The day after Syria declared in breach of #CWC and its rights and privileges under the treaty were suspended, @OPCW identified a new problem with Syria's CW declaration. For those of you following along at home, this is the 20th outstanding issue with Syria's declaration.
In its 91st monthly progress report on elimination of Syrian CW, @OPCW reports that it has evidence that Syrian CW site produced CW despite Syrian denials. Not only that, samples of CW agent were found in several large containers. Kicker: the agent itself was undeclared.
Note that @OPCW did not say it found degradation products or by-products of production--they found actual CW agent. Samples were taken in September 2020 but no indication of when the production itself took place. Another important question is the identity of the undeclared agent
Syria has already declared production of sulfur mustard, sarin, VX, VM, soman, and ricin (although last two were not part of original declaration). Most likely the newest undeclared agent is tabun. 2 reasons for that:
1. Tabun (GA) is the only classic nerve agent that Syria hasn't admitted to researching and/or producing. Tabun is reportedly "easier" to produce than sarin: bellingcat.com/resources/arti…
Tabun is the "easiest" of the nerve agents to produce:
Of course, there are other possibilities such as the vesicants nitrogen mustard and lewisite and the nerve agents cyclosarin (GF) and Russian VX (RVX). Of these, undeclared RVX of most concern and would indicate leakage of former Soviet CW info and know-how to Syria.
Indeed, former Soviet CW expert General Anatoly Kuntsevich was implicating in smuggling of CW materials to Syria in the 1990s: baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-19…
But he kept working with the Syrians until he died mysteriously on an Aleppo-Moscow flight in 2002. His death has been attributed to the Mossad: ynetnews.com/articles/0,734…
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A couple of observations.
The only immediate effect is that Syria is not allowed to vote or hold any positions at @OPCW
This is a slap on the wrist given how blatant and brazen Syria's violations of the #CWC have been. However, the decision is a milestone in accountability.
Members of the @OPCW can and should do more. If Syria remains in non-compliance with the #CWC by the next Conf of States Parties, the Conf should refer the case to UNSC. Yes, I know Russia will use its veto to protect Syria--but (at least) 3 good reasons to do so.
Last week, the @OPCW IIT issued detailed report on Syrian govt responsibility for chlorine attack on Saraqib in February 2018: opcw.org/iit/second-rep…
Last April, @OPCW IIT issued first report which found Syrian air force responsible for 1 chlorine and 2 sarin attacks on Ltamenah in March 2017: opcw.org/iit/first-repo…
Latest @OPCW report on elimination of Syria's CW is out. Good news: The DAT closed 3 outstanding issues with Syria's initial declaration.
Bad news: 19 issues remain unresolved.
Worse news: Syria still denies producing any CW at one of its declared CW production facilities
Syria's continued denial in face of samples indicating production and/or weaponization of a nerve agent at said facility indicates that Syria is still committed to continued obstruction on history, scope, and scale of its CW program.
The answer is yes. This @HHSGov guidance document
says that Teletracking will replace the CDC's National Healthcare Safety Network hhs.gov/sites/default/…
.@OPCW just released its final report on the April 7, 2018 chemical attack on Douma: opcw.org/sites/default/… Thread to follow
FFM concluded that info collected “provide reasonable grounds that the use of a toxic chemical as a weapon took place. This toxic chemical contained reactive chlorine. The toxic chemical was likely molecular chlorine.”