Now to explain why Ham radio guys can be a whole lot more useful that academic & archival historians** for EW -- the 2 August 1939, LZ130 Graf Zeppelin flight.
**Note: Every field has it's weak points. Extremely few academic tract historians are radio geeks... 2/
...and being a radio geek is a better skill set for the subject matter than most PhD's not awarded to Dr Alfred Price.
LZ130 flew one of the first ELINT missions ever, against the UK Chain Home system with 25 RF engineers aboard. 3/
along with the engineers, LZ130 had broadband radio receivers covering 2 -100 MHz.
Luftwaffe General Wolfgang Martini thought that the British CH towers might be radar and put together this flight and an earlier on in May 1940.
Neither found radar. 4/
The German engineers believed that Britain was developing radars in the same 100-150 MHz
range as Germany, so the team concentrated on that band.
Up to this point, we are in the "standard narrative" historiography. 5/
This is where Adam Farson being a Ham radio guy comes in for "non-standard" history.
He understands the affect of the Mains cycle or powerline hum.
...in why General Martini's boffins missed the CH signal.
The Luftwaffe signals boffins picked up pulsed signals of CH modulated by 'mains hum' in the 20-50 MHz range, but discounted these as ionosonde signals or mains powerline hum from the UK national grid. 7/
According to Mr. Farson, the British grid was synchronous.
To avoid grid electromagnetic interference (EMI) interference, the 250 kW peak pulse CH transmitters were keyed from different points on the 50 Hz mains cycle to avoid co-channel interference between stations.
8/
This clever synchronization scheme of the CH radar builders to avoid the UK National Grid's mains cycle/powerline hum from screwing up their radar ended up camouflaging the CH signal from the Luftwaffe radar signals intercept boffins.
9/
Where have you heard that bit of electronic warfare history in the "Battle of Britain" narrative?
Even Dr Alfred Price and Dr. R. V. Jones missed this one.
/End
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
It turns out that, in addition to "TAF-10" USMC SCR-270 radars, the USMC 90mm Heavy AA Battalion SCR-584 radars saw quite a few of the Japanese Balloon Radar Decoys at Okinawa in/near Hagushi Beach, Yonton & Kadena air fields.
The Marine AA troops didn't know what they were, but their descriptions match known aerodynamic templates for them.
The balloon decoy tended to fall through different levels of wind direction & updrafts. So the decoy often went in different directions than the ground wind. 2/
The 1st Marine Provisional Anti-Aircraft Group Hqtrs saw the radar decoy balloons most often when the Japanese engaged in a night time tactic they referred to as "Ice-Tong attacks."
Pairs of Japanese planes established themselves in orbits just outside effective 90mm gun
The one of the previous drawing is of a captured decoy from Roi island in March 1944.
Roi was subject to several IJN air raids using this decoy, as USS New Mexico reported its effects 14 Feb 1944, later reported in a Section 22 Current Statement dated 3 April 1944. 2/
Somehow the report in General Douglas MacArthur's Section 22 radar hunters current statement was scrubbed from all the Feb-March 1944 period after action reports and war diaries of USS New Mexico I've checked.
There is an tragi-comic story behind this Russian foreign ministry claim.
The Russian use the term "direct participation" because of a lie by Chancellor Scholz a year ago when he claimed the computer system used to program the Taurus missiles... 1/
The CO of the top scoring Buk [Nato designation SA-11 Gadfly] battery in the PSU did an interview ~2 years ago (early 2023).
He said they used their own Mavic drones to check that their camouflage and
Zoltan Dani & A2/AD doctrine🧵 1/
...that their battery concealment was good enough to fool Russian drones.
So, the PSU does a drone quality assurance check on its camo during the "hide" phase of the hide-shoot-scoot cycle, AKA you have to survive in order to have the opportunity to shoot enough to become the highest scoring SAM battery.
In contrast, the Russian VKS parks their missile TELARs in the middle of a field to get maximum obstacle clearance and range. Then they are shocked when hit by deep strike assault drone or GMLRS rocket.
In 2005, the Strategypage -dot- com web site had the following on the downing of an F-117 over Serbia.
These tactic are the heart of Ukrainian IADS doctrine.
---
How to Take Down an F-117
November 21, 2005: The Serbian battery commander, whose missiles downed an American F-16, and, most impressively, an F-117, in 1999, has retired, as a colonel, and revealed many of the techniques he used to achieve all this. Colonel Dani Zoltan, in 1999, commanded the 3rd battery of the 250th Missile Brigade. He had search and control radars, as well as a TV tracking unit.
1/
The battery had four quad launchers for the 21 foot long, 880 pound SA-3 missiles. The SA-3 entered service in 1961 and, while it had undergone some upgrades, was considered a minor threat to NATO aircraft. Zoltan was an example of how an imaginative and energetic leader can make a big difference. While Zoltan’s peers and superiors were pretty demoralized with the electronic countermeasures NATO (especially American) aircraft used to support their bombing missions, he believed he could still turn his ancient missiles into lethal weapons
2/
The list of measures he took, and the results he got, should be warning to any who believe that superior technology alone will provide a decisive edge in combat. People still make a big difference. In addition to shooting down two aircraft, Zoltan’s battery caused dozens of others to abort their bombing missions to escape his unexpectedly accurate missiles. This is how he did it.