At a glance it looks vulnerable: an admin provides a string that is used as a key. Anyone that calls a function w/ 1 ETH and the string takes away 30 ETH.
So just find the admin's transaction and copy the string, right?
Wrong. Hidden away in Etherscan is an internal call that updates the string. You can't see the update on Etherscan, but plugging this into ethtx.info makes it clear the correct string has been updated.
Interestingly within hours of deployment a few people tried to exploit this honey pot. Looks like 3 ETH was trapped, and the creator made away with that and their initial 30 ETH.
Should have explained this before, but this is what I meant by find the admin's transaction and plug in the string.
At first glance it must have looked like you just stumbled on a 30 ETH jackpot that someone sloppy deployed!
That string looks like the string that would "solve" the quiz and transfer you the 30 ETH...
Unless it is replaced with a sneaky internal call to new(), which is what happened in the transaction that was hidden away in the contract's internal transactions
Went down a rabbit hole trying to figure out how long this fellow has been doing this honey pot. They've deployed this dozens of times and made way more ETH than I thought.
F in the chat for the people who lost 7 ETH on this one alone!
Today 95% of blocks on Ethereum are built by just two parties. This centralization threatens Ethereum's neutrality and resilience.
BuilderNet provides a decentralized, neutral, and open alternative, and the first release is live today.
The first release is a big step towards decentralized building by introducing "multioperator" building - where many parties can operate the same builder in a TEE, which users can verify. The initial operators are the Beaverbuild, Flashbots, and Nethermind teams.
The most vain searcher on-chain and all the ways they flex 🧵
We're looking at 'bigbrainchad.eth' from the dark forest; a bot that exploits contracts the block after they become vulnerable
Beyond the name and the MEV extraction, they flex on chain in a few ways that you might not have ever seen before
To start, all their transaction hashes start with 0xbeef - a flex I've seen any of the other mempool monsters do where they proof-of-work style mine a transaction hash prefix!
So not only do they extract MEV, they also take the time to mine a vanity hash
A brief thread on a novel MEV searching strategy, where we chase the trail of a mysterious bot backrunning private flow and reveal how they do it.
@blairmarshall pointed out a bot that appears to have private access to user orderflow that was landing bottom-of-the-block blocks on the Flashbots builder. That didn't make sense to me. We don't run backrunning bots! So we investigated.
MEV-Boost payments were at an alltime high yesterday, totaling 7691 ETH (!) which is nearly double the previous ATH of 3928 ETH during the FTX fiasco this fall.
A few statistics on MEV on Ethereum yesterday in this thread
You can't compare stats these 1:1, but the ATH for daily miner profit from mev-geth was 6397 ETH in June 2021. That's the *profit* of running mev-geth vs a vanilla mempool mining client.
A similar metric here would be the difference in payment for validators from running mev-boost or not. There's not a great up to date estimate of this out there I think
You could derive it by looking at the value of the mempool builder we submit (0xa1defa) and the winning block