In _Denationalisation of Money_, Hayek supposed that competing private fiat-like monies would vie for market share by demonstrating their stable purchasing power. But, as I observed many years ago, Hayek overlooked something of fundamental importance.
He assumed that private individuals, in deciding which monies to prefer, would judge them by their _macroeconomic_ merits. In that case, the macroeconomically best would win. Hayek assumed this would mean those with the most stable purchasing power.
Granting Hayek's assumption for the sake of argument, his conclusion was a non-sequitur. In choosing what money to prefer, why would people act differently than they do in choosing other goods or assets? Why not pick the fiat-like money promising the greatest _private_ gains?
That could mean preferring not stable purchasing-power products but ones that could appreciate. And of course, if enough did so, the expected appreciation would become a self-fulfilling prophesy, with consequences quite unlike those predicted by Hayek's theory.
First, if the chosen product did indeed become "money," that is, the dominant medium of exchange and unit of account, it would bring deflation, and possibly very severe deflation--a potentially serious problem in the presence of downward nominal price and wage-rate rigidities.
But the second and more fundamental problem was that, precisely because it offered such high returns, the chosen medium would be held (or, in today's vernacular, HODLed), rather than routinely exchanged for goods and services.
That is, the very qualities that made it more popular that rival products would also prevent it from every becoming "money," meaning a widely-used medium of exchange and account. Instead, it would serve only or overwhelmingly as a pure "store of value" or investment medium.
Nor are these the only problems with Hayek's theory. As @lawrencehwhite1 and others have shown, even if an issuer of a stable purchasing power "private fiat money" succeeded in gaining a large market share, it might then profit by breaking its promise and issuing oodles of it.
It's partly for this reason that monies freely convertible into commodities "won out" in historic currency competitions.
Whether any modern cryptocurrency can succeed in overcoming these problems remains to be seen.
The Fed has a ways to go to get its Fintech access rules in good order. Fortunately, the ones I've posted are preliminary only. The Fed is now seeking comments for their improvement: federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pre…:
The response of BPI (the big banks' lobby) to the Fed's request for comment on Master Account approval guidelines, shown in follow-up tweets, should leave no doubt that this is about terms for granting such accounts to fintechs holding "special" bank charters.
BPI's comment reads, "The issue of who can access the Federal Reserve’s payment system is an important one, and it is good that the Fed has sought comment on the complex questions surrounding it. Historically, only regulated and supervised banks have been permitted access, ...
"and if Big Tech and FinTech firms seek that right, the question is whether they ought to shoulder the traditionally associated responsibilities, and whether further protections are warranted given that they are uninsured and lightly regulated,...
In the Spring of 1941, @zachdcarter observes in his excellent book, _The Price of Peace_, Keynes's "marked emphasis on inflation surprised some of the economists, who, after so many years of depression, were still focused on employment as the topic national economic concerns. ...
"But with the war orders coming in on a massive scale, Keynes insisted that is was only a matter of time until rapid price increases took effect. Americans would need to prepare to have a battle plan ready when they did."
The most recent stats then available (for March 1941) put the 12 month CPI inflation rate then at 2.26%--its highest level since 1937. This March the 12 month CPI inflation rate was 2.6%--its highest level since August 2018.
My sincere desire (and I think Nathan will agree) is that we go beyond both sweeping celebrations and sweeping condemnations of the New Deal to better understand both its successes and its failures.
Too much “mythologizing” infects both extreme views. Take one simple myth both sides subscribe to: that the New Deal was inspired by Keynes’ ideas. One side celebrates it for this foresight; another confirms it as it does Keynesianism writ large.
In fact, Keynes had little influence on the New Deal; while he praised some aspects of it, he was highly critical of others as impeding recovery. FWIW, my own view is that, had his advice actually been heeded, we’d have seen a much more rapid and complete post-1933 recovery.
What Nathan dismisses as a myth here was accepted by scholars and observers of all persuasions at the time and long since. It is he who is promoting a myth of near complete recovery before the ‘37 crash.
Relief and recovery were very distinct objects. The New Deal programs were successful in one. Less so in the other. No toying with statistics will change that reality.
Still I'll try: monetary expansion DOES create wealth when it prevents what would otherwise be a shortage of exchange media. Such a shortage can result in recession and unemployment. That is, it can destroy wealth. Monetary expansion adds to wealth by preventing that outcome.
Economists of practically all schools have long understood this exception to the rule that monetary expansion only causes inflation. I mean economists going back to G. Poulett Scrope and John Stuart Mill! It is not just a "Keynesian" idea, though he shared it.