This thread is about the Israeli Iron Dome missile defense system - based on both recent events & my July 2014 Chicagoboyz blog post - that addresses the "Asymmetrical War" & Cold War ABM defense myths applied to Iron Dome versus its reality. 1/
I named that Chicagoboyz post as follows:
Iron Dome: Winning Asymmetric Warfare Through Superior Cost Accounting
Graphics like this represent the innumerate "Magical Thinking" that passes for true cost - benefit analysis regards asymmetrical warfare.
It simply does not work this way. 3/
To begin with, that infographic of the cost of Hamas rockets excludes the cost of digging & outfitting the underground production facilities or smuggling price mark up to get the precursor explosive & rocket chemicals through Egyptian & Israeli border security. 4/
I count 42 Tamir rocket exhausts in this photo.
At $25,000 US dollars for each new Tamir, that works out to $1,050,000 for the pictured interceptors.
Each Tamir is being guided to a Hamas rocket trajectory by an Iron Dome radar & computer that have been identified will be
5/
...impacting in a programed "keep out zone."
These keep out zones are priority defense locations, key infrastructure & highly populated areas.
Considering all the value of Israeli lives, serious injuries & property saved by these Tamir "Defense Blossoms." That is a bargain
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But don't take my word for it.
To evaluate Tamir defense versus Hamas rocket attack in terms of cost-benefit, you start with the fact that Iron Dome is ignoring Hamas rocket trajectories that land in places like farm fields & rural roads with low/no people. This 21st century
7/
...digital selectivity stacks very well with Israel's civil defense warning system of sirens & cellphone apps.
Next, you have to ask what is the price of a life or a serious injury prevented. Thus you need a insurance actuary or a life insurance table for that cost. 8/
I wrote that 2014 Chicagoboyz blogpost because there was an easily available document that did just that.
It is called "The True Cost of Road Crashes: Valuing life and the cost of a serious injury" (cover photo & doc link attached) 9/ web.archive.org/web/2021051207…
A good friend took that report's actuarial cost model (attached photo) and did the calculations of the official
* Value of Statistical Life (VSL) and
* Value of Serious Injuries (VSI)
for Israeli rocket injuries the 2006 Lebanon War & Gaza rocket fire from 2000 to 2010. 10/
I've placed the page link, the screen captured text & calculations here.
Trust me when I say click the link to read there and save your eyes from the screen captures.
Considerations of digital selectivity and the economic cost avoidance that Iron Dome provides to Israeli policy makers was utterly missing from the 2014 criticisms of MIT physicist, media talking head, and so-called ‘missile-defense expert’ Ted Postol. 12/ web.archive.org/web/2014071710…
There are many problems with Prof. Postol's criticisms. But at heart, it is the one that most defense intellectuals share.
They are, one and all, learned cynics who "...know the price of everything and the value of nothing." 13/
Prof Postol made his bones with criticisms of the US Army Patriot missile's performance versus Scud missiles in the 1991 Gulf War and in 2003. He applied his Patriot critique in 2014 (see figures) to the Tamir, his focus was on the 'failure' to engage & destroy warheads... 14/
...by both missiles.
Postel's specific point was his analysis suggested Tamir's were not getting nose-to-nose, Tamir to rocket, warhead impacts 100% of the time and thus was a technical failure. 15/
Prof. Postel's arguments here are a tarted up version of the Late Cold War ABM debate with nuclear weapons.
Only destroying the warheads counted and anything less than 100% perfection was failure.
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This was the kind of straw man arguments defense intellectuals of the late 20th century loved to use in the "Star Wars" ABM debates.
You set up impossible to meet performance system requirements and say the system failed when they don't. 17/
Newsflash: Hamas rockets don't carry nukes!
If you can knock a rocket off course 300 yards into an empty field or highway by tagging it's tail.
That is mission accomplished. 18/
In a very real sense, Iron Dome is Asymmetric Warfare by a technologically advanced society on an irrational/suicidal opponent that has converted suicide terrorism into an economically affordable war of attrition that trades suicidal robots — Iron Dome’s Tamir interceptor 20/
missiles plus traditional guided missiles from Jets or unmanned drones — for suicidal Hamas rocket crews & the civilian “human shield” infrastructure that hides them at a cost-trade off beneficial to the advanced western economy supported Westphalian Nation-State.
/End
It turns out that, in addition to "TAF-10" USMC SCR-270 radars, the USMC 90mm Heavy AA Battalion SCR-584 radars saw quite a few of the Japanese Balloon Radar Decoys at Okinawa in/near Hagushi Beach, Yonton & Kadena air fields.
The Marine AA troops didn't know what they were, but their descriptions match known aerodynamic templates for them.
The balloon decoy tended to fall through different levels of wind direction & updrafts. So the decoy often went in different directions than the ground wind. 2/
The 1st Marine Provisional Anti-Aircraft Group Hqtrs saw the radar decoy balloons most often when the Japanese engaged in a night time tactic they referred to as "Ice-Tong attacks."
Pairs of Japanese planes established themselves in orbits just outside effective 90mm gun
The one of the previous drawing is of a captured decoy from Roi island in March 1944.
Roi was subject to several IJN air raids using this decoy, as USS New Mexico reported its effects 14 Feb 1944, later reported in a Section 22 Current Statement dated 3 April 1944. 2/
Somehow the report in General Douglas MacArthur's Section 22 radar hunters current statement was scrubbed from all the Feb-March 1944 period after action reports and war diaries of USS New Mexico I've checked.
There is an tragi-comic story behind this Russian foreign ministry claim.
The Russian use the term "direct participation" because of a lie by Chancellor Scholz a year ago when he claimed the computer system used to program the Taurus missiles... 1/
The CO of the top scoring Buk [Nato designation SA-11 Gadfly] battery in the PSU did an interview ~2 years ago (early 2023).
He said they used their own Mavic drones to check that their camouflage and
Zoltan Dani & A2/AD doctrine🧵 1/
...that their battery concealment was good enough to fool Russian drones.
So, the PSU does a drone quality assurance check on its camo during the "hide" phase of the hide-shoot-scoot cycle, AKA you have to survive in order to have the opportunity to shoot enough to become the highest scoring SAM battery.
In contrast, the Russian VKS parks their missile TELARs in the middle of a field to get maximum obstacle clearance and range. Then they are shocked when hit by deep strike assault drone or GMLRS rocket.
In 2005, the Strategypage -dot- com web site had the following on the downing of an F-117 over Serbia.
These tactic are the heart of Ukrainian IADS doctrine.
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How to Take Down an F-117
November 21, 2005: The Serbian battery commander, whose missiles downed an American F-16, and, most impressively, an F-117, in 1999, has retired, as a colonel, and revealed many of the techniques he used to achieve all this. Colonel Dani Zoltan, in 1999, commanded the 3rd battery of the 250th Missile Brigade. He had search and control radars, as well as a TV tracking unit.
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The battery had four quad launchers for the 21 foot long, 880 pound SA-3 missiles. The SA-3 entered service in 1961 and, while it had undergone some upgrades, was considered a minor threat to NATO aircraft. Zoltan was an example of how an imaginative and energetic leader can make a big difference. While Zoltan’s peers and superiors were pretty demoralized with the electronic countermeasures NATO (especially American) aircraft used to support their bombing missions, he believed he could still turn his ancient missiles into lethal weapons
2/
The list of measures he took, and the results he got, should be warning to any who believe that superior technology alone will provide a decisive edge in combat. People still make a big difference. In addition to shooting down two aircraft, Zoltan’s battery caused dozens of others to abort their bombing missions to escape his unexpectedly accurate missiles. This is how he did it.