Thread: On polarization, “consensus,” and multiracial democracy in American history.
I’m writing a book about the idea of “polarization” and how it has shaped recent American history. @JakeMGrumbach is making a crucial point here, and I’d like to add a few thoughts: 1/
First of all, @JakeMGrumbach is right: Political “consensus” was usually based on a bipartisan agreement to leave the discriminatory social order intact and deny marginalized groups equal representation and civil rights. A white male elite consensus was the historical norm. 2/
The frequently invoked “consensus” of the post-World War II era, for instance, was depending on both parties agreeing that white patriarchal rule would remain largely untouched. “Civility” was the modus operandi between elites who adhered to that order. 3/
By the 1960s, however, white elite consensus had fractured and America split over the question of whether or not the country should become a multiracial democracy: a system in which all citizens count equally and elect a representative government with majoritarian rules. 4/
Over time, one party came to advocate this liberal, multiracial version of democracy – while the other is committed to do whatever it takes to prevent what conservatives believe would be the downfall of “real” (read: white Christian patriarchal) America. 5/
It was not at all a coincidence that “polarization” started when one party decided to break with this white elite consensus and support the civil rights legislation of the 60s. 6/
In many ways, “polarization” is the price U.S. society has had to pay for real progress towards multi-racial democracy – there is absolutely no need for polarization-induced nostalgia. 7/
Unfortunately, that type nostalgia is exactly what characterizes much of the broader polarization discourse. For proponents of a centrist realignment in American politics, in particular, “polarization” is the great evil, the root cause of all that plagues the country… 8/
…and a return to a golden age of consensus (the 1950s!) is the goal – a supposedly better time before radical activists and a mean cancel culture threatened peace and prosperity (and it is really quite telling that much of the anti-polarizers’ ire is focused on “the Left”). 9/
But it’s not just journalists and pundits who fall for consensus nostalgia – it is quite prevalent in the work of political scientists and historians as well who have adopted the “polarization” concept as the framework for their analysis. 10/
For a longer discussion of the pitfalls of using #polarization as a governing historical or political paradigm and the challenges of writing a (pre-)history of the polarized present, see my @ModAmHist piece from 2019. 11/
In short, telling the history of recent decades as a story of polarization tends to create a narrative of the American polity in decline. “Polarization” is almost always used as a pejorative term: it is meant to invoke dysfunction, instability, conflict. 12/
The terminology suggests that the status quo ante against which the polarized decades since the 1970s are measured was one of unity and order. The polarization interpretation, almost by definition, casts the “consensus” of the postwar era in a problematically favorable light. 13/
The implied nostalgia for a supposedly better, pre-polarization era shines through even in generally excellent work, such as Steven Levitsky’s and Daniel Ziblatt’s investigation of “How Democracies Die.” /14
Levitsky and Ziblatt provide a convincing dissection of how the pre-1960s “consensus” was based on racial exclusion and depended on a cross-party agreement amongst white men to leave white supremacy intact. 15/
And yet, in the end, the authors still combine a warning against the dangers of polarization with praise for the mid-twentieth-century consensus era that was supposedly characterized by “egalitarianism, civility, sense of freedom.” (p. 231) 16/
Historians are not at all immune to the misleading nostalgia that often comes with the polarization framework. Let’s look at Jill Lepore’s grand retelling of U.S. history in “These Truths,” for instance. 17/
Lamenting the end of a “midcentury era of political consensus,” Lepore diagnoses “division, resentment, and malice” as the animating forces in American politics since the late 1960s. 18/
In her interpretation, “wrenching polarization” brought “the Republic to the brink of a second civil war” and shaped America “to the detriment of everyone.” (quotes on p. 633, 658, 546) But what if it did not? “Everyone” is certainly doing some heavy lifting here… 19/
Bottom line: Let’s be more critical about a paradigm that can’t distinguish between the fact that, in a vacuum, unity is good—and the fact that in the reality of American history, consensus politics always stifled necessary change and real political and social advancements. 20/
If the goal is to capture the central development in recent history and the crucial threat to democracy as precisely as possible, we need to de-emphasize the concept of “polarization” and instead foreground the radicalization of the conservative movement and the GOP. /end
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Sunday reading: Why the Extremists Took Over on the Right
I wrote about the escalating sense of besiegement that has fueled the rise of dangerous people and truly radical ideas that fully define the Right today.
This week’s piece (link below):
We have been talking a lot - and with good reason - about the “crisis of liberal democracy.” But in crucial ways, it is the conception of “real America” as a white Christian patriarchal homeland that has come under enormous pressure. That’s why the Right is freaking out.
Socially, culturally, and – most importantly, perhaps – demographically, the country has moved away from the rightwing ideal since the middle of the twentieth century. As a result, the conservative hold on power has become tenuous.
Fear of a pluralizing America is fueling a radicalization out of a sense of weakness and besiegement.
Some thoughts from my new piece (link below):
🧵
What is America? Who gets to belong? How much democracy, and for whom? Those have always been contested issues. But the fact that this struggle now overlaps so clearly with party lines is the result of a rather recent reconfiguration.
That is the fundamental reality of U.S. politics: National identity and democracy have become partisan issues. This existential dimension of the conflict between Democrats and Republicans overshadows all other considerations, it shapes all areas of U.S. politics.
In the MAGA imagination, America is simultaneously threatened by outsiders – invaders who are “poisoning the blood” of the nation, as Trump has put it – and by the “enemy within.” The core promise of Trumpism is to purge those inherently connected “threats.”
To the Trumpists, the “enemy within” - those radical “leftists” and “globalists” – are as acutely dangerous as the invaders from without.
In order to restore the nation to former glory, to Make America Great Again, it has as to be “purified” – the enemies have to be purged.
According to the Trumpists, only the providential leader can guide the nation to its re-birth and former glory – “Only I,” Trump loves to say. The rightwing base is all in on this, fiercely loyal to Trump personally, bound to him by a cult of personality.
What does the U.S. look like in five or ten years?
I was asked to reflect on this question, alongside other scholars. In a stable democracy, the range of plausible outcomes is narrow. But for America, it now includes complete democratic breakdown.
There should not have been any doubt about the intention of the Trumpists. They desire to erect a form of plebiscitary autocracy, constantly invoking the true “will of the people” while aggressively narrowing the boundaries of who gets to belong and whose rights are recognized.
At every turn, the response to the rise of Trumpism has been hampered by a lack of political imagination – a lingering sense that “It cannot happen here” (or not anymore), fueled by a deep-seated mythology of exceptionalism, progress gospel, and willful historical ignorance.
I wrote about why even critical observers underestimated the speed and scope of the Trumpist assault, why they overestimated democratic resilience – about what America is now, and what comes next?
New piece (link below)
I take stock of where we are after two months of Trumpist rule, explore that space between (no longer) democracy and full-scale autocracy where America exists now, reflect on what competitive authoritarianism means in theory and practice, and recalibrate my expectations.
I revisit “The Path to Authoritarianism,” a crucial essay Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way published in Foreign Affairs in early February. It captured their expectations at the outset of the Trumpist regime – a powerful warning that has nevertheless been overtaken by events already.
People who claim Zelensky was at fault yesterday and should have been more “diplomatic” or “respectful” are either deliberately propagating the Trumpist attack line – or they fundamentally misunderstand what the Trumpist project is and who is now in power in the United States.
There is this pervasive idea that Trump doesn’t really mean it, has no real position, and can therefore be steered and manipulated by tactical and diplomatic finesse; or maybe he’s just a businessman looking for a great deal. But that’s all irrelevant here.
Trump himself has been very consistent about his preference for foreign autocrats, especially Putin, and his (at best) disinterest and siding with Ukraine and (actually) explicit antagonism towards not only Zelensky, but Europe’s democracies more generally.