Trent Telenko Profile picture
Jun 5, 2021 13 tweets 6 min read Read on X
Paul Woodage's [@WW2TV] had a very nice video stream today with Kevin Hymel using information from his forthcoming book on Gen Patton.

This thread will expand on a piece of it regards Operation Huskey's friendly fire incident that killed 400 troops
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Operation Huskey's 2nd set of air drops resulted in 23 C-47 & C-53 troop carriers, & some gliders, being shot down with 400 US & UK paratroopers plus air crew aboard them. 
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amcmuseum.org/history/a-very… Image
The friendly fire incident was due to the lack of a plan for centralized control of fleet and the just landed shore based anti-aircraft weapons.

The Report of Allied Force Airborne Board on Operation “HUSKY” is online (link)
fold3.com/image/1/270149…
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These are pages 32, 33, & 34 of the 42 pages of "The Rpt of Allied Force Airborne Board on Op. “HUSKY” on Fold3.com.

Short form - The Allied Navies were given time, course & speed of the paradrop when agreed & they didn't pass the information on in time.
4/ ImageImageImage
Every single Allied invasion convoy the troop transport stream flew near shot at them.

This was a comment at the end of the report:

"C-in-C A.F.H.Q.
I am in general agreement with this report. To my opinion the operation as planned was not operationally sound. It involved
5/
...the troop carrier flying along some 35 miles of actual front. Even if it was physically possible for all the troops and ships to be duly warned, which is doubtful, any fire opened either by mistake or against any enemy aircraft would almost certainly be supported by all
6/ Image
...troops within range — AA firing at night is infections and control almost impossible.
s/
A. Tedder"

Captain E.W. MacMillan, one of the fighter controllers in Operation Husky amphibious landing fleet, begged to differ.
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Captain E.W. MacMillan taught a USAAF course titled "Fighter Control and Aircraft Warning in Amphibious Operations" in January 1945 at the AAF School of Applied Tactics, AAF Tactical Center, Orlando, Florida.

His course materials are on-line.
cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collec…
8/
This is the Gela Beachhead Fighter Control graphic for Operation Husky. The ships marked "Sector" are to act as Fighter Sectors. The Sector ships L to R were USS Biscayne, USS Samuel Chase and USS Ancon. The Flagship is USS Monrovia w/USAAF Air Defense Control Center.
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The graphic was created by Capt. MacMillan for his course. He was on the USS Monrovia the night when the 82nd Airborne Division was blown out of the sky.

Pretty much anything that could go wrong with communications did, at the worst possible time.
10/ Image
But Capt. MacMillan's front line lesson learned as to the No. 1 factor in killing those paratroopers & air crew was the lack of a centralized amphibious anti-aircraft control authority.

The attached slide is the transcribed text from his JAN 1945 course.
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Capt. MacMillan explained later in his course that the Navy & Ground AA liaison officers were placed on USS Ancon for the Operation Avalanche landings at Salerno, Italy and fixed most of the friendly fire problems compared to Operation Husky.

This command set up was used at
12/
...Anzio, Normandy and Southern France.

None of these lessons learned from Europe made it to the USN in the Pacific. Much to it's regret when the Japanese kamikazes came calling.

/End ImageImage

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More from @TrentTelenko

May 12
This is one of the most logistically incompetent hot takes by any German journalist in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

95% getting through is a 5% loss rate per trip
95%(x) for 10 to 20 kills means x = 200 to 400 trucks on this route
10 trips means 40% total fleet loss - 80 to 160 trucks
1/Image
You can follow the 5% loss curve in this 500 unit fleet at 10 exposures in the graphic below.

A 40% fleet loss in 10 days from a 5% drone loss rate is logistical collapse for the Russian Army in occupied Ukraine.

Only some trying to get AfD eyeballs would say different.

2/ Image
This leaves out the fact that the Russian Army doesn't use *ANY* mechanized logistical enabler like pallets, Truck D-rings, forklifts, or telehandlers.

Russian trucks are in the drone kill zones 3 times as long as a Western truck due to loading times.

Receipts:
3/3
x.com/i/grok/share/e…
Read 4 tweets
May 10
Regarding this:

"The DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, with a range of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers, was specifically designed and publicly nicknamed by Chinese military analysts as the "Guam Killer.""

I disagree with those analysts.
1/
The Chinese PD-2900 drone (2,500 km range, 12-hour endurance, 250 km/h speed, stealthy Su-57-like design) is far more a "Guam Killer" than the DF-26.

It is a matter of numbers.

2/
As laid out by warquants -dot- com, China is buying one million OWA drones to destroy all US/Taiwan/Taiwan allied military logistics from Guam to the China coast.

A quantity of one million "Shaheed plus" class OWA drones has quality all its own.

3/
Read 7 tweets
May 5
The reduction in murder deaths -IS NOT- due to law enforcement, or reductions in underlying rates of violence.

It is due to the fact that medical care has improved such that the same gunshot wound inflicted in 2015 is 1/3 as lethal as 1960.

Murder rate🧵
1/
Homicide statistics since the early 1960s are not comparable to earlier periods because medical advances have turned many fatal injuries into survivable ones.

See the CDC report below⬇️


2/
There are four major medical trauma care changes since 1960 reducing murder rates:

1. Trauma centers established ~1961.

2. Standardized trauma procedures ~1978.

3. Adoption of military (Korea/Vietnam) emergency treatment, air transport, and improved triage ~1986.

3/
Read 5 tweets
Apr 29
This passage:

"Lebanese security forces reportedly seized 1 truck last June carrying 5,000 explosive drones..."

...is the heart of why I say that the US Army & USMC ground troops will bleed heavily in their first real drone war.

Drone War🧵
Each of those 5,000 Hezbollah drones is individually far more lethal than a dumb 155mm shell, and a 5-ton truck can carry only 176 of them.

Each of those 5,000 drone can kill a truck carrying those 176 shells.

2/ Image
You simply can't hide from drones like you can from a shell.

It will follow you inside hard cover with a thermobaric warhead.

There is no safe space on the battlefield unless you build one with fishing nets and drone jammers.
3/ Image
Read 6 tweets
Apr 29
I'm tempted to say the difference between military flag ranks who are competent at 2026 peer to peer warfare, and those who are not, is the understanding and application of attritional loss curves to combat loss rates, electronic warfare and logistics.

Professional military education (PME)🧵
1/Image
The set of curves I had an AI produce for me above have been used for air warfare many times starting at the end of WW2, in the USSBS after WW2 and by many classic RAND airpower studies from the 1950's to 1980's.

2/ Image
All post 9/11/2001 Western flag ranks are counter-insurgency (COIN) trained & experienced.

They have no gut feel at all to statistical attrition models at all.

These "COIN-head" flags may prove to be highly resistant to changing this. Which is required to deal with drones.
2/Image
Read 14 tweets
Apr 27
The effectiveness of drones is directly affected by the electronic warfare competence of the drone users.

The fact that the US Army defenestrated every EW practitioner in the 2000's and has compete "EW virgins" as flag rank leadership means it will fail with mass casualties in its first major drone war combat.
1/3
A US Army serious about drone warfare would:

- Rebuild the full EW enterprise with organic division-level EW battalions and real exercises.

- Embed EW jamming into all combat branches (not MI-only).

- Shift to gun/autocannon dominant combined-arms counter-drone doctrine.

2/3
- Require FAA drone pilot + Ham radio licenses for flag ranks to build drone domain literacy.

None of these four reforms will happen until after US Army soldiers are deep in both defeat and buckets of blood.

3/3
Read 4 tweets

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