The latest from Respekt, @the_ins_ru and Bellingcat, revealing more details into the GRU's operations in Europe, evidencing how there were linked to the conflict in Ukraine bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-eu…
We previously identified more team members of the GRU team responsible for the Vrbetice warehouse explosion in Czechia, and that it included the most senior leadership of the unit. bellingcat.com/news/2021/04/2…
Two open questions remain the subject of speculation by the press: First, whether the sabotage operation in Czechia in 2014 is linked to the poisoning of the arms manufacturer Emilian Gebrev in 2015 bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-eu…
Second, what might have been the underlying motivation of the sabotage operation – and of the subsequent attempt on Emilian Gebrev’s life.
Data analyzed by Bellingcat supports the hypothesis that the explosions in Czechia were part of a longer-term GRU operation aimed at disrupting Ukraine’s capabilities to procure munitions during the conflict in Ukraine.
The operation appears to have been initiated shortly after July 2014 when Russian authorities subordinated the disparate Russia-supported militant groups in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine under central control and military supervision of the GRU.
The mission, which appears to have been run by the subversion and sabotage sub-unit of GRU’s Unit 29155, included several contiguous operations among which were the explosions at the Vrbetice depots, the assassination attempt on Emilian Gebrev.
We can also say that with increasing likelihood that includes at least one of the three explosions at munition depots in Bulgaria in early to mid-2015.
This version of events is corroborated by the overlap of the small sabotage team in the Czech and Bulgarian operations; the team members’ contiguous assignments in the two countries; and the links to EMCO in both sets of operations.
Moreover, telephone records analyzed by Bellingcat show that several members of Unit 29155 communicated actively with Russian military officers deployed to the Donbas, as well as with local militant commanders fighting against the central Kyiv government, in 2014 and 2015.
At the same time, an analysis of correspondence between EMCO and the depot operator Imex from 2014 indicates that the target of the GRU sabotage operation may not have been (solely) Gebrev’s munition stock.
The data reviewed by Bellingcat also sheds doubt on the Czech official version of events according to which the GRU unit had planned for the explosion to occur on Bulgarian territory after repatriation of the munition purchased by EMCO.
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A (re)discovered series of posts seemingly authored by Q shed a little more light on the figure behind the notorious conspiracy. Largely unnoticed, they have not entered "official" aggregators of "Q drops" - as true believers call Q's prophecies.
How do we know they share the same author as Q's "canonical" posts? These "lost drops" include large sections of text which are identical to both previous and subsequent Q drops, in several cases sharing a unique user ID with the latter.
Compare Lost drop A (left) with canonical drop 4 (right). These apocryphal "Q drops" were made shortly after the first verified Q drop, on October 28, 2017. The conspiracy was in its infancy - what would an impostor have to gain?
Thanks to everyone who attended today's digital showcase from @zkharazian, who discussed how to track disinformation in an Armenian context.
You can watch a recording of the event here (~2.5 hours):
You can watch this Monday's digital showcase event, ran by @RuslanLeviev, here (Russian):
Our next digital showcase event will be @Soshnikoff on May 6th, with a presentation led in Russian on an investigation he conducted, and then on May 7, a presentation in Ukrainian from a journalist at @bihusinfo focusing on anti-corruption investigations using OSINT techniques.
New details of the Czech arms depot explosion in 2014 from Bellingcat, including details of a senior GRU leader's direct involvement, and details of other team members involved bellingcat.com/uncategorized/…
Bellingcat has established that the GRU operation which Czech authorities have linked to the explosion of the munition depot in Vrbetice on 16 October 2014, involved at least six operatives from GRU’s Unit 29155.
It was supervised personally by its commander, Col. Gen. Andrey Averyanov, a senior deputy to the head of the GRU, who traveled undercover to Central Europe at the exact time of the operation and left back to Moscow mere hours after the explosion.
Here, nighttime imagery from the @NASAEarth VIIRS sensor highlights bright-burning gas flares from oil wells south of Erbil.
This time lapse (captured between 2013 and 2017) also shows the period when ISIS captured Mosul.
@wammezz@oballinger@NASAEarth Gas flares are a major sources of air pollution. Combining VIIRS imagery with @ESA_EO Sentinel-5p data in @googleearth Engine, we can also see high levels of Nitrogen Dioxide around flaring sites, many of which are located near big cities
The Comité International Pour La Protection Des Droits de L'homme (CIPDH) bills itself as a human rights group with headquarters in Paris. But as @elisethoma5 discovered, this was far from the whole story … bellingcat.com/news/2021/04/1…
@elisethoma5 CIPDH, it transpires, has exaggerated an apparent relationship with the UN, issued what the European Commission describes as “fantasy passports” and even misappropriated the identity of several prominent individuals
@elisethoma5 Until last year, CIPDH stated on its website that it partnered with more than a dozen UN agencies. Yet not one of those agencies said they had heard of CIPDH when contacted by Bellingcat