I, for one, think the Supreme Court ruled 9-0 against the FTC because "permanent injunctions" does not mean retrospective monetary belief, not because SCOTUS loves fraud. (1/x)
Truth of the matter is the signs that this was coming have been around a long time and have been largely ignored inside the agency. Guardrails were put up around the fraud program to restrict the use of this authority to a narrow subset of cases. (2/x)
One after another, those guardrails have been blown through: attempts to seek disgorgement in cases that were not pure fraud, attempts to get all revenue from D in cases where the underlying product had real value (3/x)
To be clear, I think Congress should and will "fix" 13(b). But the fix should include guardrails and restrictions to ensure that it is not used to deter proconsumer behavior. And it absolutely should not be "fixed" to apply retroactively. (4/x)
Kobayashi and Cooper have a nice paper discussing these issues and a fix to 13(b) that would focus the equitable monetary relief on consumer harm, as it should be. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
(5/x)
A fun side point: SCOTUS 9-0 decision that the FTC successfully used an authority it didn't ACTUALLY have to get billions of dollars on behalf of consumers is in some serious tension with the narrative from FTC critics that this is a weak and feckless agency! (6/x)
The FTC will some have authority to get equitable monetary relief. It should be focused on consumer harm in the appropriate set of cases (pure fraud). It will take a bit of time to get it right. But this should and will happen. (7/x)
But it is not a surprise in any way that FTC efforts to expand the authority to inappropriate cases or to take all revenue rather than the harm caused by the deception have resulted in some pushback from the courts. (8/x)
I will close with my very unpopular view that FTC v AMG is not after all a story about how SCOTUS loves fraud, but rather one about agency overreach over time that provides some lessons for Congress and the FTC. (9/9)
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Let me expand a little bit. Getting all revenue is good in fraud cases BC the incremental gains are all consumer harm (i.e. product has no value such as weight loss scams, etc.). (1/6)
The problem has been the all revenue approach is in cases where a deceptive/ unfair practice causes some harm but consumer also receives real value, e.g. a deceptive claim increases what I pay for an otherwise valuable product. (2/6)
I agree the D should pay every $ of consumer harm they cause. But there is indeed a rational policy basis for wanting optimal deterrence (this is an area where @chopraftc and I agree), e.g. the D to pay no more and no less than the full harm caused in those cases (3/6)
I am briefly interrupting my Shark Week to share a few thoughts on FTC v. Qualcomm.
First, I’m flattered to have 3 articles relied upon by the court. This highlights my special skill of picking fantastic co-authors, including @geoffmanne@lmedwards_ & Judge Ginsburg. (1/x)
Second, please go read @geoffmanne and @randypicker as well as more critical threads from @ErikHovenkamp and @marklemley. There are a few others that view the decision as *checks notes* the end of the world. You can find those on your own. (2/x)
Disclosure: Qualcomm supports general educational programming @GAI_GMU. Qualcomm does not and has not funded any of the articles cited. I am personally recused from participating in this litigation -- and so am only sharing my personal views. (3/x)
If you ignore the silly but parts about me inventing law and economics, optimal deterrence, or harm-based penalties at the FTC -- hold your breath dear readers -- but @matthewstoller has a point here. Yeah, I think that requires a THREAD. (1/x)
Optimal deterrence is the core of economic theory regarding penalties, Becker (1968). The fundamental idea is that if the expected value of unlawful behavior net of legal sanctions is positive, then the market will produce it. (2/x)
A lot has been written about optimal deterrence in courts and agencies. See, e.g. Polinsky & Shavell; Mungan; Sunstein. Here is Ginsburg & Wright for an example calling for novel sanctions in the price-fixing context. (3/x) papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
Hi, former FTC Commissioner here. And a conservative.
A conservative Senator (@HawleyMO) has proposed that the FTC — a group political appointees at a federal regulatory agency — regulate internet speech.
But first, a thread.
The bill asks the FTC to determine when social media platform moderation decisions are “designed to” or intend” to negatively impact a political party. Or when they have a “disproportionate impact” on a party.
The most obvious point — one @BerinSzoka has emphasizes — is that a “Fairness Doctrine” for the internet is a bad idea. And the bill quite literally injects a board of bureaucrats into millions of decisions about internet content. This is central planning. Full stop.
Really LONG thread coming on vertical mergers responding to @TomValletti and @geoffmanne exchange --- which refers to me and to @GAI_GMU and questions my credentials as an economist at some point. But never quite finds a way to @ me or @GAI_GMU. First...a short version. (1/x)
TL; DR: @TomValletti: the evidence is vertical mergers = bad. @geoffmanne: Nope; see Lafontaine & Slade & @GAI_GMU. @GAI_GMU: Most VI studies don't show net harm.
Valletti: GAI are not econs! They are bad. I am good. They are old.
Also Valletti:*most studies don’t show net harm.*
I woke up this morning to an interesting thread from @TomValetti. Tommaso was responding with sound and fury -- and a heavy dose of pedantry and misplaced credentialism -- to a post from @geoffmanne about the @GAI_GMU submission to the FTC hearings on vertical mergers. (3/x)
Here's a really unpopular opinion about the FTC skaters, organist, & piano teacher cases. They are heavily criticized as a symbol of the agency being out of touch or misallocating resources.
But these are good cases. The FTC was right to bring them. (1/x)
DISCLOSURE: I voted in favor of bringing these cases.
To be clear --- my claim is that they are socially valuable cases and belong in the AT agency portfolio; it is not that they should be the only cases. We will get to the agency resource arguments shortly. (2/x)
The various criticisms of the skater/ organ / piano teacher cartel cases are wrong and reveals some real structural problems in the current Neo-Brandeisian (NB) / Hipster Antitrust critique of modern antitrust. Let's discuss. But first, let's lay out the cases (3/x)