As Credit Suisse is aware, Counterparty credit risk is so complicated, that almost all the formulas in the CRR had to be corrected two years later !
A thread!
Ooops we forgot a floor in the duration calculation (btw this formula is still horribly wrong)
Who’s the bloody intern who forgot the long-term bonds in the notional calculations!?
Seriously, no one told you that a number inside a square root has better be positive? (I mean CCR is complex, but not in *that* sense)
I can’t believe you made the same error TWICE!
When you say it out loud, SF sounds so much nicer than SK
You can’t sum on a null set, dude.
Rule number 1 of mathematical logic : if you open a parenthesis, you have to close it & vice versa. You might not seen it, but the computer will.
I can’t believe they took the wrong hedging set for non-electrical commodities. Rookie error.
Read it 23 times and see if you can find the error.
Yeah, I always make the same mistake when I price a bond. 1%, one Basis point, what’s the difference anyway. It’s only money.
Confusing notional and market value for a Jump to default… this will not end well.
Do you need an aspirin ?
Banking regulations are so complex that, after taking three years to draft a regulation, they have to publish a corrigendum two years after, because it was filled with errors.
I hope you feel reinsured.
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1) You might have missed it but the EU just published the CMDI package – one of the most consequential pieces of bank regulation. It fixes something that has been really embarrassing about European banking regulation for more than a decade. And the impacts are huge.
2. What was the problem: the resolution framework (i.e. how do we deal with bank failures) lies on a legal pillar, the No Creditor Worse Off principle which means gvts can play with property rights ONLY if creditors would have been worse off (or =) in a bankruptcy.... BUT
3. But we had one resolution framework and… 27 different creditor hierarchies in a 27-member single market! How big a problem is this ?
1/13 Fed Governor Bowman just dropped her US bank reform blueprint – on top of the “easy” headline you’ve all seen (less capital), there’s some pretty important stuff in there. A thread.
2) Something most analysts missed is that Bowman clearly wants assets BACK inside the regulated banking system. She said it multiple times. The shadow banking era had a good run, but the sheriff is back in town.
3/13 Non-bank lenders, private credit funds, money market vehicles — she's not naming names but the subtext is clear: if you're doing bank-like things outside a bank, the new rules are designed to make that less attractive. The moat is being rebuilt.
This is an opportunity for a bit of bond market education😊
You’ll often read that Italy is wider than France now, or actually the opposite, with people posting various screenshots from different sources to make their point.
An old theme is coming back to haunt them: Basel 4!
Quick thread.
After almost 10y of discussion the package was finally enacted with full implementation in 2033.
Everyone felt, after many EBA reports & banks' disclosures, that impact would be mild.
But for first time banks are publishing capital ratios w/ the new rules and for DB it's ugly
How does it work? Banks are still allowed to use internal models, but the RWA (in 2030/2033) must be at least 72.5% of the standard (non internal models) RWA. ("output floors") and for DB that's a 33% increase!
CET1r would go from 13.8% to 10.35%! Ouch!
Why is the latest EC proposal on securitization a big deal for banks and how does it change the SRT market?
A slightly geeky thread - with some backround on the SRT market if you're not aware of this important market.
First what’s a SRT?
Following secular finance practice of reinventing the wheel but changing its name, the new trendy capital optimization transactions are “significant risk transfers”, but they’re just good old securitizations (invented in the 1860s 😊.)
(cash or synthetic)
The reason they’re now called SRT is a regulatory one.
The 2013 CRR (Art 244/245) allowed banks to get capital relief under some conditions, essentially that “significant risk” was transferred to someone else.