This article remains the best discussion of the ethical underpinnings of Swedish corona strategy, if anyone is still interested. The author is a leading political scientist, formerly of Uppsala University, and a long-standing member of policy circles. /1 dn.se/debatt/sverige…
The central normative ideas behind the Swedish legal framework that governed the response were equality, dignity, and autonomy – and the notion that human beings must never be treated as mere means, but always as ends in themselves. /2
This normative framework inspired the view that the best way to deal with challenges is to equip citizens with the information and other resources that would allow them to do the right thing of their own volition, rather than relying on mandates and bans to force them to. /3
This is how Sweden ended up with a strategy that depended (to a greater extent than elsewhere) on recommendations rather than restrictions, on social norms rather than legal penalties, and so on. /4
The strategy was not based on a cold utilitarian calculus, of the kind that allows or requires that individual autonomy, goods and rights be sacrificed for the greater good. /5
Nor was it based on the lexical priority of negative rights ("freedom from") over positive rights ("freedom to"). /6
NB: None of this is to say that the ethical framework was the right one, obv., nor that it was implemented correctly. I'm only talking about what normative assumptions *in fact* drove the legal framework that governed the response. /7
Finally: Note that the law was articulated on the basis of very explicitly *normative* ideals. Nobody was trying to hide the fact that the process was driven ultimately by values.
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Periodic reminder that in terms of outcomes, Swedish corona policy is thoroughly average in EU comparison – not exactly a model to be emulated by the rest of the world, nor a crime against humanity that should be prosecuted in the Hague.
Only about two weeks separate Sweden and the EU in this graph, which shows cumulative confirmed COVID-19 deaths per 1M people. Source: ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-da…
There's a lot of disinformation. Here's @ForeignPolicy, which I've always considered a reputable publication, writing that Sweden's death rates are among the highest in Europe: foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/22/swe…
One point that the pandemic has brought home to me is just how narrow people's expertise is. I'm regularly surprised by how a celebrated professor of X can exhibit a sub-college-level understanding of Y, even when X and Y are related. /1
Ask a professor of (say) virology about the properties of viruses and I assume you'll get a dependable answer; but ask about human behavior, public policy, causal inference, the law – or God forbid, ethics – the answer can go whichever which way. /2
Call me naive, but in the microenvironment where I work – in the intersection of science and the humanities – people take a certain amount of pride in being well read, even outside of their official domain of expertise. /3
Let me preface this by saying I think "war" is a terrible analogy for scholarly discourse: (a) it trivializes the real thing, (b) it suggests science is a zero-sum game, (c) it triggers norms suggesting that "all is fair," and (d) it encourages people to choose teams. /2
Anyway, let's ignore the clickbaity headline and the hard-charging introduction and go straight to the conclusion. Here's what Sauer thinks the evidence shows. /3
The FT and @gideonrachman go down a well-worn path when criticizing the Swedish corona strategy – and end up with a predictably misguided conclusion. /1 ft.com/content/4f6ad3…
In Rachman's narrative, "Sweden's failure" can be traced back to a single "decision" – viz., the "refusal to go for a hard lockdown" – which was "a policy error" driven by "self-confidence … shaded into arrogance about the country's supposedly superior rationality." /2
As is well-known by now, the Swedish constitution does not permit a hard lockdown. There were things on the margin that the government could have done differently, but home confinement, travel bans, etc., were simply not in the cards. /3 bppblog.com/2020/04/23/the…
Terrific assessment of projections of demand for Swedish ICU beds. The first two panels are model-based projections by academics; the third is a simple extrapolation by the public-health authority; the fourth is the actual outcome /1 dn.se/nyheter/vetens…
tl;dr Model-based projections drastically exaggerated the actual demand – sometimes by more than an order of magnitude. Today the number of patients in intensive care is about 450; it never exceeded 600 /2 icuregswe.org/data--resultat…
Around the same time, if I read their data file correctly, the IHME projected a demand of 4400, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1400–11000. The real number is therefore way outside the interval /3 healthdata.org/covid/data-dow…