1/5 The Copenhagen experiment showed that Ergodicity Economics (EE), limited to its predicted utility functions for given dynamical settings, is a better fit to human behavior than classic expected-utility theory with a freely chosen single utility function.
2/5 I don’t find this terribly interesting. Classic expected-utility theory is conceptually flawed, and science is more than data-fitting. However well or poorly it fits observations, one would have to reject expected-utility theory anyway.
3/5 Here is what's interesting: I didn’t think EE would perform well in the Copenhagen experiment because I had bought into the narrative that the tested behavior was shaped by evolution over millions of years and cannot be re-learned on short time scales.
4/5 The experiment finds something else: we’re astonishingly quick at adapting to new dynamic environments. This opens the door to a whole new way of thinking about how and what we can learn. The brain is far more plastic than economic models suggest.
5/5 The really exciting bit: economic decision models are widely used in neuroscience. If we can improve on these models, it can have a direct effect on neuroscience.
Hence my enthusiasm for our collaboration with @DRCMR_MRI.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/ Sometimes it helps to say why we do things. So why worry about ergodicity in economics?
The ergodicity problem means, e.g., that economic models overlook the fundamental benefit of cooperation, a cornerstone of complexity theory - why structure emerges in living systems.
2/ Formally, the failure happens because expected utility theory (EUT) optimizes expected value, and expected value is irrelevant and inaccessible to decision makers (it's even called `expected' utility theory...)
EUT in turn is the basis for game theory.
3/ Game theory is hugely influential in (geo-)politics.
It doesn't seem like a good idea to leave a fatal flaw, which makes us blind to the value of cooperation, in the theoretical foundations of how we conduct international politics.
1/ How can I put this?
"Expected utility maximizers don't maximize utility."
Why? Because utility is not usually an ergodic quantity in the mathematical models used by economists, and maximizing its expected value doesn't mean much in the real world.
2/ I've written a blog post about this with @hulme_oliver, where we spell out the mathematics and give you an interactive app.
Try it out for yourself. Maximizing expected utility destroys actual utility. ergodicityeconomics.com/2025/05/28/exp…
3/ What does that mean?
I would say it means that this core concept of orthodox economics -- utility -- is meaningless and misleading.
But don't take my word for it - this is known: empirically, expected-utility theory and its descendants like prospect theory etc don't work.
1/thread🧵
Almost 20 years ago, I started thinking about the ergodicity problem in the context of economics. That turned out to be surprisingly fruitful, and now there's a book about it.
This work soon attracted the attention of some extraordinary thinkers. I had met them because we were all members of the community around the Santa Fe Institute @sfiscience. Among them were Murray Gell-Mann, Ken Arrow, Reuben Hersh, and Cormac McCarthy.
I benefited immensely from their encouragement and their generosity with their time.
1/9 I read @davidbessis book last year. It's brilliant!
It brought back many memories of conversations with Reuben Hersh, who is briefly mentioned.
Mathematics as a human creative act, not as axioms, deductions, and finally theorems. Seeing the answer, and using logic to check.
2/ Pappus wrote (paraphrased by Polya).
'Analysis:' start from what is required (the result) and trace it back to something you know to be true.
'Synthesis:' reverse the process and walk back to the result.
The human process is analysis: see the result, then understand how you know it.
But we write too much synthesis.
3/ @davidbessis emphasizes the most valuable aspect of mathematics: learning to educate our intuition.
This leads him to a critique of Kahneman's System 1 (intuition) and System 2 (logical mechanical 'thought').
System 1 is not fixed. The whole point is to change it: David's System 3.
In the social context, the ensemble is usually a population, and the ergodicity question becomes this: does the average over the population represent what happens to the typical individual over time?
So this is about the relationship between collectives and individuals.
You may think: whatever is good for the collective must be good for the individual because the collective is made up of individuals.
In economics, that corresponds to working with "the representative agent," and it's precisely the ergodicity error.
Let's make a list of people who have discovered problems in economics.
Feel free to add your own favorites.
@ThomasHerndon1: as a graduate student exposed the Reinhart and Rogoff paper, which had had trillion-dollar austerity consequences around the world, as jaw-droppingly flawed.
@StephanieKelton: exposed that the public narrative about the mechanics of the monetary system, which is also taught in economics departments, has little to do with the mechanics of the monetary system.