Thread by @guillaume_0823

As Manchester United's 2020-2021 season fizzles out with a disappointing performance in Gdańsk, it felt right to shortly revise my thread on #MUFC's main tactical problems back in February.

I will also throw in some other tweets, so consider this a shortened season review.

Globally, it's important to have knowledge of a few items. First is the coaching staff's game model and their tactical periodisation.

Next is understanding the importance of the principles mentioned in the original thread - not only for this game model but for every team.

#MUFC's coaches' interpretation is a team that presses to score and is versatile enough to build short or long, attack shortly or patiently, depending on the opposition analysis reports.

I did not pull this out of the hat, this is what OGS envisages and mentions in interviews.

Tactical principles, such as cover, width, depth etc. find their way into any team - it's the sub-principles that set teams apart, and separate tactical identities.

Overlaps, line height, rotations et cetera ultimately materialize the coaches' ideas, identity and philosophy.

It's fine having a great understanding of the game, but a head coach must transfer it to the players. Some struggle on a linguistic level, some struggle on a social level. Solskjaer struggles to find the time.

In a thread, I analyzed their only training session before the Europa League final.

https://twitter.com/staggeredlines/status/1397456854830227463

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For a manager that likes to change game plans every game (i.e. be adaptable), time is vital. #MUFC's lack of it means they've looked undetailed for most of the season.

Now that that's out of the way, let's revise the thread in order. First thing I mentioned back then was the team units.

#MUFC build long which needs horizontal compactness - between those team units - to regain the 2nd ball.

Manchester United's offensive and midfield units are often too disjointed after goal kicks and general long play as the midfield and defensive units don't join the first unit well enough, which leaves 2nd balls to be a transitional gamble more often than not.

By fitting Pogba on the left-wing and aiming to find him from goal kicks, this tactical problem has been magnified more over the last weeks.

For reference, Liverpool compress the units very well and even drop in their striker during such phases:

https://twitter.com/SteveBeregi/status/1120291006061133827

Secondly, I mentioned the lack of sub-principles in defensive transitioning. During emergency defending (losing the ball in the first third) and turnovers in the 2/3, it's paramount to close the centre first and then defend that part of the pitch towards the goal.

In the final third, Manchester United aim to counter-press and close off the nearest exit routes. I made a little visual on this (collective principles above, individual tactical principles below):

Here are a few successes & failures of this. Note that, yes, this is an arbitrary selection of - only - screenshots, yet consciously made to represent #MUFC's hot and cold form on this tactical feat.

Sometimes good, sometimes bad.

"Not screening while pressing" was the next topic - and the one upon which the team improved most over this February-May period, despite it still not being optimal.

Ole always liked to press man-for-man in wide areas as below. For the most part, United do this well.

When the front four jump to the ball, however, the press lacks coordination and communication. Cover shadows rarely work without the shadowed player being pressed too.

I mentioned this in the original thread as well:

https://twitter.com/staggeredlines/status/1363578048730308610

Another issue I picked up on was the team's lack of angles in possession phases. At the time of writing this was aimed at our central play, as many players offer dynamic angles from wide areas - think of Shaw, Rashford, Pogba, Bruno and Amad.

In the centre, however, things are far staler. United's progressive burden in the second third is mostly on either of the pivot players or the centre-backs. While the former are not the best line-breaking passers, the structure in front of them doesn't help much either.

Except for Bruno when he's in the mood to do so, United don't have a regular starting between-the-lines player who can receive on the half-turn and release the ball.

Often do they drop out of the lines to receive safely, yet not contributing anything to the team.

#MUFC therefore usually attempt to beat blocks by going around them through wide combinations, but not being able to go through or over a block blunts their sword too much.

During Project Restart things were different. Not only were Pogba and Matic progressing play, but Bruno, Martial and Greenwood all staggered themselves between the lines. Those different heights between the lines facilitate combination play and third man combinations.

A fairly recent example of what staggering the lines can do to a team's combination play.

Personally, I like it too because the reference points are not hard to pick up on for the players.

That leads me to the final problem I touched upon in February. Counter-movements.

As some followers may know, I'm pretty big on them, because, they too, are highly effective.

Counter-movements in the front line pull out defenders, opening gaps beyond the lines to play into, as Bruno profited from for his goal at Leicester in December.

A goal in ten seconds:

These positional rotations still demand spatial awareness from the reacting players (Donny in the screenshot below). Van de Beek, for example, should curve a dive into the space opened for him.

That's all for this season from me. Hope you somewhat enjoyed the entertaining games, goals and actions this season despite the ending, we'll be back next season. Stronger.