1/12
Very good, sober @noahpinion piece on digital RMB (it seems hard for most to write soberly about digital currencies). He makes at least four important points:

First, given how advanced China's payments system already is, the main difference...

bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
2/12
a digital PBoC wallet creates is that it gives the regulators more control over and information about household and business transactions and savings. Although he doesn't mention this, it may also transform the liability structure of the commercial banks.
3/12
Second, a digital RMB is unlikely to increase the international prominence of the RMB, let alone at the expense of the US dollar. In fact the RMB is only remarkable internationally for how little it is used relative to China's size, and especially its size as a trading...
4/12
nation. There are some obvious and less obvious reasons for this, almost none of which are addressed by the creation of a digital currency.
5/12
Third, if its very low transaction costs and a greater willingness by Beijing to give up control of the digital currency actually do result in more widespread use of the RMB internationally, this cannot but come at the expense of Beijing's ability to control its...
6/12
financial and monetary system. This is true almost by definition. But given growing problems in the banking system, Beijing is more likely to want more control rather than less. The recent peek-a-boo over a possible...
7/12
Huarong default (just the latest in a long line) should remind us how very unstable the financial sector can be and how nervous Beijing is about the potentially destabilizing effects of fixing the underlying problems.
8/12
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the global dominance of the US dollar may benefit Wall Street enormously and buttress American geopolitical power, but it comes at a high cost to American workers, farmers, producers and the middle class. If the digital RMB or some...
9/12
other currency did partially replace the US dollar, this would in fact benefit the US economy, not undermine it (although expect Wall Street and foreign affairs and defense officials to worry).

In my opinion the US should be eager to share its exorbitant burden with...
10/12
other major economies, but in spite of all their concerns about the "exorbitant privilege", no one wants the burden — least of all countries like China, Japan, Germany, or others that depend heavily on the US to resolve their structural demand deficiencies.
11/12
That is why a permanent diminution of the role of the US dollar is unlikely to happen either until the US economy is no longer able to bear the burden, and the system breaks down chaotically (the story of sterling in the 1920s and 1930s perhaps gives a preview), or until...
12/12
Washington finally takes steps to rebalance trade and reduce dollar dominance, either in favor of another currency (unlikely) or in favor of a synthetic currency like bancor or the SDR.
For those interested, a quick reminder that @izakaminska’s article on the same topic was also very useful.

ft.com/content/76e450…

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More from @michaelxpettis

22 Apr
1/5
As the relationship between Washington and Beijing continues to deteriorate (and unfortunately, as I’ve long argued, given global imbalances and trends it is likely to get worse before it gets better), the irony here is that in a world of weak...

scmp.com/knowledge/us-c…
2/5
demand, any aid or support either provides to Africa and Latin America actually benefits their own economies, especially to the extent that they ensure the aid is spent domestically, rather than “saved” abroad in the form of corruption.
3/5
This is because any aid that is spent to improve productivity or welfare must ultimately be spent directly or indirectly on imports. This is just an accounting identity, and the same identity tells us that these imports directly or indirectly will increase exports in the...
Read 5 tweets
22 Apr
1/4
"The main thing, says Germany, is for Spain to offer 'an ambitious and credible' commitment to reduce public debt, as a sign to the markets."

What the markets need in today's environment to get businesses to invest is not signs of fiscal...

english.elpais.com/economy_and_bu…
2/4
restraint but rather a revival of real demand. This reminds me of the official (and wrongheaded) position of France in the early 1930s that the key to recovery was for France, the US and the UK to cut spending in order to protect a financial system based on gold.
3/4
Fortunately French advice was largely ignored (By FDR, not by the American banking establishment, who largely agreed), but in France it led both to a weakened contribution to global demand and ultimately the torpedoing of the French economy that forced it off gold anyway.
Read 4 tweets
21 Apr
1/4
This is a strange article. The PBoC plans to increase the allocation of green bonds in its reserves to support the national transition to a low-carbon economy, which I assume means buying bonds issued by Chinese entities.

caixinglobal.com/2021-04-21/chi…
2/4
But obviously it cannot buy RMB-denominated bonds (reserves can only be held in foreign currency), so if it is buying dollar-denominated bonds issued by Chinese entities rather than using local funding to buy their RMB-denominated bonds, the only net impact is to switch...
3/4
the FX risk from the PBoC to the Chinese borrowers, which seems a bizarre thing to want to do.

Alternatively it could force state-owned banks to buy additional dollars bonds, which just means the PBoC is intervening indirectly (which we already assume is happening).
Read 4 tweets
21 Apr
1/3
10-12 years ago when I first started writing about China's growing addiction to debt, most analysts – Chinese and foreign – responded by claiming that anyone who understood China knew that the this was impossible because of the deep cultural...

scmp.com/news/people-cu…
2/3
antipathy Chinese people had towards debt.

This was always nonsense. In every country and culture there is a normal distribution in the willingness of households and businesses to take on debt, and whether they do so in the aggregate is almost wholly a function of the way...
3/3
in which the financial system accommodates the debt-taking side of the curve. Of course people prefer to rely on simple ethnic or cultural explanations, and so I guess we are in the midst of creating a new cultural stereotype about Chinese attitudes towards debt.
Read 4 tweets
21 Apr
1/4
I don't know how you can credibly model these things, especially given the difficulty of accounting for the impact of debt, but you get the same conclusion simply from the economic logic. Income inequality can be economically justified in an economy in which the main...
2/4
constraints to productive investment are scarce savings and the high cost of capital. In that case the higher savings of the rich can be used to fund rising investment and employment, and eventually everyone benefits.
3/4
But in an economy with weak demand and rapidly rising debt (needed to prop up demand) the main constraint isn't the lack of savings but rather the lack of robust demand. Rising income inequality makes this worse by converting real demand into unwanted savings.
Read 4 tweets
21 Apr
1/11
This is definitely the right way to think about it: someone will have to absorb Huarong's huge balance-sheet losses, and what mostly matters is who that someone is. This is ultimately a political question, not a financial or legal one.
2/11
But the options are not only foreign investors or domestic investors. If the debt is restructured, and the contingent losses at Huarong are converted into explicit debt — either at the banks or at government-related shareholders (which is all a bail-out means...
3/11
in this case) — the losses can also eventually be absorbed by households (mainly through taxes, financial repression, or lower municipal services) or by local governments (through asset liquidation).
Read 11 tweets

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