Have you ever wondered how the Chinese Communist Party's censorship regime works at home and abroad? What follows is a short thread 🧵 /1
The CCP's sharp power works with the help of the *simultaneous* use of carrots and sticks. In my book "The Struggle for Democracy in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong" I called the carrots rule by bribery and the sticks rule by fear /2
A key instrument is the psychological warfare technique of ‘decomposition’ (Zersetzung) against domestic and international opponents of the regime /3
The CCP's threatening posture leads to imagined and / or realistic fear among members of the target audience. The result is individual and institutional self-censorship. Why is self-censorship so corrosive? /4
People start worrying about upsetting Chinese partner organisations / funders; fear putting colleagues / family / friends in China at risk; and / or fear losing access to China. Such conflict avoidance means that individuals are afraid to ‘live in truth’ (Václav Havel) /5
Another outcome of censorship is enforced silence. Open discourse about China is seen as a dangerous act. Victims of CCP censorship need to justify silence to avoid cognitive dissonance. And those who do not want to be silent are likely to feel guilty (internal dilemma) /6
Yet there are also those who want to continue to collaborate with “official China” regardless of the political limitations. When there are no red lines to such an unconditional engagement, however, we can observe highly problematic coping strategies /7
Coping strategy 1: Wilfully playing down valid empirical evidence in order to appease Chinese authorities /8
Coping strategy 2: An alternative excuse is claim to discuss sensitive issues behind ‘closed doors’ only /9
Ultimately, the political and psychological costs of the CCP's censorship are enormous /11
It leads to the open or tacit support for ‘official China’ (represented by the party-state) and the marginalisation of ‘unofficial China’ (by which I mean Chinese citizens who seek autonomy from the CCP and who no longer accept its rule by fear) /12
Acceptance of the CCP's censorship normalises the Chinese party-state /13
There is subsequently also no empathy and no solidarity with the many victims of CCP rule /14
Acceptance of the CCP's political censorship also leads to a denial of the values of one’s own socialisation process and the lowering of one’s own standards /15
And another impact of not mounting any resistance to political censorship is that one loses the respect of the Chinese Communist Party, which leads to an encouragement for even more aggressive behaviour /16
To a certain extent we are all victims of the CCP's totalitarian rule. But we don't have to accept this predicament. I firmly believe that we can overcome political censorship through solidarity and collective action /17
Did I perhaps overlook some important aspects related to the phenomenon of the CCP's censorship regime? Do you agree or disagree? What can we do beyond standing in solidarity with one another to overcome CCP censorship? Your comments and reflections are most welcome /End
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Folks need to understand that elite capture / strategic corruption is real: in the 🇺🇸, in 🇪🇺 , wherever you look. For too long we assumed that our democratic institutions could withstand the onslaught of corporate and foreign government lobbying / influence / interference /1
What started with the Schroederisation of politics has now morphed into institutional corruption. This is the inconvenient truth, the 🐘 in the room. We now not only need strengthened 🇪🇺 military capabilities but also national and transnational movements against corruption /2
Self-serving European elites contributed to today’s mess just as much as the true believers of the MAGA movement. Both have major blind spots, just different ones. The resulting #hypernormalisation prevents necessary reforms aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability /3
German strategic culture remains stuck in the outdated paradigm of economic interdependence. Although 'change through trade' has been discredited, no new strategic framework has emerged to take its place. This shift would require not only new ideas but also fresh leadership /1
I was intrigued by Johannes Volkmann @jbvolkmann, a 27-year-old candidate for the German Bundestag. As the grandson of the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, he may come to represent a new generation of German politicians /2 hessenschau.de/politik/johann…
I noted with great interest that he has an academic background in Contemporary Chinese Studies from Oxford, complemented by his year spent in 🇨🇳 at both Tongji University and Peking University. He appears to possess the much-needed 'China competence.' /3 johannes-volkmann.de/uebermich/
Warum strebt der "treueste Verbündete des Kanzlers" (Mona Jaeger in der FAZ, 5.2.2025, ) Wolfgang Schmidt @W_Schmidt_ ein Bundestagsmandat an? Kann er sich wirklich von @Bundeskanzler Scholz emanzipieren? Ich habe da so meine Zweifel. Ein kurzer 🧵/1 archive.is/G4Xk5
"Seit 2002 arbeitet Schmidt für Scholz," schreibt Mona Jaeger, "er war sein Büroleiter zu Generalsekretärszeiten, sein Stabschef als Arbeitsminister, Staatssekretär im Finanzministerium, dann als Kanzleramtsminister Organisator der Ampelkoalition" /2 faz.net/aktuell/politi…
In der NZZ wurde ein Oppositionspolitiker zitiert, der Schmidt als «Machtabsicherungsapologet» bezeichnete. Es gehe darum, Scholz gegen Kritik in Schutz zu nehmen. Er ziehe ausserdem "einen Schutzwall um Scholz, intransparent und unkontrollierbar." /3 archive.is/Kh1fH#selectio…
I would find op-eds in favour of China engagement more convincing if they would not rest on logical fallacies. @Bkerrychina's article "Labour is right to forge more trade links with China – not doing so would be folly" is a case in point. A short 🧵 /1 theguardian.com/commentisfree/…
Brown rightly points out that in the past decade or so the UK's approach to China has not been very consistent. But in my view he also frames the ongoing policy debates in terms of a false choice: as if we either have to choose between (naive) engagement or (full) decoupling /2
The point of contention is also not that Reeves went to China. German foreign minister @al_baerbock did the same. But she also had a robust public exchange with her Chinese counterpart Qin Gang. Reeves was much more deferential to the CCP. And that deserves to be critiqued /3
Five facts you need to know about 'Ilha Formosa' (美麗之島), the stunningly beautiful island-state also known as Taiwan. In this 🧵 I explain why it is in all of our interests that democratic 🇹🇼 is safeguarded against military annexation by 🇨🇳 - now and in the future /1
In the following I will assess Taiwan's turbulent history; offer reflections about sovereignty, trade, identity formation; and address the island-state's geo-economic and geo-strategic importance for the free and democratic world. But first let us rewind a bit /2
People in Taiwan have struggled against outside rule for centuries. The Dutch (1624–1662) had a colony in the south, whilst the Spanish ruled in the north (1626–1642). Uprisings by indigenous people (原住民; Lamey Island massacre) or Han settlers were violently suppressed /3
Annalena Baerbock oder Robert Habeck? Wer hat es geschafft, Olaf Scholz in der Chinapolitik zu einem realistischeren Kurs zu bewegen? Ein 🧵 mit meiner Bewertung nach drei Jahren Ampel-Koalition /1
In ihrem Buch 'Ende der China-Illusion' (Piper, 2023) hat Oertel darauf hingewiesen, dass es in der außenpolitischen Forschung eher unüblich sei, "Haltungsnoten für Entscheidungsträger:innen" zu verteilen. Ich halte das jedoch für notwendig, um politische Führung zu bewerten /2
In den letzten drei Jahren haben sich zwei Grünen-Politiker in der deutschen Chinapolitik besonders verdient gemacht: Habeck und Baerbock. Welche Akzente haben sie jeweils gesetzt? Wem ist es gelungen, die Konturen einer neuen deutschen strategischen Kultur stärker zu prägen? /3