Paul Woodage's [@WW2TV] had a very nice video stream today with Kevin Hymel using information from his forthcoming book on Gen Patton.
This thread will expand on a piece of it regards Operation Huskey's friendly fire incident that killed 400 troops 1/
Operation Huskey's 2nd set of air drops resulted in 23 C-47 & C-53 troop carriers, & some gliders, being shot down with 400 US & UK paratroopers plus air crew aboard them. 2/ amcmuseum.org/history/a-very…
The friendly fire incident was due to the lack of a plan for centralized control of fleet and the just landed shore based anti-aircraft weapons.
The Report of Allied Force Airborne Board on Operation “HUSKY” is online (link) fold3.com/image/1/270149…
3/
These are pages 32, 33, & 34 of the 42 pages of "The Rpt of Allied Force Airborne Board on Op. “HUSKY” on Fold3.com.
Short form - The Allied Navies were given time, course & speed of the paradrop when agreed & they didn't pass the information on in time. 4/
Every single Allied invasion convoy the troop transport stream flew near shot at them.
This was a comment at the end of the report:
"C-in-C A.F.H.Q.
I am in general agreement with this report. To my opinion the operation as planned was not operationally sound. It involved
5/
...the troop carrier flying along some 35 miles of actual front. Even if it was physically possible for all the troops and ships to be duly warned, which is doubtful, any fire opened either by mistake or against any enemy aircraft would almost certainly be supported by all 6/
...troops within range — AA firing at night is infections and control almost impossible.
s/
A. Tedder"
Captain E.W. MacMillan, one of the fighter controllers in Operation Husky amphibious landing fleet, begged to differ. 7/
Captain E.W. MacMillan taught a USAAF course titled "Fighter Control and Aircraft Warning in Amphibious Operations" in January 1945 at the AAF School of Applied Tactics, AAF Tactical Center, Orlando, Florida.
This is the Gela Beachhead Fighter Control graphic for Operation Husky. The ships marked "Sector" are to act as Fighter Sectors. The Sector ships L to R were USS Biscayne, USS Samuel Chase and USS Ancon. The Flagship is USS Monrovia w/USAAF Air Defense Control Center. 9/
The graphic was created by Capt. MacMillan for his course. He was on the USS Monrovia the night when the 82nd Airborne Division was blown out of the sky.
Pretty much anything that could go wrong with communications did, at the worst possible time. 10/
But Capt. MacMillan's front line lesson learned as to the No. 1 factor in killing those paratroopers & air crew was the lack of a centralized amphibious anti-aircraft control authority.
The attached slide is the transcribed text from his JAN 1945 course. 11/
Capt. MacMillan explained later in his course that the Navy & Ground AA liaison officers were placed on USS Ancon for the Operation Avalanche landings at Salerno, Italy and fixed most of the friendly fire problems compared to Operation Husky.
This command set up was used at
12/
...Anzio, Normandy and Southern France.
None of these lessons learned from Europe made it to the USN in the Pacific. Much to it's regret when the Japanese kamikazes came calling.
/End
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Given the massive Ukrainian victory in the "Battle of the Azov Sea."
We can say Ukraine has achieved “Usable Drone Air Superiority" over the Sea of Azov in exactly the way the Chinese would in the waters around, & air over, Taiwan when it invades.
🧵
The "Battle of the Azov Sea" shares a lot of historical elements of both the WW2 "Battle of the Bismarck Sea" and the slaughter of Allied oil tankers in 1942 during Operation Drumbeat (Paukenschlag) and Operation Neuland.
2/
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was the slaughter of 12 ships of a 16 ship Imperial Japanese convoy of eight IJA freighters and eight IJN destroyers moving 6,900 IJA troops.
Tipped off by IJN seaplane deployments & radio intercepts, only 2,700 IJA troops arrived w/o weapons or ammo.
3/
I asked @grok to document this Russian policy of atrocity at the link, excerpt:
"February 24, 2022–present (Full-scale Russian invasion): The scale escalated dramatically. As of May 2026, the WHO had verified more than 3,000 attacks on healthcare via its Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA). A coalition of organizations (including PHR, eyeWitness, Truth Hounds, etc.) documented ~3,095 attacks, with 1,632 damaging or destroying hospitals and clinics"
When I've talked about the legacy of Soviet industrial gigantism (one big factory) making Putin era Russia far more vulnerable to a drone strategic bombing campaign.
I've talked about this vulnerability in a couple of previous threads. Here is a shorter one:
Putin's decades long "Russian exceptionalism" propaganda campaign, that says WW2 was won on the Eastern Front, has made Russians incapable of seeing this.
There is so much to object to here that I'm going to restate some basic design observations on the FP-5 to clarify how the Russian reflexive control data fed AI slop that is polluting public discussions of the FP-5.
1. The FP-5 Flamingo is about four times the launch weight of a BGM-109 Tomahawk (i.e. ~13,200 lb), and 2-3 times the range (i.e. ~1,620 nmi) while carrying twice the warhead mass (i.e. ~2,000 lb).
2/
2. The FP-5 design concept is modelled on the USAF MGM-13 Mace GLCM as Fire Point told Ukrainian military analysts - but designed with modern technology to be extremely cheap to make (claimed 1/6 the cost of a Tomahawk - likely not counting the engine cost).
The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that in 2026 Ukraine has not only replicated, but likely exceeded, the 2018 capabilities of the USAF's Stand-off Munitions Activity Center (SMAC) at at Barksdale AFB.
Electronic warfare is always a "saving throw" with an expiration date for the defense.
Plus no one in the world, since 1989, has invested in enough mobile guns for robust AA-combined arms to screw up the simple arithmetic of a saturation drone/missile attacks.
2/
Russia burned out Ukraine's considerable stocks of 5V55 SAMs (~3,300 rounds), 9M83 SAMs (~1,000) and 9M38 SAMs (~800) by repeat saturation attacks.
Ukraine returns the favor. This is not that difficult to grasp.
Saturation attacks were central to legacy Soviet doctrine.
3/