Paul Woodage's [@WW2TV] had a very nice video stream today with Kevin Hymel using information from his forthcoming book on Gen Patton.
This thread will expand on a piece of it regards Operation Huskey's friendly fire incident that killed 400 troops 1/
Operation Huskey's 2nd set of air drops resulted in 23 C-47 & C-53 troop carriers, & some gliders, being shot down with 400 US & UK paratroopers plus air crew aboard them. 2/ amcmuseum.org/history/a-very…
The friendly fire incident was due to the lack of a plan for centralized control of fleet and the just landed shore based anti-aircraft weapons.
The Report of Allied Force Airborne Board on Operation “HUSKY” is online (link) fold3.com/image/1/270149…
3/
These are pages 32, 33, & 34 of the 42 pages of "The Rpt of Allied Force Airborne Board on Op. “HUSKY” on Fold3.com.
Short form - The Allied Navies were given time, course & speed of the paradrop when agreed & they didn't pass the information on in time. 4/
Every single Allied invasion convoy the troop transport stream flew near shot at them.
This was a comment at the end of the report:
"C-in-C A.F.H.Q.
I am in general agreement with this report. To my opinion the operation as planned was not operationally sound. It involved
5/
...the troop carrier flying along some 35 miles of actual front. Even if it was physically possible for all the troops and ships to be duly warned, which is doubtful, any fire opened either by mistake or against any enemy aircraft would almost certainly be supported by all 6/
...troops within range — AA firing at night is infections and control almost impossible.
s/
A. Tedder"
Captain E.W. MacMillan, one of the fighter controllers in Operation Husky amphibious landing fleet, begged to differ. 7/
Captain E.W. MacMillan taught a USAAF course titled "Fighter Control and Aircraft Warning in Amphibious Operations" in January 1945 at the AAF School of Applied Tactics, AAF Tactical Center, Orlando, Florida.
This is the Gela Beachhead Fighter Control graphic for Operation Husky. The ships marked "Sector" are to act as Fighter Sectors. The Sector ships L to R were USS Biscayne, USS Samuel Chase and USS Ancon. The Flagship is USS Monrovia w/USAAF Air Defense Control Center. 9/
The graphic was created by Capt. MacMillan for his course. He was on the USS Monrovia the night when the 82nd Airborne Division was blown out of the sky.
Pretty much anything that could go wrong with communications did, at the worst possible time. 10/
But Capt. MacMillan's front line lesson learned as to the No. 1 factor in killing those paratroopers & air crew was the lack of a centralized amphibious anti-aircraft control authority.
The attached slide is the transcribed text from his JAN 1945 course. 11/
Capt. MacMillan explained later in his course that the Navy & Ground AA liaison officers were placed on USS Ancon for the Operation Avalanche landings at Salerno, Italy and fixed most of the friendly fire problems compared to Operation Husky.
This command set up was used at
12/
...Anzio, Normandy and Southern France.
None of these lessons learned from Europe made it to the USN in the Pacific. Much to it's regret when the Japanese kamikazes came calling.
/End
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The following is evaluation is based on a number of professional discussions:
This CRPA found in a shot down jet Shaheed is reported to be Russian built. This is highly doubtful as the design and construction style looks far too professional for Russian industry.
Bluntly - Russians tend towards cheapskate up-front capital manufacturing solutions.
The upshot is injection molded and die cast components are not a common feature in Russian designs as tooling for manufacturing designs is expensive up front,
2/
...even if the mass production unit costs are lower.
In addition, Western style SMA RF connectors are not a feature of the Soviet technology base.
" Please summarize the pre-World War 1 to 1942 career of merchant armed raiders and compare that data to Ukraine's recent drone attack in the Mediterranean with a drone armed commercial vessel."
2/
This is @grok's final summary:
"In essence, Ukraine's approach modernizes the raider concept—swapping guns for drones and merchant disguises for stealthy launches— but lacks the historical volume due to the conflict's constraints.
3/
In Donetsk, reconnaissance operators face constant drone surveillance, electromagnetic degradation, and hyper-local combat conditions that invalidate long-held assumptions about stealth and standoff intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
2/3
This article contends that NATO must, with urgency, reform its reconnaissance doctrine, training, and force structure to survive and efficiently operate in a drone-saturated battlefield."
Every competent USN surface officer knows in their gut an anti-aircraft cruiser should not be operating with downed identification friend or foe (IFF) and Link-16 data link with no E-2 Hawkeye AEW support.
That sound drama isn't World War One or any "medium intensity" conflict since 1918.
It is the sound of how 21st century Peer-to-Peer conflict is fought.
A conflict Western ground militaries are obsolescent in equipment to face.
2/3
That Russo-Ukraine War video is a soundscape US Army National Training Centers are too obsolete/incapable of replicating, because US Army flag ranks are allergic to training with high densities of small/cheap/many FPV drones.
SHORAN was a WW2 blind bombing system using two radio stations and an electromechanical computer.
In 1938 an RCA engineer named Stuart William Seeley, while attempting to remove "ghost" signals from an experimental television system, discovered he could measure distances 2/
...by time differences in radio reception.
Instead of building a radar unit with this discovery, he proposed using this technique for precision ground-based radio beacon navigation bombing aid.