Have you ever wondered how the Chinese Communist Party's censorship regime works at home and abroad? What follows is a short thread 🧵 /1
The CCP's sharp power works with the help of the *simultaneous* use of carrots and sticks. In my book "The Struggle for Democracy in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong" I called the carrots rule by bribery and the sticks rule by fear /2
A key instrument is the psychological warfare technique of ‘decomposition’ (Zersetzung) against domestic and international opponents of the regime /3
The CCP's threatening posture leads to imagined and / or realistic fear among members of the target audience. The result is individual and institutional self-censorship. Why is self-censorship so corrosive? /4
People start worrying about upsetting Chinese partner organisations / funders; fear putting colleagues / family / friends in China at risk; and / or fear losing access to China. Such conflict avoidance means that individuals are afraid to ‘live in truth’ (Václav Havel) /5
Another outcome of censorship is enforced silence. Open discourse about China is seen as a dangerous act. Victims of CCP censorship need to justify silence to avoid cognitive dissonance. And those who do not want to be silent are likely to feel guilty (internal dilemma) /6
Yet there are also those who want to continue to collaborate with “official China” regardless of the political limitations. When there are no red lines to such an unconditional engagement, however, we can observe highly problematic coping strategies /7
Coping strategy 1: Wilfully playing down valid empirical evidence in order to appease Chinese authorities /8
Coping strategy 2: An alternative excuse is claim to discuss sensitive issues behind ‘closed doors’ only /9
Ultimately, the political and psychological costs of the CCP's censorship are enormous /11
It leads to the open or tacit support for ‘official China’ (represented by the party-state) and the marginalisation of ‘unofficial China’ (by which I mean Chinese citizens who seek autonomy from the CCP and who no longer accept its rule by fear) /12
Acceptance of the CCP's censorship normalises the Chinese party-state /13
There is subsequently also no empathy and no solidarity with the many victims of CCP rule /14
Acceptance of the CCP's political censorship also leads to a denial of the values of one’s own socialisation process and the lowering of one’s own standards /15
And another impact of not mounting any resistance to political censorship is that one loses the respect of the Chinese Communist Party, which leads to an encouragement for even more aggressive behaviour /16
To a certain extent we are all victims of the CCP's totalitarian rule. But we don't have to accept this predicament. I firmly believe that we can overcome political censorship through solidarity and collective action /17
Did I perhaps overlook some important aspects related to the phenomenon of the CCP's censorship regime? Do you agree or disagree? What can we do beyond standing in solidarity with one another to overcome CCP censorship? Your comments and reflections are most welcome /End
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I am not convinced that institutional funding by @AuswaertigesAmt for @merics_eu is such a good thing. China competence sounds great, but we need to understand the multitude of our relationships with China better. This will require a (self-)critical introspection. A short 🧵/1
I am mindful that think tanks need to diversify their funding streams. So I can understand why @merics_eu is happy to accept support also from @AuswaertigesAmt. But there is a catch: when it comes to China policy, the AA has struggled to assert itself vis-à-vis the Chancellery /2
@merics_eu @AuswaertigesAmt Of course @merics_eu could use AA funding to publish more insightful reports about China. But in my view we do not simply need more knowledge about China. In addition, think tanks should regularly assess the state of our relationships with China. But that is quite challenging /3
In #ChinaLeaks (C.H. Beck, 2024) investigative journalist Markus Frenzel uncovers Beijing's secret influence network in Germany. A must-read for those concerned about Western elites' complacency towards the Chinese Communist Party's illegal interference in liberal democracies /1
Frenzel’s book is the result of a two-year investigation with twenty-one journalists across ten countries. It explains the 'friend-enemy' mentality underpinning the CCP's United Front work at home and abroad. It draws on specific examples of elite capture in Germany /2
While making an uncomfortable reading for Chinese citizens on the leaked #UnitedFront list, it is important to recognise the book's focus on political critique rather than racial bias. Frenzel emphasises the need for critical awareness over discrimination /3
Strategic blindness in Germany’s approach to China has led to mounting costs in terms of national sovereignty, economic independence and civil liberties. Learn how entanglement with China erodes Germany's strategic autonomy. A short 🧵/1 rusi.org/explore-our-re…
Beyond the partner, competitor, and systemic rival trifecta. A neo-totalitarian Chinese Communist Party (CCP) threatens freedom, prosperity, and security, at home and abroad /2
Why the CCP struggles against its opponents. A key feature of both Maoism and Stalinism, 'perpetual struggle', informs Xi Jinping's thinking and fuels the party's friend-enemy mentality /3
German China policy remains highly contested 🇩🇪🇨🇳. On the one hand there are the German industrialists representing the interests of the #4BigCorps VW, BMW, Daimler, BASF etc and their defenders of the status quo in politics and academia /1
On the other hand we have a motley crew of independent-minded parliamentarians, journalists & analysts, who would like to see a more principled and assertive German China policy. Thus far the silverbacks are winning. How can we bring about policy change under such conditions? /2
In my newest book "Germany and China: How Entanglement Undermines Freedom, Prosperity and Security" (Bloomsbury, 2024) 📖🇩🇪🇨🇳 I have outlined my theory of change (TOC) /3
On 14 March 2024 the Centre for Finance and Security at @RUSI_org, in partnership with SOC ACE, organised a workshop on the threats faced by 🇩🇪 and 🇬🇧 from hostile state actors. What follows is a short 🧵 with key takeaways from the conference report /1 rusi.org/explore-our-re…
The workshop brought together experts, academics, policymakers from Germany and the UK, private sector representatives, and civil society members /2
State threats are defined as hostile acts orchestrated by foreign governments and proxies that fall short of war but include threats to people, assets, services, information acquisition, interference with democracy, and shaping the international environment /3
Der Einfluss der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas in 🇩🇪 beschränkt sich nicht nur auf die extremen politischen Ränder links und rechts, sondern reicht tief in unser politisches und wirtschaftliches Establishment hinein. Wann wird diese #Elitenkooptierung aufgedeckt? Ein kurzer 🧵 /1
🇨🇳 Einmischung in 🇩🇪 ist schon länger auf der Agenda. Der Fokus liegt aber meist auf bestechliche Politiker. Journalisten haben mir erklärt, dass sich Leser nicht für von Peking kultivierte 🇩🇪 Eliten in Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft interessieren, da sie nicht sehr bekannt seien /2
Die China-Debatte ist stark durch Personen mit Agenda geprägt, wobei nicht immer klar ist, ob aufgeklärte 🇩🇪 Interessen oder die der 🇨🇳 Partei vertreten werden. Es darf uns aber nicht egal sein, wenn von Peking kultivierte 🇩🇪 Eliten unseren Chinadiskurs so stark prägen /3