Do wealthier households save a larger share of their incomes than poorer ones?
I suspect most people's prior is that the answer is "yes." Turns out that's incorrect, or rather: things are considerably more subtle, at least in our Norwegian wealth tax registry data.
A short 🧵:
The 🧵 is based on a major revision of "Saving Behavior Across the Wealth Distribution: The Importance of Capital Gains", which is joint with @AndreasFagereng@BlomhoffHolm & @GNatvik
Why do saving rates matter? Answer: for (i) secular trends in income & wealth inequality and (ii) how such distributional shifts feed back to macro aggregates
If we measure saving net of capital gains, i.e. "net" or "active saving", then saving rates are flat across the wealth distribution, i.e., the rich do *not* actively save a larger share of their incomes than the poor.
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At the same time, saving rates *including capital gains* increase strongly with wealth.
Why? Wealthier households own assets that experience capital gains which they hold onto instead of selling them off to consume.
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Also here's what saving rates look like in different years 2005-2015: in all years "net or active" saving rates are flat & vary little, while saving rates incl capital gains fluctuate lots depending on asset markets (e.g. it's way down in 2008, also note the different scales)
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Aside: the flat active saving rates are v different from what Saez & @gabriel_zucman found using "synthetic" saving rates. Instead our results are more in line with Smith @omzidar Zwick's attenuated saving rate disparities and more important role for asset price changes.
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What's going on?
We show that our findings are actually consistent with completely standard models of wealth accumulation with homothetic preferences under one additional assumption: rising asset prices are accompanied by declining asset returns rather than rising cashflows.
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Intuitively, when asset prices rise even though cashflows do not, richer households do not experience a larger income effect than poorer ones and therefore consume approximately the same fraction of their disposable incomes. See Proposition 1.
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Part of the booming asset prices of recent years are due to falling interest/discount rates. That this probably matters for wealth distribution is also catching on -- see the great work of @ProfGreenwald@HannoLustig@SVNieuwerburgh, Gomez & Gouin-B
We do some counterfactuals to flesh out the implications. We conclude that saving rate heterogeneity across wealth groups is not likely to be an important contributor to changes in aggregate saving and the wealth distribution, but capital gains are.
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Now a final important point: some of you may now think "oh, in that case these capital gains and the accompanying changes in wealth distribution are just welfare-irrelevant paper gains."
Takeaway same as here: the macro, wealth inequality and PF literatures need to consider changing asset prices with more care. Fortunately this has started to happen, see e.g. the great work of @cmtneztt, @kuhnmo@schularick & Steins
🤓 Nerd tweet for the heterogeneous-agent macro crowd
You like sequence-space Jacobians? But you also like working in continuous time?
Then I have just the thing for you! 🤓
Two very nice recent papers and some code:
1. René Glawion's very nice continuous-time implementation of the @a_auclert @BardoczyBence Rognlie @ludwigstraub sequence-space method:
- “Sequence-Space Jacobians in Continuous Time”
- GitHub repository with codes papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf… github.com/reneglawion/Se…
2. @AdrienBilal and Shlok Goyal's paper on the same topic
- "Some Pleasant Sequence-Space Arithmetic in Continuous Time"
It's about Bob's incredible gift as a writer and his generosity toward his students.
It's the fall of 2009 and I'm a grad student at the University of Chicago. Bob is on my thesis committee.
I've just finished a first draft of my job market paper with which I will be applying for assistant professor jobs. I've put *a ton* of work into the paper and I'm pretty happy with it overall. I email it to Bob asking whether he could take a look, hoping for some verbal comments
Below is what it looked like at the time.
A day later Bob emails me back saying "Come by my office, I've got some minor comments."
Here is a collection of some of the most extreme doomsday predictions. Two reasons:
- provide a benchmark to which to compare the substantial economic costs 🇩🇪 has seen
- the hope that the worst offenders (particularly those with ulterior motives) will lose some credibility
1. @BASF CEO Martin Brudermüller said an end to Russian gas would cause "the largest economic crisis since World War II" adding "Do we knowingly want to destroy our entire economy?"
My reason for taking another shot at explaining this: if people don't understand the policy, then it won't work as intended. So communication is key. Just as @R2Rsquared writes here.
Main points: this is
- a lump-sum scheme
- NOT a price cap / subsidy
- NOT a non-linear pricing scheme, e.g. a cap on 80% of past consumption
-- > people can save a lot of money on their energy bills by reducing their gas consumption also below 80%