reached with Iran. It's incredible. I've always said nuclear is very important to me. They can't have a bomb, they just can't. And let me tell you, you're gonna love it".

The past few years have offered a case study to test the argument made against limiting Iran's nuclear program through diplomacy: That covert operations and sabotage can do the job better and without giving any sanctions relief.

Here's what happened instead [thread]:

https://twitter.com/Jerusalem_Post/status/1562845499232645121

2/ When Natanz was attacked in July 2020, intel assessment from the Trump admin and Israel claimed it would take up to 2 years for Iran to get back to pre-attack capabilities.

2 years later, Iran had 4x as many advanced centrifuges running, at higher levels of enrichment.

Iran agreed to a roadmap with the @IAEAOrg on clarifying these issues in March.

Here's what that framework said: provision of clarifying documents, exchanges between the IAEA and AEOI, and a report from the DG at June board meeting.

https://twitter.com/muhamadjamshidi/status/1555600847995899904

2/ Here's what the IAEA reported: At Marivan, information consistent with explosive experiments, and no clarification regarding the presence of man-made uranium particles.

IAEA DG: "A safeguards regime, reinforced by the additional protocol and the amended small quantities protocol, can give us the trust and confidence we need that those states using nuclear energy for the wellbeing of their people, are not hiding anything." 1/

https://twitter.com/iaeaorg/status/1554736421549887488

2/ "Those who truly favour effective safeguards, would never use their cooperation as a bargaining chip, or IAEA inspectors as pawns in a political game.

While diplomatic negotiations over the IRI’s nuclear programme continue, the IAEA has been steadfast and clear:

Almost 5 months to the day that E3 negotiators left #ViennaTalks with, as @PhilippeErrera put it, "our job done", it's back to the Asparagus Palace - first time all of the P4+1, U.S., and Iran will be in the same place at the same time since March. [Thread] 2/ At the time, success seemed within touching distance: "The FTO and a pair of footnotes", as one senior Western official told me. Iran and @IAEAOrg were agreeing on a roadmap to address safeguards, concluded in Tehran on 5 March. But that's also when the unravelling began.