If you missed it, here's my latest in @TheAtlantic. This is my attempt to carefully outline my position on Gaza and lay out the broader context that brought us here. There are two conflicting narratives. I try to make sense of where they diverge.
If you look at the Gaza crisis in a vacuum—as if there is no history and as if context is irrelevant, you'll come to certain conclusions, but they will be based on misleading premises. The question has to be: why now? And what are the "sources" of the conflict?
There is a danger in talking about "root causes." People will accuse you of justifying Hamas' actions. But it should be possible to do two things—to believe Hamas is committing war crimes, while also recognizing that the current crisis didn't appear from the sky unannounced.
I know for a fact that many who want to speak out about Israel's bombing campaign are reluctant to do so for precisely this reason: the fear that harshly criticizing Israel's actions will be perceived as apologetics for Hamas, a terrorist organization.
If we want to prevent violent conflict or terrorist activity from happening in the future, then we have to understand what drives violent conflict or terrorist activity. This is close to an article of faith among those of us who study violent extremism. And for good reason.
This isn't some leftist thing. Even George W. Bush was a proponent of the "root causes" approach to addressing violence. Instead of saying these are a bunch of crazies who hate us and have to be blown up, he and his top aides began focusing on a different set of questions.
As for Hamas, we know why they're doing this. It isn't some mystery. Hamas is following a traditional rational actor model. That's the tragedy—the various belligerents are acting precisely as we might expect. And that's what proving so destructive.
I'd bet that a lot of people who are saying Israel has a right to defend itself by any means necessary (even if it leads to considerable "collateral damage") weren't even aware of what was happening before the Gaza conflict actually started.
The narratives on Gaza diverge most starkly on self-defense and the occupation. If you see Israel's right to self-defense as the only truly salient issue, this will lead you to certain conclusions.
If, on the other hand, you recognize the centrality of the occupation—and all the tragedy that has flown from it—this will lead to a different set of conclusions. It's not clear to me how anyone can analyze the current Gaza crisis without taking into account the occupation.
Ultimately these two conflicting narratives are irreconcilable. Make of that what you will.
If you missed it, my new @BrookingsFP piece on how Arab regimes mastered the art of not caring about the Palestinians while pretending to care about them. But this isn't new. Decades ago, Anwar el-Sadat was the pioneer of a separate peace
The Trump administration was right that Arab nations could be peeled off the Palestinians one by one, but it was building on an old idea with a storied history. Camp David is almost unanimously seen as Carter's great achievement, but there was a dark side.
For the best account on how Camp David was the first, original step in sidelining the Palestinians, see @SethAnziska's brilliant book based on original archival research—'Preventing Palestine': amazon.com/Preventing-Pal…
In Gaza, the death toll is up to 119, including 31 children. All just in the matter of a few days. This is the "proportional" response we keep hearing about.
In the last Gaza war, which lasted 7 weeks, around 100 of the over 700 Palestinians killed were children. So this is not new. If anything, it could become worse.
Yet Palestinians face indignity not just in life but in death. It's not Israel's fault, according to this particular narrative. Palestinians brought this upon themselves. They are being blamed for being killed.
Israel's "generous offer" to Palestinians is the myth that will never die. I've never met a single Palestinian who thinks the offer was "generous." Presumably what they think matters. Unless one thinks that there's something fundamentally irrational about Palestinians as a people
Israel's "generous offer" was not generous. But once the propaganda started (spread by Bill Clinton to deflect responsibility), it never stopped. I discuss the myth of the generous offer in this essay: theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
I'm glad folks are starting to say the quiet part out loud. It basically comes down to this: Palestinians don't know what's good for them. They're irrational and self-destructive. It's just a couple short steps from that to say that they deserve it. The dehumanization of a people
Israel is not aiming for "proportionality" or trying its best to minimize civilian casualties. The goal is to inflict overwhelming pain on the Palestinians so that they learn their lesson. This isn't new. That's always been at the heart of Israel's deterrence strategy in Gaza 1/x
This from @dbyman is probably the best thing to read on how Israel approaches deterrence. Basically it's an "eye for a tooth." And it may even be understandable from an Israeli perspective. But let's not pretend Israel is trying to protect Palestinians 2/x foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/24/an-…
This part is key:
"Disproportional military operations...are at the core of deterrence, which demands disproportionate 'eye for a tooth' operations to succeed"
I have a new essay that delves deeper into one of my preoccupations—whether "unity" or "consensus" are good things, or whether they are best avoided in democracy. Here's my case against consensus. 1/x
In his address to Congress, Biden said something that stood out to me, because it seemed to misunderstand at a rather fundamental level why democracies are better than autocracies. 2/x
The framing of the problem betrays a technocratic bias—that regime types should be judged based on whether they work. "What works-ism" provides us with a purely instrumental argument, and one that wades into the democracy vs. autocracy contest on autocrats' terms. 3/x
What you'll get is three good friends debating in good faith, trying to figure out how and why they diverge. Based on the conversation, I think that some of our disagreements are foundational, but I mean that in the best way possible. We don't need to agree on the foundation
.@AkyolinEnglish is proposing a particular path that Islam could follow, and the direction that I think Islam will follow is quite a bit different. Depending on which direction you think is preferable and more realistic, there are some major implications for U.S. foreign policy