@DrydockDreams has put up another Coral Sea post modeling ships & US Navy CAG William Ault plus his disappearance returning from the strike against IJN CarDiv 5.
This thread goes into what the role of preventable HF communications failure played in that
To do so I will be using screen captures from Squadron Leader A. L. Hall, RAAF, presentation "farewell to communication failures" reprinted in the Aug 1944 CIC magazine
This is a clip showing the beginning of S/F Hall's manuscript.
WW2 wartime military periodicals often have 'retro' or 'era specific' high tech buried in the articles that modern eyes will not understand.
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What that diamond & cross shape with chains between a plane, a ship and two ground antennas represents is a Rhombic antenna.
This antenna was invented by Bell Labs in the 1930's and was used extensively in WW2 era strategic HF coms & SIGINT.
See: qrznow.com/the-mighty-rho… 4/
At the beginning of WW2 Australian government & military built a series of rhombic antenna point to point high frequency analog voice circuits (wireless telephone of W/T) to link Northern & Western Australia to the South East. 5/
This system brought Australia face to face with the problems of what we now call "space weather" living in the bad radio neighborhood of the "Great South Pacific Radio Blob."
This radio system didn't pop into existence like Athena from Zeus' brow.
Australian Radio Research Board, established by J P V Madsen in 1928, worked together with the Australian civil service & got the American Carnegie Institution's Department of Terrestrial Magnetism to 7/
...put an ionosphere observatory in Watheroo, Australia.
The operation of Australia's HF wireless telephone system brought Australian RAB scientists face to face with the fact that the British military HF frequency prediction system pushed by Marconi scientist T L Eckersley 8/
...did not work as well as the the British civil radio predictions using the Appleton-Beynan periodic layer model.
E Appleton & T L Eckersley had been academic enemies of the worst sort since 1930. When the British ISIB was stood up in 1941 & copied by the USA. It used the 9/
...rival Newbern Smith model instead.
In Australia, it was all "needs must as the devil drives" & the devil was the "Great South Pacific Radio Static Blob."
Just prior to Coral Sea, Gen. MacArthur called a scientific conference to standardize HF communications in the SWPA. 10/
This standard was implemented for Coral Sea and all SWPA air & sea search elements. They had no problems communicating with each other.
This was not the case for CAG William Ault and the air groups on Lexington & Yorktown. 11/
S/L Hall obliquely refers to this inability of the SWPA to communicate by radio to USN carriers during the Battle of Coral Sea in his manuscript.
The inability of the SWPA & SoPAC to effectively communicate endured until the latter was absorbed by the former in Aug 1944. 12/
The inability of USN carrier groups in 3rd/5th Fleets to communicate to SWPA units lasted the entire war and played a major role in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
The US Navy, or course, blamed General MacArthur for this.
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S/L Hall's manuscript gives a very good idea of how CAG William Ault died.
Six Mhz was generally the best SWPA HF radio freq. during the daylight hours, but failed at dusk & dawn. But, you had to have planned alternate frequencies for where your plane was going & it's base. 14/
CAG William Ault was not so blessed.
Being outside the ground wave, facing a weather front, Ault wound up in a high freq. "skip zone" where no communications would reach USN CV's.
Like Hudson A-16-198 in S/L Hall's manuscript, Ault got lost, ran out of fuel & crashed.
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One the DCMA quality inspectors on my team worked at an EMALS contractor in Texas.
I can't say more than the Chinese tested their EMALS at subsystem level (unlike the USN) with the knowledge the four catapults needed to be independent of each other for operations,
...based on how the USN f--ked up their EMALS design.
That is, when any single EMALS catapult on the Ford class goes down for any reason. They all can't be used.
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As strategypage dot com put it in 2019:
"EMALS proved less reliable than the older steam catapult, more labor intensive to operate, put more stress on launched aircraft than expected and due to a basic design flaw if one EMALS catapult becomes inoperable,
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While much has been said about US targeting support for these past Ukrainian oil strikes, and future Tomahawk strikes, much of this appears to be "role inflation" and grandstanding by Deep State parties briefing US media.
The inability of Western elites to understand how Putin regime reflexive control propaganda locks everyone there into "WW2 Russian exceptionalism" just boggles the mind.
The Putin Regime lives in a George Orwell 1984-like present, with no past or future.
and in September, 1,202 KIA and 649 WIA, i.e. 1.85:1.
These numbers strongly exceed any previous campaigns dating back to the Crimean War, and do not include non-combat deaths due to disease or exposure."
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Late 20th Century combat saw one dead for every four wounded.
Russia is suffering between one and 3/4 to one to something like one and 4/5ths to one killed to wounded at Povrovsk.
Gosh, remember all those 2023 US Navalist accounts that denied - DENIED, I tell you - that drones from containerships would ever, ever, be a threat and that I personally was delusional for saying so publicly.
One in every five US Naval vessels are defenseless to Chinese drones, surprise launched from Chinese merchant & fishing vessels, because the
every CNO since 1989 didn't want USN logistical officers to get a captaincy and compete for flag ranks.
Instead of dealing with reality, the USN flags send out minions on X to say "de-lu-lu" things like this⬇️
Because the USN Flags from the Aviation, Surface and Sub communities don't want to have logistical officers get flag ranks and spotlight their professional delusions🤮🤮 3/3
The missile is currently active aboard Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers, Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, Wasp-class amphibious assault ships, America-class amphibious assault ships, San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ships,
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Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships, Harpers Ferry-class dock landing ships, and littoral combat ships (LCS).[6]"
This was a US Navy procurement disaster in the age of drones.
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