I mean, this all sounds like a service dedicated to checking your own shit, right? Unless like me you are entirely shameless, that might be an issue for some:
Oh, wait, what?
"We only conduct a Social Media Check once the person to be checked (subject) has provided consent."
So who is the "your" in "Check your social media", then?
Let's ignore the fact that — for entirely sensible "don't do this, it's a really bad idea" — it's against Facebook's terms of service to give away your access credentials to commercial third parties. facebook.com/legal/terms
Not to mention that: passwords are the WORST way to achieve data sharing with third parties
But even if they were doing it legitimately and using the PLATFORM API, they'd be forbidden "to make eligibility determinations about people, including for housing, employment, insurance, education opportunities, credit, …benefits, or immigration status"
"you may not use…information derived from Twitter Content [for] …conducting or providing analysis or research for any unlawful or discriminatory purpose, or in a manner that would be inconsistent with Twitter users' reasonable expectations of privacy
I am having a hard time getting clarity on the mechanism here; apparently you are supposed to authorise SocialMediaCheck to do its privacy-invasive thing, which sounds like OAuth; but there is also talk of logging in with your passwords... which sounds... equally or more bad.
Question for @EerkeBoiten and @PrivacyMatters : is it possible to meaningfully provide consent for processing which you do not understand the extent of, upon data that you likewise no longer have full awareness of?
Hot on the heels of #ChatControl and in the name of “identity” and “consumer choice” the EU seeks the ability to undetectably spy on HTTPS communication; 300+ experts say “no” to #Article45 of #eIDAS #QWAC alecmuffett.com/article/108139
If you would like to see more discussion regarding:
Regulation: EU Digital Identity Framework — including #eIDAS and #QWAC
When Signal and WhatsApp have fled the surveillance of the #OnlineSafetyBill, what app will still be around for politicans, journalists, and actual normal people to use, securely.
@JohnNaulty @matrixdotorg Let's be clear: we are talking about the evacuation of the entire Signal and WhatsApp userbase / niche, from the United Kingdom.
That's a lot of people.
WOW:
- No Signal
- No WhatsApp
- No iMessage
- No Facetime
@jamesrbuk called it #internexit; the UK will be extraordinarily isolated from the rest of the internet.
A big part of the the reason for the existence of that API was because the European Union wanted to enable people to access their data; so they created the problem, complained when the inevitable leaks happened, and are now reinventing it
Could be the attached, but my suspicion is that this is going to be another CYBER! DARKWEB! CYB3R! SYBER! CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA‼️BRAIN CONTORL! YOU SAW AN ADVERT AND SO A RUSSIAN ARTIFISHIAL INTELLIGENCE APP MADE YOU VOTE FOR UKIP! … thing.
Plucky spooks in Cheltenham but dressed for speed-dating in 2015-era Shoreditch, battle "Russian influence operations" that Nadine Dorries will soon cite as rationale for the #OnlineSafetyBill.
Token American subplots help sell the series to the US.
Back in 1991 I published an open-source password cracking tool which defined the state of the art for the next 5+ years, so much so that echoes of it can be found in all major password crackers of today.
Some folk criticised me for doing this, choosing words like these to do so:
I know that in general it's bad form to take a single quote out of context and use it to critique an entire essay (concerned.tech) — but I do feel that this time it's deserved.
The concerned-dot-tech essay has had extensive technical debunking, e.g.: