I gave a lecture once in which I riffed on the democracy of the dead, per Chesterton vs. the democracy of the non-existent, á la Parfit. I whipped up a few illustrations to go with. Later a pro-life person emailed and asked to use the baby one and I said ok. 
https://twitter.com/bw/status/1399538145201426442
Oh - hey, I totally forgot. I also talked about paradoxes of identity and preference satisfaction for the same lecture. Suppose as a child you really want three scoops of bubblegum-flavored ice cream but, alas, it is not to be.
Later do you have a reason to satisfy that desire just because you are still the same person, even you you no longer want bubblegum-flavored ice cream? (I was going through a Jim Flora phase, as illustrator.) Obviously you do not still have a reason.
Not such a hard question, but somewhat trickier ones follow. To what degree do we have reasons to respect only the wishes of the dead who are our direct ancestors, according to Chesterton?
At any rate, if you can’t be disqualified either by accident of death or non-birth, will we need some sort of presentist Calhounianism of the living, to preserve our rights? Or will just plain Nietzsche do the trick?
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