Don't get me wrong: Carr definitely talks about Realism in the text. But the text is about much more than that (as he writes in Chapter 2)
Carr began the text in the late 1930s. By then, the onset of another war seemed likely: Germany had remilitarized the Rhineland, Japan had invaded Manchuria, Italy conquered Abyssinia, etc, etc.
By the time the book was published in 1939, war in Europe had begun. As Carr states in the preface, his hope was that the book could be instructive for the NEXT peace conference
What lessons did Carr hope to teach those future Peace Conference participants?
Let's go to the end of the text.
He thinks it is important, even necessary, for officials to consider the "social ends" of a policy. If they do so, then they'll see that the country's well being is not determined solely at home.
How can that be done? In Carr's view, it's already happening due to the Great Depression.
The Great Depression made clear that governments can and must step in to address economic hardships.
Notice he mentioned expenditures on armaments. He goes on to say that German expenditures on arms helped its economy during the 1930s and that such expenditures will do so "elsewhere" as other countries rearm (he calls it the rearmament crisis of 1939)
He maintains that "Employment has become more important than profit, social stability than increased consumption, equitable distribution than maximum production." He refers to this as a "revolution."
Hmmm....I'm sensing he's been influenced by reading this guy's work 🤔
Carr acknowledges that while the trend is in this "hopeful" direction, the world isn't there quite yet (he calls his expectation a "utopia").
However, he thinks HIS utopia has a better chance of happening than the "utopia" of a reformed League of Nations.
Why is that? Because his solution recognizes the importance of "power". He acknowledges that none of what he wrote will happen until "the issue of power is settled".
And Carr did indeed emphasize power. See this passage from Chapter 8 (which, in my view, is the epitome of the realist view of world politics)
And in case his point isn't clear, the Chapter's opening should do so
So while Carr thinks power is important (even central) to international politics, he also thinks the lessons of the Great Depression and rearmament are leading the world to a state where power is balanced with "moral considerations".
In sum, I no longer view "The Twenty Year's Crisis" as a book OF Realism. Instead, like any good textbook (and that is what it was), it is a book ABOUT Realism...and a host of other ideas.
To elaborate: Carr thinks states must first settle "the issue of power". Below is again the passage I posted in the main thread.
Nothing "unrealist" in saying that when states solve the issue of power, then peace and harmony will arise. Morgenthau (and other realists) made similar statements.
The key is whether the author thinks world conditions will allow the issue to be settled now or will instead have to wait until some future time.
Given his observations about how the Great Depression is changing (or has already changed) the incentives and goals of governments, it seems that Carr thinks "the power issue" is being settled now (or very, very soon).
There's something else: his views don't seem that far from the views of Norman Angell (which is interesting, given Angell was a target of Carr's). google.com/books/edition/…
Maybe it was a difference in means (liberal capitalism v marxist communism) not end (war will soon be over) that separated Carr and Angell? 🤔
That's a question for another thread.
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Which of these two men is most responsible for World War II?
Short answer: not Churchill
Long answer: [THREAD]
To be clear, in this thread I am dealing with the onset of the war in Europe. The War in Asia was just as important and obviously connected to Europe. But that is for another thread. For now, I do highly recommend Paine's book "The Wars for Asia"
Solving the "Europe Problem" has vexed US foreign policy since the beginning.
[THREAD]
As I wrote last week, a key trait of US "grand strategy" since the founding of the Republic was "Go West" either by expanding US territory west or seeking to maintain trade with China.
Since the founding of the republic, US foreign policy has been about one thing:
Go west (and don't let Europe get in the way).
[THREAD]
I'll write more about "don't let Europe get in the way" in another 🧵. This one will focus on the "Go west" part (which will also touch on the Europe part).
One could go so far as to argue that the Republic itself was founded because of a desire to go west. Specifically, the colonials were forbidden to go west of the 1763 Proclamation line.
When you hear "Liberal International Order", just think "the G-7, for better and for worse"
[THREAD]
While some scholars and policy makers like to speak of the "Liberal International Order" as the collection of post-World War II international institutions.... cambridge.org/core/journals/…
...the phrase itself is much more recent in origins, largely a product of the mid-1990s.
As I wrote in my latest for @WPReview, shifting patterns in population growth will inevitably influence international politics. worldpoliticsreview.com/global-demogra…
This isn't a new idea. It's one found in classic works on change in world politics.