Poor industry performance is responsible for high nuclear power costs and industry stagnation, not regulation. I’ve had several people ask about this post, so here is a thread on nuclear costs
The post reviews the argument in a recent book “Why Nuclear Power Has Been a Flop.” It notes that nuclear power plants in many countries are expensive, and lays much of the responsibility on nuclear safety regulation rootsofprogress.org/devanney-on-th…
The causes of high nuclear costs are complex and vary depending on projects. Regulation does have costs because safety has costs. That said the book and post do not reflect current literature on the causes of high costs
The large sizes of conventional nuclear power means reactors are construction megaprojects, typically defined as projects costing more than $1 billion.
Across countries and technologies, megaprojects are prone to cost overruns and escalation mckinsey.com/business-funct…
This is true for energy infrastructure as well. When we examined it we found construction cost overruns for most electric infrastructure, but particularly nuclear and hydro units due to their large sizes sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
Complexity requires precise project management and even then unexpected events (i.e. a global pandemic) can cause workforce, parts, and other delays.
As capital-intensive infrastructure that must be financed, time overruns breed cost overruns (and higher future financing costs)
Looking at overnight construction costs (w/o financing), @J_Lovering , @arthurhcyip , and @TedNordhaus found wide variations in cost performance.
Many nations saw increases. Low costs were achieved with standardization, multiple units, and learning sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
In the U.S., total costs quickly rose in the 1970s due to rising interest costs, limited workforces leading to salary escalations, poor quality workforces, and a lack of reactor standardization.
Further, the energy crisis evaporated demand for projects
Notably, while largely missing from the literature and public debates, dozens of nuclear projects were cancelled.
So not only do nuclear plants carry a risk of going way over budget, they also have a high risk of being cancelled
For nuclear projects, the construction issues are often driven by concrete and steel. The nuclear island is only a portion of the overall capital costs (and engineering/licensing is tiny on a PROJECT basis) world-nuclear.org/information-li…
Based on project analysis, industry experience, and academic literature know why some nuclear plants are cheap and others are expensive. @kirstygogan and Eric Ingersoll lay it out well d2umxnkyjne36n.cloudfront.net/documents/D7.3…
Not having standardized designs or, inexplicably, beginning construction before a design is complete are large drivers of high costs
What role does regulation have to play in in high costs? Its debatable but probably not a lot.
Specific regulatory changes during construction could cause delays for a project (like NEPA or TMI) but the general scheme of regulation is historically predictable
A recent analysis found that safety related costs were only a minor factor in rising costs.
More important were general increases in construction costs in the economy, and soft costs like labor supervision cell.com/joule/pdf/S254…
So the question is how do we make nuclear cheap?
Reactor standardization, low labor costs, and effective megaproject project management are likely to support Russia and China’s dominance of markets for conventional nuclear power powermag.com/russia-china-d…
In the U.S. and many markets, however, advanced reactors appear to be the only (and perhaps last) hope for a revitalization of the nuclear industry. For the first time, we see dozens of advanced nuclear startups and innovations in the sector thirdway.org/graphic/2020-a…
This is important because business model diversity can be as important as technology for market success (and historical issues are tied to limited vendors/competition).
The reactor designer, EPC construction, and utility ownership model may be an aggravating factor in costs
This is especially important as modern electricity markets are quickly moving away from vertically integrated IOUs (in part due to historical utility bankruptcies from nuclear cost overruns). Relying on utilities to finance and build nuclear power may no longer be a viable option
Even with this market uncertainty, there are many market opportunities for advanced nuclear if costs can be reduced and competitive business models developed @LucidCatalystlucidcatalyst.com/arpa-e-report-…
To do this, new nuclear construction projects must stop cost overruns and assuage justified fears of risks of overruns.
This is a huge challenge for first-of-a-kind demonstration projects
Modularity in terms of factory production is probably the most known cost and risk reducing feature of advanced reactors. In my opinion, this is likely to be only a minor actual factor, at least initially sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
Smaller designs help considerably. Although they lose economies of scale in process efficiency they avoid diseconomies of scale in construction.
Small means simple simple, simple means quick, low risk of time overrun, low risk of cost overrun, rapid iteration and learning
As a capital-intensive technology, nuclear power needs access to low-cost capital.
Despite its carbon-free nature, most ESG ratings and development banks explicitly exclude nuclear.
That is not analytically sound and somewhat colonialist
What role can regulations play in reducing costs?
Safety regulation can certainly increase costs and pose barriers if done poorly. NRC is embarking on an ambitious regulatory modernization effort so it can efficiently and effectively regulate the next generation of nuclear power
The book identifies fees as a cost driver. Licensing and annual fees were not substantial during the primary era of nuclear construction in the US. @mchammo provides a good overview of these issues
Getting fees right is as much about making sure NRC (or other regulators) have sufficient capabilities to be efficient and effective as it is about minimizing industry costs.
Stay tuned as @theNIAorg has forthcoming work on exactly this topic
I’ll end with this - I’ve met a lot of nuclear regulators, both staff and Commissioners. They are hard working, dedicated, and are not trying to stop nuclear power. Regulatory costs can be minimized, especially with next generation designs
Many are working to align the policy incentives and regulatory environment.
Ultimately, it is on industry to demonstrate that they can build cost competitive projects on-time, on-budget, and predictably (end)
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This is a big deal and a shock the Senate parliamentarian allowed it through.
Although power plant regulations may be stymied by the recent Supreme Court case, there is no legislative doubt that the Clean Air Act includes GHGs as air pollutants
If anything, this underscores the reserved nature of the Supreme Courts ruling. It was focused on an important doctrine ("major questions"), but had it gone after the endangerment finding, Congress would have just overruled it
Now thats resolved, the next congressional priority should be a carbon price or explicit power plant regs
Well thats a shock. The Supreme Court case is about as technical, procedural, and irrelevant as it can get. It stops EPA from using generation shifting as a best system of emissions reduction to set carbon caps under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf…
Mind this is just from reading the syllabus but it looks like the Supreme Court wanted to take the 2015 Clean Power Plan case as if the Trump Administration did not exist. It avoids rulings on Chevron, general GHG authority, and (apparently) even EPA's ability to use 111(d)
Based on this, not only does EPA still have GHG regulation capabilities for many sectors, it can also move ahead to promulgate a 111(d) rulemaking that avoids generation shifting. Meaning source control, like carbon capture
Not only does the Administration's use of the Defense Production Act violate congressional intent, it shows the continued neglect of and lack of leadership by this admin for advanced nuclear RDD&C
The DPA is not meant to support long-term civil domestic infrastructure. It's two most recent high-profile uses, COVID and baby formula, are acute health security issues.
Enabling the private solar industry through protectionism is not closely tied to national defense
Even if there is a defense rationale, there is no cohesive rationale for excluding nuclear energy.
The nuclear energy industrial base and supply chain are foundational to the Nuclear Navy, which is the foundation of US hegemony. It is atrophied and urgently needs revitalization
Its not everyday an article you write gets a direct rebuttal from Amory Lovins...
In Utility Dive, Lovins argues that nuclear energy and renewables are direct competitors (they aren't) and thats why we should ignore its climate value utilitydive.com/news/nuclear-e…
Lovins does not fully address or refute my three major arguments: 1. fossil fuels still dominate energy supply 2. electricity is a service, not a commodity, and unit level metrics are poor tools 3. portfolio principles are essential if we are talking climate change
This is a great thread about the challenge of getting EU off Russian gas.
What about why?
Russia has already used EUs gas dependence as a weapon this winter. They constrained volumes, exacerbating the global energy crisis, so that Europe would feel politically constrained
Now that most European countries have decided to provide weapons to Ukraine, Europe and allies must prepare for Russia to cut off all gas exports. They've already constrained volumes and invaded a sovereign state. Cutting off exports, or even the threat, jeopardizes public safety
It might just be a contingency plan, but we are past "this is hard," or "can't be done," or "Putin would never."
He very much could, and of course its hard. We over prioritized energy economics and environmental performance over energy security. An energy cutoff is a risk now
Just a few technical notes on Germany's nuclear fleet and whether it could help reduce gas demand. Reverting retired facilities is very difficult, bordering on impossible
In most cases, these units are in various stages of decommissioning. These may be irreversible.
Even if technically feasible, the facilities would likely need to be relicensed. Doing this quickly would be very difficult (and absolutely necessary for social license in Germany)
Further, the workforces for these facilities have likely already dispersed.
It may be possible to reverse these closures, but we are talking a 2023-2025 solution at best.