They digitized millions of Wikipedia person-entries to create a "history of notable people." They show trends in the migration, gender ratio, industry background, geography, life expectancy, etc, of "notable people." ideas.repec.org/p/spo/wpecon/i…
So for example, here's the life of Erasmus:
Here's the history of notable people.
(It looks a lot like the history of population tbh)
(obviously "notable" here is "notable in modern databases;" arguably a lot of people believed to be notable in the past may be forgotten today, and this forgetting may be spatially correlated with e.g. colonialism or imperialism)
(OTOH, that may not matter: people notable *to the world we live in today* are an actually-interesting subset of *people ever notable to any society*)
Longevity data.
What's remarkable here is that the trend in life expectancy is not simply up, but a funnel and kinda U-shaped-ish!
Same story for gender balances as well! The "women kept totally out of public" dynamic is NOT present in the pre-1600 data! There's a lot of variability in the early periods but it really looks like "notability is for men" is a product of early modernity, not antiquity.
Though, granted, even in the recent cohorts women only make up 25% of the notable people identified, so there's nothing even approximating equality here. But the extent of inequality varies considerably.
Now THIS is a picture of cultural change! Wish I'd seen this a few months ago; I'd have used this data in a report that'll come out on Thursday discussing a closely related topic!
But folks, LOOK at that rise in sports notability! Here I've zoomed in.
I'm sure a non-trivial share of this is change in sampling, and OBVIOUSLY sports dominates *recent* cohorts because athletes become famous *at young ages*.
But while overstated.... the rise in sports fame-dom from e.g. 1950 to 1970 is not just an age thing. That's a shift in social priorities.
Notice which categories have long-term secular declines too:
Nobility
Family
Religion
However, again, this is a sort of strange sample. Here's their geographic split.
In *1800* , 30% of their notable people were in North America.
That.... is exceedingly implausible.
Sorry, here it is:
It is *exceedingly unlikely* that North America had 30x as many people in it who made notable contributions to global culture today as Asia, especially since at that time Asia had something like 80-90 TIMES as many people in it.
That implies that the average North American in 1800 was something like 2,500 times as "culturally productive" (from the viewpoint of "what is culturally notable in 2021") as the average Asian in 1800. And I just.... don't believe that.
So I think it would be wisest to do like region-population-weights or something.
Migration is increasingly important for notable people.
The authors provide a file with 100k of their notable people. I downloaded it, stripped the file down to just the US, and here's what we get for occupational history by year the notables turned 20.
So the notable people in America 1750-1890 were apparently *overwhelmingly* politicians.
They were displaced over time *primarily* by celebrities and athletes.
And that's the history of civics in America folks!
Here it is consolidated even more.
Very interested in theories of American history that explain a linear increase in the prevalence and importance of entertainment 1820-1930, but not much increase after that.
I mean basically just industrialization right?
but fwiw, that's also basically the period the US underwent its fertility transition
oh no did i just walk myself backwards into a marxist reading of us cultural history
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Approximately 15-25% of everything we know about global fertility comes from basically one source: the Demographic and Health Surveys.
The contract funding them seems to have been cancelled.
If you're worried about falling fertility, this is a five-alarm fire.
This piece is cowritten by me and @MoreBirths . Our take here is basic: the DHS surveys are a well-run program yielding very clear benefits to the U.S. and are a key tool we have on hand to figure out how to tackle low fertility.
Losing this tool is not good at all.
Obviously, there remain a lot of unanswered questions about the long-run status of USAID-financed programs with contract terminations. It isn't clear which are gone forever, which paused, which will be re-envisioned... but the contract for DHS has indeed been terminated.
there's a TRADEOFF between "adapting" to demographic decline and "solving" demographic decline!
many strategies that help societies cope in the near term make demographic balances worse later on.
when grandmas have to work later in life, they provide less childcare
when grandma hits retirement, women have more babies, and this effect is largest for the youngest women, meaning later retirement ages feed both reduction AND delay of fertility.
Today at @FamStudies we released a new study of almost 9,000 reproductive-age Americans showing that the only path to a more family-friendly America is opening up new land for single-family housing (thread).
The heart of our study is this graph, which shows the results of a randomized forced-choice (conjoint) experiment where respondents had to choose, between different housing options, in which they'd be most open to having (more) kids.
We find that the top two priorities for American families are, very simply, low crime and good schools. This is pretty obvious and I think surprises nobody, so let's consider the other findings!
are turkish nationalist types aware of how massively homosexual the ottomans pre 1600 or so were? like is this on their radar? have they ever read ottoman love poems? which are literally 95% about little boys?
i'm genuinely curious how aware modern turks are of this
we have ottoman sex manuals written for royals and they run on about how excellent it is to have sex with little boys for multiple chapters
one of the most popular forms of ottoman theater was a morality play about a conflict between pederasts and fornicators and the big comical ending is when the fornicators admit they were wrong and nothing compares to little boys
Today the @guardian has a piece out saying that @natalismorg is a conference for fascism and liberal eugenics.
It does include fascists and liberal eugenicists. I abhor and detest both ideologies, and it's insane to act like that's the range of ideologies represented.
Knowing many of the speakers listed, I know many of them don't support *any* variety of eugenics, myself included. Many of us are very publicly on record publicly condemning the entire eugenic/dysgenic framing of fertility change!
While Jason Wilson (can't find twitter handle?) highlights @cremieuxrecueil 's defense of Lynn's national IQ data, he seems to ignore the speaker list also includes people very publicly critical of that data (hi, it's me).
Today, I and 3 awesome coauthors have a new paper out at the Journal of Population Economics where we show that a huge part of the story has to be ELITE LEADERSHIP.
When one Kartvelian elite decided to change his country, he succeeded.
For years, I've been saying that the Georgian Orthodox Patriarch boosted his country's fertility by using his superstar status to motivate extra births through a campaign to personally baptize higher parity babies.
I had some evidence, but there were always some skeptics.
The problem was always that we never actually had data on the core treatment group: women identified by religious denomination X marital status X parity.
That's a very demanding treatment group; that model will be data hungry.