One of the critiques of my immigration proposal in “C,A” of multi-tiered citizenship is that it is not novel; it exists in many countries. I see that point. But it focuses only on the end point of the analysis and not on how I get there, which is important.
My tiered citizenship is derived against the background of desirable full mobility of labor (worldwide), existence of citizenship premium, defense by that premium by indigenous populations, and trade-off between migration and migrants' rights (faced by indigenous population).
So to come to the tiered citizenship I go through all these steps which are important in order to understand the logic of the proposal; but also to see what would change if one of these steps were to changed (e.g. if the premium goes down; if the trade-off becomes sharper etc).
In that part I also argue that citizenship is becoming "degrounded"; that we could have a situation such that all citizens of A live in other countries & receive income earned in other countries, while only Bs live in country A. Citizenship is revealed to be an "ideal" category.
Degroundedness means that one can be US citizen, live in Europe, receive US social security income whose origin is tax on US investment in the Philippines. So neither is the citizen living in his country, nor is income he gets earned in his country.
As degroundedness becomes more common, it reveals that the old-fashioned citizenship: living in one's country, working there, earning income there, participating in political life there, becomes increasingly irrelevant. This is why citizenship is just an "ideal" category.
Degroundedness is something new and shows us that in globalization the concept of citizenship has gone far from the one of the 19th C, or even of Aristotle's. Has implication for political life too.
It is instructive to read Tocqueville and Marx discuss the 1848 revolution. It does not often happen to have two such heavyweights describe the same events as they happen (w/o a historical "recul").
Marx's "18th Brumaire" was written in 1852,
journal articles (collected in "The Class struggles in France") as the revolution occurred; Tocqueville's "Souvenirs" in 1850.
Both agree in the sociological analysis of Louis Phillippe's rule. They disagree on June 1848 when workers' demonstrations were crushed.
T's book is memoirs; so it is more personal and is written from the point of view of a participant.
It is probably better written than Marx's, but is weaker in the overall social dimension, perhaps because it ends too early, before Louis Napoleon's coup.
The most interesting points from the paper by Yang, Novokmet and @BrankoMilan on China elite's transformation 1988-2013 forthcoming in British Journal of Sociology. wid.world/wp-content/upl…
"The percentage of people among the top [richest] 5 percent whose incomes are private sector related increased from 5% in 1988 to almost 40% in 2013."
"The rising importance of private and individual
business owners among the top 5% is due to an overall increase in the numbers of capitalists, who also tend to be much richer than the average person, rather than the product of an exceptional enrichment of business owners as such"
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The table below is useful to situate Western income distribution within global income distribution and to realize the problems linked with the idea of degrowth (i.e., of keeping global income fixed).
Column 1 shows that an average-income WENAO citizen is about three times as rich as an average person in the world ($52/$16=3.2), and the median income WENAO person is about 6 times better off than the global median person ($41/$7).
Column 2 shows that a median-income WENAO person is at the 90-91 global percentile. If the entire world were to be "allowed" to have income of the median WENAO person, world total GDP would have to rise 2.6 times ($41/$16).
The Super League illustrates another problem. It is very difficult to explain what is the issue with the SL to some of my American friends b/c the sports in the US have historically been organized along entirely different lines from the rest of the world.
There were at least 2 big differences:
- No internationalism; all American games are only between the Americans. Explaining that FIFA is like the UN (UEFA like a European UN), and that the Super League is akin to officially quitting the UN is perhaps a useful parallel.
--History. In purely organizational terms soccer was ruled by gentlemen-amateur, then by national federations (political bodies) and over the time acquired hugely localized political/social importance which is now eroded by globalization and extreme commercialization.
The great success of unfettered capitalism is how many people have totally accepted as obvious the argument that whoever has the money has the right to decide on the rules and do whatever he likes.
Moreover, it is made without people fully realizing what they are saying.
1) When Twitter decided to ban people it did not like, many said, "it is a private company, it can do whatever it wants: if you do not like it go elsewhere".
2) When Bezos bought the Washington Post, many said, "he can buy whatever he likes and decide what they write. If you do not like it, read something else."
The difficulty of discussion w/ @jasonhickel comes also from the fact that he just does not *know* things about which he writes. He is right that today's GDP does not include non-marketed activities. But this is less obvious for the past. He seems to imagine that in 1820 England
Zambia and Peru had statistical offices that calculated GDP according to today's rules and excluded then quite sizeable non-market activities. But this is of course not true. There are no statistical offices and GDP methodology until late 1940s and early 1950s or even 1960s.
Historical GDPs are calculated based on assessments of arable land, yields, some info on people's consumption patterns, and data on production on a few manufactured goods. Such an approach which, in agriculture, does not depend on marketization but on physical production can...