1/x
The thread that follows represents a short "book review" of sorts of Richard Velkley's book on Heidegger and Strauss
amazon.com/Heidegger-Stra…
The thread that follows represents a short "book review" of sorts of Richard Velkley's book on Heidegger and Strauss
amazon.com/Heidegger-Stra…
2/x
It's an OK book by academic standards. Anyone interested in Strauss and Heidegger should probably read it (though my dissertation is much better)
It's an OK book by academic standards. Anyone interested in Strauss and Heidegger should probably read it (though my dissertation is much better)
3/x
It's got some interesting twists and turns, some great quotations regarding Strauss' admiration for Heidegger
Strauss was first rate enough to admit that Heidegger was simply in a different category of Being (no pun intended)
It's got some interesting twists and turns, some great quotations regarding Strauss' admiration for Heidegger
Strauss was first rate enough to admit that Heidegger was simply in a different category of Being (no pun intended)
4/x Indeed, even the great Weber was a mere "orphan child" compared to Heidegger --- the only contemporary of Strauss' who deserved the designation of philosopher
Second rate Straussians consider Strauss himself to be a philosopher --- Leo himself knew better (good boi!)
Second rate Straussians consider Strauss himself to be a philosopher --- Leo himself knew better (good boi!)
5/x In any kind of philosophical confrontation (auseinandersetzung) between person x and Heidegger, the rules of the game in American academia (especially Velkely's milieu) is that Heidegger has to lose
He's a "bad guy" after all. It would be naughty if he "won"
He's a "bad guy" after all. It would be naughty if he "won"
6/x So let's cut to the chase and get into the substance of Velkley's critique
To understand his critique of Heidegger, first important to understand his conception of Strauss, which deviates a bit from some popular and even scholarly understandings...
To understand his critique of Heidegger, first important to understand his conception of Strauss, which deviates a bit from some popular and even scholarly understandings...
7/x Strauss' work "City and Man" is good entry point into Velkley's conception of Strauss
It explores a central tension between philosophical truth, which is in principle universal, and politics, which pertains to the particular conditions in which man, as man, remains embedded.
It explores a central tension between philosophical truth, which is in principle universal, and politics, which pertains to the particular conditions in which man, as man, remains embedded.
8/x
The philosophers' "middle-condition" is one of erotic tension, according to which the philosopher, as man (and according to Diotima half poverty half plenty) attempts to liberate himself from his particularity, including the particularity of his own corporeality! see Phaedo
The philosophers' "middle-condition" is one of erotic tension, according to which the philosopher, as man (and according to Diotima half poverty half plenty) attempts to liberate himself from his particularity, including the particularity of his own corporeality! see Phaedo
9/x
connection between the City and Man theme and the erotic condition of man is impt to Velkely's understanding regarding the proper (Socratic/Straussian) relationship between theory and practice, and, more specifically, between philosophical radicality and political prudence
connection between the City and Man theme and the erotic condition of man is impt to Velkely's understanding regarding the proper (Socratic/Straussian) relationship between theory and practice, and, more specifically, between philosophical radicality and political prudence
10/x
This leads us to the core of Velkley's position:
The Socratic/Straussian takes politics (City and Man) so seriously as a philosophic matter, that it never gets around to doing much about politics as a practical matter!---the classic torpedo fish!
This leads us to the core of Velkley's position:
The Socratic/Straussian takes politics (City and Man) so seriously as a philosophic matter, that it never gets around to doing much about politics as a practical matter!---the classic torpedo fish!
11/x
This counter intuitive formulation sounds less bizarre when one considers the erotic character of the political problem. That is, to take politics seriously as a philosophical matter, and indeed as the entry point to philosophy,
This counter intuitive formulation sounds less bizarre when one considers the erotic character of the political problem. That is, to take politics seriously as a philosophical matter, and indeed as the entry point to philosophy,
12/x
means for the philosopher to fully immerse himself in the erotic tension between the philosopher as embedded, particular, and political, and the philosopher as one who strives toward the universal.
means for the philosopher to fully immerse himself in the erotic tension between the philosopher as embedded, particular, and political, and the philosopher as one who strives toward the universal.
13/x
Insofar as the philosopher remains radically enthralled in the erotic aporia that exists within the tension between city and man, the particular and the universal, he will have no philosophic basis on which to act politically with commensurate radicalness.
Insofar as the philosopher remains radically enthralled in the erotic aporia that exists within the tension between city and man, the particular and the universal, he will have no philosophic basis on which to act politically with commensurate radicalness.
14/x
And so, in a nutshell, Velkley's position is that Strauss' Socratism is such that the philosopher will be engaged in the aporetic philosophical side of politics,
And so, in a nutshell, Velkley's position is that Strauss' Socratism is such that the philosopher will be engaged in the aporetic philosophical side of politics,
15/x
and that this philosophical extremism distracts from or even prevents political action... especially the dangerous radical political action associated with Heidegger
How nifty!
and that this philosophical extremism distracts from or even prevents political action... especially the dangerous radical political action associated with Heidegger
How nifty!
16/x
Before addressing the Heidegger critique, should say first that Velkley's Strauss is more interesting than the Bloomian Strauss and the Kojevian Strauss
Before addressing the Heidegger critique, should say first that Velkley's Strauss is more interesting than the Bloomian Strauss and the Kojevian Strauss
17/x By Bloomian Strauss I mean the dollar store version (not necessarily even advanced by A. Bloom but spiritually connected) according to which Strauss' Socrates serves as a bulwark of Absolute morality against evil German relativists or historicists
18/x Despite Jaffa's antagonisms with Bloom (and basically everyone else) the Bloomian Strauss might even be better associated with him spiritually. The Absolute vs the relativism of nihilists, historicists and such
Velkely's Strauss avoids this
Velkely's Strauss avoids this
19/x
Velkley's Strauss also serves as an implicit critique of the Kojevian Strauss.
That is, the Strauss whose political use is to defend liberal democracy.
I understand Kojevian Strauss is an awkard formulation given Strauss' famous debate with Kojeve on similar questions
Velkley's Strauss also serves as an implicit critique of the Kojevian Strauss.
That is, the Strauss whose political use is to defend liberal democracy.
I understand Kojevian Strauss is an awkard formulation given Strauss' famous debate with Kojeve on similar questions
20/x. But the Kojevian Strauss is a real thing insofar as many Straussians appropriated his teaching to advance liberal democracy in the same way Kojeve advanced communism as the "universal homogeneous state"
Fukuyama comes to mind but there are others
Fukuyama comes to mind but there are others
21/x So Velkley's philosophical aporetic Strauss is distinct from both Absolutist (perhaps even Thomistic) Strauss and the Kojevian Strauss
22/x
For Vekley's Strauss--political philosophical questions can't be answered, have no absolute answer, and lend themselves to no political telos such as a universal homogeneous state (liberal, communist or otherwise) to "immanentize"
For Vekley's Strauss--political philosophical questions can't be answered, have no absolute answer, and lend themselves to no political telos such as a universal homogeneous state (liberal, communist or otherwise) to "immanentize"
23/x
And the above, according to Velkely, has the advantage of being philosophically interesting and politically boring -- because the questions of pol philosophy can never be resolved to the point of allowing for radical political action
And the above, according to Velkely, has the advantage of being philosophically interesting and politically boring -- because the questions of pol philosophy can never be resolved to the point of allowing for radical political action
24/x
The crucial question for Velkley is whether his sound critique of the Kojevian Straussians actually translates to a sound critique of Heidegger
I say it doesn't.
The crucial question for Velkley is whether his sound critique of the Kojevian Straussians actually translates to a sound critique of Heidegger
I say it doesn't.
25/x
Velkley's thesis re: relationship between philosophical radicality with practical and political humility, together w/ the notion of permanent and erotically driven philosophical tensions that it presupposes, works perfectly as a counter to unwittingly Kojevian Straussians
Velkley's thesis re: relationship between philosophical radicality with practical and political humility, together w/ the notion of permanent and erotically driven philosophical tensions that it presupposes, works perfectly as a counter to unwittingly Kojevian Straussians
26/x
The crucial question then arises whether and what extent this criticism, that I would concede works wonders against Kojeve, Straussian Kojevians, and most moderns seeking absolution politically in some version of universal homog state, appropriately applies to Heidegger.
The crucial question then arises whether and what extent this criticism, that I would concede works wonders against Kojeve, Straussian Kojevians, and most moderns seeking absolution politically in some version of universal homog state, appropriately applies to Heidegger.
27/x
Here I am much more skeptical. I do not think there is any equivalent to the universal homogeneous state in Heidegger's thought, and by that I mean any kind of ultimate redemption of the human condition that can be achieved politically.
Here I am much more skeptical. I do not think there is any equivalent to the universal homogeneous state in Heidegger's thought, and by that I mean any kind of ultimate redemption of the human condition that can be achieved politically.
28/x
What will prove crucial here is the fact that Heidegger and Velkley's Strauss (which is my favorite Strauss, by the way) disagree as to what constitutes the basic and natural condition of humanity that requires restoration.
What will prove crucial here is the fact that Heidegger and Velkley's Strauss (which is my favorite Strauss, by the way) disagree as to what constitutes the basic and natural condition of humanity that requires restoration.
29/x
For Strauss, this basic and natural condition relates to supposedly permanent philosophical problems related to the permanent and irresolvable erotic tension in man between the universal and particular.
For Strauss, this basic and natural condition relates to supposedly permanent philosophical problems related to the permanent and irresolvable erotic tension in man between the universal and particular.
30/x
That is, that there are a host of permanent questions about the whole that man, as man (in the empowered sense), uniquely has access to, but also, as man (in the limited sense) is never able to answer.
That is, that there are a host of permanent questions about the whole that man, as man (in the empowered sense), uniquely has access to, but also, as man (in the limited sense) is never able to answer.
31/x
This constant philosophical striving made possible by this intermediate position between particular and universal means that man's natural place, his home, is precisely in this state of frustrated noetic eroticism.
This constant philosophical striving made possible by this intermediate position between particular and universal means that man's natural place, his home, is precisely in this state of frustrated noetic eroticism.
32/x
For Heidegger the "natural" condition of man is as Dasein, and (as the term implies) this means that man's natural and proper condition pertains to his role as a Shepherd of Being, or the unique onto-ontological entity for whom Being is an issue
For Heidegger the "natural" condition of man is as Dasein, and (as the term implies) this means that man's natural and proper condition pertains to his role as a Shepherd of Being, or the unique onto-ontological entity for whom Being is an issue
33/x
For Heidegger, the history of western metaphysics (Seinsgeschichte) has at the same time been the history of the loss of Being (Seinsverlassenheit) and therefore the closure of the truth of Being to man.
For Heidegger, the history of western metaphysics (Seinsgeschichte) has at the same time been the history of the loss of Being (Seinsverlassenheit) and therefore the closure of the truth of Being to man.
34/x
This closure with respect to Being, though it beings with Plato, intensifies dramatically with Modernity (inaugurated by Newton, Galileo, and Descartes) and achieves its culmination in the post-Nietzschean technological midnight.
This closure with respect to Being, though it beings with Plato, intensifies dramatically with Modernity (inaugurated by Newton, Galileo, and Descartes) and achieves its culmination in the post-Nietzschean technological midnight.
35/x
his is relevant politically because what Heidegger saw in National Socialism (at least its early stages) was a chance to somehow achieve a real alternative to Soviet communism and Americanism, which Heidegger believed to be metaphysically the same...
his is relevant politically because what Heidegger saw in National Socialism (at least its early stages) was a chance to somehow achieve a real alternative to Soviet communism and Americanism, which Heidegger believed to be metaphysically the same...
36/x
and, more specifically, metaphysically the same in that both represented the dominance of technology and therefore the complete closure of Being with respect to man---and therefore the disappearance of man's essential role as Dasein.
and, more specifically, metaphysically the same in that both represented the dominance of technology and therefore the complete closure of Being with respect to man---and therefore the disappearance of man's essential role as Dasein.
37/x
Heidegger explains his support for Nat Socialism b/c it in his mind offered only possibility of achieving a free relationship to technology, which to H represented final closure of Being w/ respect to man, and thus the complete loss of mans proper role in relation to Being.
Heidegger explains his support for Nat Socialism b/c it in his mind offered only possibility of achieving a free relationship to technology, which to H represented final closure of Being w/ respect to man, and thus the complete loss of mans proper role in relation to Being.
38/x
But if Heidegger saw political movement of Nat Socialism as offering an alternative to the technological forces behind Communism and Americanism, doesn't that mean that he made the mistake (from Velkley's Strauss' pov) of attributing redemptive possibilities to politics?
But if Heidegger saw political movement of Nat Socialism as offering an alternative to the technological forces behind Communism and Americanism, doesn't that mean that he made the mistake (from Velkley's Strauss' pov) of attributing redemptive possibilities to politics?
39/x
Partially, perhaps, though I would say in the crucial sense not. To help understand my thinking here, I would draw attention to description of Strauss' thinking of Modernity, and specifically History, as a "cave within a cave."
Partially, perhaps, though I would say in the crucial sense not. To help understand my thinking here, I would draw attention to description of Strauss' thinking of Modernity, and specifically History, as a "cave within a cave."
40/x
Strauss spent a great deal of time and effort addressing the question of History precisely because he thought that History most powerfully obscured the more natural and appropriate concerns of man--qua man-- that have to do with these permanent erotic tensions.
Strauss spent a great deal of time and effort addressing the question of History precisely because he thought that History most powerfully obscured the more natural and appropriate concerns of man--qua man-- that have to do with these permanent erotic tensions.
41/x
By loose analogy, I would suggest that the closure with respect to Being represented most dramatically and fully by technology was, for Heidegger, a "cave within the cave," of sorts.
By loose analogy, I would suggest that the closure with respect to Being represented most dramatically and fully by technology was, for Heidegger, a "cave within the cave," of sorts.
42/x
What on earth do I mean by that? Note that Strauss attacks historicism without thinking that, should such attacks should prove successful, that man should achieve some ultimate absolution.
What on earth do I mean by that? Note that Strauss attacks historicism without thinking that, should such attacks should prove successful, that man should achieve some ultimate absolution.
43/x
Strauss rather attacks historicism not to achieve some kind of redemptive resolution of tension, but to uncover and restore more basic tension that Strauss deems to be more appropriate to mans philosophical nature--the tension between universal, particular, city and man...
Strauss rather attacks historicism not to achieve some kind of redemptive resolution of tension, but to uncover and restore more basic tension that Strauss deems to be more appropriate to mans philosophical nature--the tension between universal, particular, city and man...
44/x
Similarly Heidegger does not think that overcoming technology would resolve the basic tensions of man's natural and appropriate state-rather, by overcoming technology, Heidegger hopes to secure man's state as Dasein, the site or opening through which Being reveals itself
Similarly Heidegger does not think that overcoming technology would resolve the basic tensions of man's natural and appropriate state-rather, by overcoming technology, Heidegger hopes to secure man's state as Dasein, the site or opening through which Being reveals itself
45/x
To find an alternative to or somehow overcome the closure of Being threatened by technology is not, in Heidegger's view, expected to overcome the enduring tensions arising from the fact that Being necessarily also conceals itself
To find an alternative to or somehow overcome the closure of Being threatened by technology is not, in Heidegger's view, expected to overcome the enduring tensions arising from the fact that Being necessarily also conceals itself
46/x
Just because Heidegger sees some hope in early Nat Socialism of avoiding the full closure of Being threatened by technology, does not mean that Heidegger attributes to political or political solutions any ultimate redemptive possibility
Just because Heidegger sees some hope in early Nat Socialism of avoiding the full closure of Being threatened by technology, does not mean that Heidegger attributes to political or political solutions any ultimate redemptive possibility
47/x
and certainly not in the sense that Kojeve would think of the redemptive possibility of the universal homogeneous state.
So Velkley's critique doesn't really transfer
and certainly not in the sense that Kojeve would think of the redemptive possibility of the universal homogeneous state.
So Velkley's critique doesn't really transfer
48/x
I do not think, given the relevance of Dasein as a site of Being, and therefore as an opening on the one hand, and the threat of Seinsverlassenheit as a closure with respect to Being, that enough attention given to diff between the terms entscheidung and entschlossenheit.
I do not think, given the relevance of Dasein as a site of Being, and therefore as an opening on the one hand, and the threat of Seinsverlassenheit as a closure with respect to Being, that enough attention given to diff between the terms entscheidung and entschlossenheit.
49/x
Ent is a privative in German, therefore Ent-Scheidung actually suggests a closure, a mending of a fissure (Scheidung); Conversely, Entschlossenheit suggests a negation or privation of a Schlossenheit, or closure.
Ent is a privative in German, therefore Ent-Scheidung actually suggests a closure, a mending of a fissure (Scheidung); Conversely, Entschlossenheit suggests a negation or privation of a Schlossenheit, or closure.
50/x Thus Entschlossenheit, a word that is notoriously associated with Heidegger's political involvement, is incorrectly interpreted as a kind of decisionism. In reality, however, it is less a decisionism and more a resolution toward openness, that is, the openness of Being.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
