Now to explain why Ham radio guys can be a whole lot more useful that academic & archival historians** for EW -- the 2 August 1939, LZ130 Graf Zeppelin flight.
**Note: Every field has it's weak points. Extremely few academic tract historians are radio geeks... 2/
...and being a radio geek is a better skill set for the subject matter than most PhD's not awarded to Dr Alfred Price.
LZ130 flew one of the first ELINT missions ever, against the UK Chain Home system with 25 RF engineers aboard. 3/
along with the engineers, LZ130 had broadband radio receivers covering 2 -100 MHz.
Luftwaffe General Wolfgang Martini thought that the British CH towers might be radar and put together this flight and an earlier on in May 1940.
Neither found radar. 4/
The German engineers believed that Britain was developing radars in the same 100-150 MHz
range as Germany, so the team concentrated on that band.
Up to this point, we are in the "standard narrative" historiography. 5/
This is where Adam Farson being a Ham radio guy comes in for "non-standard" history.
He understands the affect of the Mains cycle or powerline hum.
...in why General Martini's boffins missed the CH signal.
The Luftwaffe signals boffins picked up pulsed signals of CH modulated by 'mains hum' in the 20-50 MHz range, but discounted these as ionosonde signals or mains powerline hum from the UK national grid. 7/
According to Mr. Farson, the British grid was synchronous.
To avoid grid electromagnetic interference (EMI) interference, the 250 kW peak pulse CH transmitters were keyed from different points on the 50 Hz mains cycle to avoid co-channel interference between stations.
8/
This clever synchronization scheme of the CH radar builders to avoid the UK National Grid's mains cycle/powerline hum from screwing up their radar ended up camouflaging the CH signal from the Luftwaffe radar signals intercept boffins.
9/
Where have you heard that bit of electronic warfare history in the "Battle of Britain" narrative?
Even Dr Alfred Price and Dr. R. V. Jones missed this one.
/End
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This 2023 post is where I posed the question of how large Russian riverine/littoral/brown water logistical efforts were to support Russian occupation forces in southern Ukraine. 3/
Given the massive Ukrainian victory in the "Battle of the Azov Sea."
We can say Ukraine has achieved “Usable Drone Air Superiority" over the Sea of Azov in exactly the way the Chinese would in the waters around, & air over, Taiwan when it invades.
🧵
The "Battle of the Azov Sea" shares a lot of historical elements of both the WW2 "Battle of the Bismarck Sea" and the slaughter of Allied oil tankers in 1942 during Operation Drumbeat (Paukenschlag) and Operation Neuland.
2/
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was the slaughter of 12 ships of a 16 ship Imperial Japanese convoy of eight IJA freighters and eight IJN destroyers moving 6,900 IJA troops.
Tipped off by IJN seaplane deployments & radio intercepts, only 2,700 IJA troops arrived w/o weapons or ammo.
3/
I asked @grok to document this Russian policy of atrocity at the link, excerpt:
"February 24, 2022–present (Full-scale Russian invasion): The scale escalated dramatically. As of May 2026, the WHO had verified more than 3,000 attacks on healthcare via its Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA). A coalition of organizations (including PHR, eyeWitness, Truth Hounds, etc.) documented ~3,095 attacks, with 1,632 damaging or destroying hospitals and clinics"
When I've talked about the legacy of Soviet industrial gigantism (one big factory) making Putin era Russia far more vulnerable to a drone strategic bombing campaign.
I've talked about this vulnerability in a couple of previous threads. Here is a shorter one:
Putin's decades long "Russian exceptionalism" propaganda campaign, that says WW2 was won on the Eastern Front, has made Russians incapable of seeing this.
There is so much to object to here that I'm going to restate some basic design observations on the FP-5 to clarify how the Russian reflexive control data fed AI slop that is polluting public discussions of the FP-5.
1. The FP-5 Flamingo is about four times the launch weight of a BGM-109 Tomahawk (i.e. ~13,200 lb), and 2-3 times the range (i.e. ~1,620 nmi) while carrying twice the warhead mass (i.e. ~2,000 lb).
2/
2. The FP-5 design concept is modelled on the USAF MGM-13 Mace GLCM as Fire Point told Ukrainian military analysts - but designed with modern technology to be extremely cheap to make (claimed 1/6 the cost of a Tomahawk - likely not counting the engine cost).
The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that in 2026 Ukraine has not only replicated, but likely exceeded, the 2018 capabilities of the USAF's Stand-off Munitions Activity Center (SMAC) at at Barksdale AFB.