THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE (Thread)
As Russian troops continue to mass along the Ukraine's Eastern border, we are all rightly concerned. But will Putin really go for another land grab? And if so, what might happen? Let’s look at how a potential scenario might unfold...
(1 of 10)
Putin attacks across three lines of advance into Western Ukraine. Whatever his strategy, this time it’s different. Unlike 2014, Ukraine forces are better prepared and much better equipped. Territorial gains within the first 24 hours are less than anticipated.
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Global condemnation swiftly follows. Further sanctions are applied, but this changes nothing at the front. Withering artillery barrages are followed-up by substantial armoured thrusts. Although Ukraine forces lose ground, Russian forces suffer significant attrition.
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Casualties on both sides begin to mount. Russian rocket artillery causes widespread damage including civilian deaths. Ukraine forces respond with Israeli-made loitering munitions of the same type used in Nagorno-Karabakh. Thousands of Russian armoured vehicles are lost.
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More important, Russia’s logistical supply chain is targeted so that troops at the front run out ammunition allowing Ukraine forces to counter-attack. Far from achieving a rapid result, the offensive soon gets bogged down and becomes a war of attrition.
(5 of 10)
Three months in, Putin’s actions have turned Russia into an outcast. Worse still, the sight of body bags being repatriated starts to sap support at home. As sanctions bite harder, life for ordinary Russians becomes increasingly difficult.
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Ukrainian special forces infiltrate Russia and unexpectedly attack key infrastructures and military installations. Within six months, Russia itself is a country under siege. The Russian economy starts to crumble. Violent public demonstrations become commonplace.
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In response to indirect Western support for Ukraine, Putin’s rhetoric becomes increasingly threatening. His inner circle fearing the consequences of escalation, recognise the danger he now poses. But will this be enough to force him out? Possibly.
(8 of 10)
We can explore different scenarios. The thing is, however much Ukrainian territory Putin manages to seize, any attack would be costly politically, militarily, and economically. Attacking the Ukraine is therefore a very risky strategy for Putin.
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Like other oppressive dictators, Putin faces a day of reckoning. If he cannot retire gracefully with the billions he has managed to hide away, he may choose to go out in a blaze of glory. He may be using the West's fear of this scenario to negotiate to his advantage.
(10 of 10)
This is a somewhat simplistic view of the situation for Twitter, but not completely unrealistic. What can be said with certainty is that Russia without Putin, without sanctions, and without a broken economy, would be a great trading partner and friend to Europe.
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So, the West needs to stand firm in its support of the Ukraine. But equally, we need to show support for ordinary Russians. We admire their culture and long history. What we don't like is its leader and his regime. They have to go.
(12 of 12)
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THREAD ON AIRBORNE FORCES AND VEHICLES
Russia's failed attempt to seize Hostomel airfield in the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine provides confirmation (if any was needed after the lessons of Crete and Arnhem) that airborne assaults against well defended targets can be disastrous. The contemporary use of drones only adds to the risks.
This means that future airborne operations will primarily be conducted at battalion and company level for coup de main missions against bridges, airfields, and objectives that need to be physically seized and held by forces on the ground. Think WW2 Pegasus Bridge. Many previous airborne tasks, especially raiding tasks, can now be accomplished using PrSM, loitering missions, or armed drones, so demolition roles will be the exception rather than the norm.
Airborne missions at brigade level are likely to be risky, particularly for the large fleet of aircraft and helicopters required to deliver them. Where larger formations are needed, they will be used to occupy locations where there are no or limited enemy forces. In this respect, airborne units will become early entry forces rather than assaulting in contact with the enemy.
The cancellation of the US Army's M10 Booker has little to do with the quality of the vehicle itself, and more about the lack of supporting infrastructure of Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, which cannot effectively support 40-tonne tracked vehicles. 1/4
In the same way that the British Army's Ajax programme includes six different versions, so that armoured cavalry regiments are self-supporting, the Booker chassis lends itself to a whole range of variants based on the M10 Booker Repair & Recovery variant. 2/4
In case Ajax's issues still aren't fully resolved, migrating each variant to the M10 Booker chassis would be a certain fix for Ajax, Ares, Athena, Argus, Apollo, and Atlas. You'd have to compromise on the original requirements, but you'd have an excellent vehicle. 3/4
It was right to retire the British Army's Thales Watchkeeper WK450 UAS. It took far too long to bring it into service and by the time it arrived, newer and better systems were available. It was also difficult to operate. The question is what do we replace it with? (1/6)
An obvious choice is General Atomics Mojave, which is optimised for STOL operations from austere locations. This has a larger payload, double the range and better ISR sensors. It can also carry up to 16 Hellfire missiles for strike tasks. Crucially, it is harder to jam. (2/6)
Mojave, which is a modified version of General Atomics' MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS, weighs 1½ tonnes and has a reinforced undercarriage. Technically, it compares well to Watchkeeper while also being considerably less expensive to purchase and operate. (3/6)
The @GD_LandSystems M10 Booker is not a derivative of the ASCOD platform, but an all-new design. The hull has well-sloped armour, an 800 hp diesel driveline and @Horstman_Group hydro-pneumatic struts. The 105 mm gun based on the UK ROF L7 and is mounted in an Abrams-based turret.
As impressive as the vehicle itself is the acquisition approach. 12 prototypes from two companies were down-selected. These were tested extensively. A winner was chosen and awarded a LRIP contract for 26. Now that all issues are resolved a full production contract can be issued.
At each stage of the process, risk was managed. The onus was on @GD_LandSystems to resolve any issues in order to move the program to the next stage. Brigadier Glenn Dean, who has assumed overall responsibility for MPF deserves credit for doing a fantastic job.
Over the last 15 months, @LockheedMartin's M270 & HIMARS rocket launchers have performed extremely well, obliterating Russian targets while reducing collateral damage at ranges of 70 km, which is beyond the enemy's capacity to return effective counter-battery fire.
Ukraine's success with HIMARS confirms what we already believed, that precision-guided deep fires rockets and missiles enable smaller armies to deliver an effect that belies their size relative to larger, less capable adversaries.
Before the Russo-Ukrainian War, the USA had already initiated an upgrade programme to increase GMLRS range from 70 km to 150 km, while the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) can hit targets at 499 km, versus the existing ATACMS with a 150 km range. This is a significant upgrade.
The British Army's Protected Mobility Pipeline (PMP) programme will see 14 platforms merged into 5. Three PM platforms (light, medium, & heavy) will replace Foxhound, Mastiff, Ridgeback, Wolfhound, Husky, Foxhound, and Panther. This will streamline through-life support.
As good as Boxer is, only 4 infantry battalions will be equipped with it. So having a larger fleet of lower cost PMVs will be essential. Also, the way in which they're being used in Ukraine, as battlefield taxis that move infantry out-of-contact, points to a new way of operating.
For some roles, it makes sense to purchase an off-the-shelf solution from abroad (e.g., Oshkosh JLTV) where the price is lower than domestically produced vehicles can match. But for others, British industry is perfectly capable of producing a state-of-the-art 4x4 or 6x6 PMV.