Today the Government introduced a bill to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. This bill differs from the draft bill published in December 2020 in several important respects.
Be warned, this is a mega🧵but for the geeks, hopefully a useful summary of where we are.
The first most visible change is to the bill's title. It no longer refers to repealing the 2011 Act. This responds to an accessibility point raised by the @JointCtteeFTPA.
The Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill is more RONSEAL. It make laws about what it says on the tin.
The second notable change is on election timetabling.
Under the FtPA, dissolution triggers an election.
Under the draft bill, it wouldn't have (on its own).
Witnesses to @JointCtteeFTPA observed this left open a theoretical risk of Governments "governing without Parliament".
In practice, it seemed likely that dissolution would always lead to an election in short order, because (among other things) governments would run out of money without Parliament. But as a matter of constitutional law, there could be a gap of up to 3 years.
Even if (as could be reasonably expected) gov'ts honoured the conventions the distinction between dissolution and calling had knock-on effects for changes to other election-related legislation. As @JointCtteeFTPA pointed out, it meant the Recall of MPs Act wouldn't work properly.
The Government has changed the bill, essentially, to keep this aspect of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act: to make dissolution the formal trigger for an election period. This eliminates the possibility of "dissolution without prompt election" and fixes the knock-on drafting issues.
A third important change is in the Explanatory Notes to the bill. In the original draft bill's ENs, the Gov't referred to the Sovereign dissolving Parliament "on the advice" of the Prime Minister. This language was criticised, as Ministerial "advice" is, by convention, binding.
If, as the Gov't contended, it was seeking to restore the constitutional position that existed before 2011, @JointCtteeFTPA concluded that meant a return to a situation where, exceptionally, the Sovereign could refuse a dissolution. The language of "request" was more appropriate.
The Government appears to have accepted that, in returning to a prerogative system, the PM "requests" a dissolution rather than "advises" it and that the Sovereign's veto is therefore real, albeit one that will almost never be exercised. The new Explanatory Notes use "request".
In several respects, the bill remains exactly or substantially the same as its December draft. It still:
(a) reverts to a prerogative system (cl 1-2)
(b) includes the same "ouster clause" (cl 3)
(c) ties Parliament's maximum term to when it first meets (cl 4)
If you want to read more about the Dissolution and Calling of Parliaments Bill, check out:
Finally, if you want to keep tabs on the progress of the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill, keep on the look-out for a @commonslibrary briefing paper from my excellent colleague Richard soon, and follow @CommonsPACAC and @HLConstitution for their scrutiny too.
[ENDS]
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Something worth bearing in mind. The Supreme Court, last year, gave a judgment on a double Bill reference, on the UNCRC and ECLSG Bills.
It rejected a @scotgov argument that Holyrood could legislate with words clearly beyond competence, then ask the courts to "read it down". 🧵
In the judgment, Lord Reed placed great weight on the fact that the Scotland Act has an established set of mechanisms for "vetting" Bills for legislative competence, including the promoter's and the Presiding Officers' competence statements on introduction.
An attempt to refer a potential, but unintroduced, Bill might face obstacles based on a similar line of reasoning: that the Scotland Act provides a specific mechanism (a bill reference before Royal Assent under s33) and that informs the scope of Schedule 6 "devolution issues".
This is an important thread, not just for #indyref2 but also for the wider role of the UK Supreme Court in accepting and determining references on disputes about devolution and devolved competence.
Normally, the UK Supreme Court operates as an appellate court. Parties appeal against decisions taken by lower courts, and they uphold or overturn them.
The devolution settlements slightly broaden this role, to allow both "bill references" and "devolution issue references". 2/x
Bill references allow legislation agreed by the devolved legislature to be vetted by the UKSC for "competence" issues.
Devolution issue references normally allow disputed points about devolved competence, forming part of another dispute, to be preliminarily settled. 3/x
It is often claimed, wrongly, that "the constitution" is a reserved matter (i.e. something that only the UK Parliament can pass legislation about).
This has never been the case.
Even to try to do that would make no sense. (1/x)
Why? Because then you'd have to define or describe the extent and limits of what the UK constitution is.
Why's that a problem? Because it isn't codified!
Such a situation would be fraught with ambiguities. What counts as constitutional and what doesn't? (2/x)
When the Labour Government in 1997-98 first introduced the Scotland Bill, they did actually propose to reserve "the constitution" (see the original Schedule 5 below).
They quickly realised this was (as a matter of clarity) a dreadful way to frame the devolution statute. (3/x)
Ratification of a Future Relationship Treaty by the UK [THREAD]
The UK Government cannot ratify a treaty with the EU unless and until it has complied with, or disapplied, Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act [1/x]
The default rule is that the Government has to lay a copy of any treaty it reaches with an international organisation. It then has to give Parliament 21 joint sitting days to scrutinise the treaty.
That means both Commons and Lords must be sitting for each of those 21 days [2/x]
How long is 21 joint sitting days? The Commons is only expected to sit Monday-Thursday each week for the rest of 2020.
Parliament usually is in recess (at least) between Christmas and New Year.
This leaves only 15 Commons sitting days in December (1-3, 7-10, 14-17, 21-24) [3/x]
Both the Advocate General for Scotland and the Attorney General have argued in recent days, that section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides a precedent for the UK legislating contrary to its international obligations.
[THREAD] [1/15]
The Government's argument seems to be that this illustrates both how:
(a) domestic law and international law sometimes come into conflict; and
(b) this sometimes justifies Ministers acting contrary to international law and/or Parliament legislating contrary to it. [2/15]
Specifically, they point to section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This provision imposed a new obligation on Ministers when introducing a Bill before Parliament.
A Minister has to make one of two statements, in writing, when they are introducing a Bill. [3/15]
The default rule about "commencement regulations" is that they are made by a Minister without any form of Parliamentary approval. By default, that is what would happen with clauses 42, 43 and 45 (the ones that break, and enable the Government further to break, international law).
This amendment would mean that the commencement regulations for each of those sections is subject to a further vote by the @HouseofCommons. A motion would have to specify which sections were coming into force and on what date.