@bertcmiller βš‘οΈπŸ€– Profile picture
Jun 9, 2021 β€’ 28 tweets β€’ 7 min read β€’ Read on X
A thread of all my MEV related threads in chronologic order πŸ‘‡πŸ»
The first Uncle Bandit pulling off a multi-block heist and launching a new category of MEV strategies
The second Uncle Bandit steps in the ring, revealing a surprising identity, and making off with 125 ETH
Vitalik using ArcherSwap to escape the predators of the dark forest
A honey pot targeting some of Ethereum's most sophisticated users
Flashbots releases v0.2 and introduces bundle merging
MEV-SGX: a proposal for complete privacy and permissionlessness using secure enclaves
Searchers gaming the Flashbots auction
A look at a complicated newπŸ₯ͺ bot's new technique
A look at leveraged sandwiching using flashswaps

A thread on Flashbots' v0.4 release introducing mega bundles
The latest in πŸ₯ͺ bot baiting, this time featuring a fake Uniswap pool

(Make sure you click through to get to the end, Twitter broke on this one)
Announcing Flashbots Protect, our tools for developers and users to make using Flashbots easier

Launches our RPC endpoint here

The pirate hacker

Make sure to dig through my tweets here, there is a whole saga
Two of the largest arbs ever were landed by the same bot within 3 hours of each other
Thoughts on just-in-time liquidity and MEV on Uniswap v3
Why we should study the broadest definition of MEV
Finding a monster in Ethereum's dark forest, ECDSA nonce reuse in the wild:
A review of last years bot on bot MEV attacks
A bot that leverages $5m of their own money into $150m using a unique strategy in order to sandwich Curve swaps

A cluster of blocks had massive MEV payments after a huge ETH market sell
MEV bots fight over ETH in a vulnerable contract

At some point I'm going to have to cut this thread off I think, not sure when I should/will do it
The story of 0xbaDc0dE making and losing $1m+ in an hour

Bad code, great content

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More from @bertcmiller

Dec 6, 2023
A brief thread on a novel MEV searching strategy, where we chase the trail of a mysterious bot backrunning private flow and reveal how they do it.
@blairmarshall pointed out a bot that appears to have private access to user orderflow that was landing bottom-of-the-block blocks on the Flashbots builder. That didn't make sense to me. We don't run backrunning bots! So we investigated.
Here is an example.

In block 18728532 a user makes a trade at the top of the block. They sell about 3 ETH worth of Truebit and it seems using a private mempool too.

etherscan.io/txs?block=1872…

Image
Image
Read 13 tweets
May 10, 2023
jaredfromsubway.eth's alpha and how to stop him
jaredfromsubway.eth is a prolific sandwich bot who went viral a few weeks back

They famously were sandwiching a TON of $PEPE traders and are frequently one of the top consumers of gas on the network

Why are they dominating sandwiches? What's their edge?

Keep scrolling, anon.
FIRST, most MEV bots go from ETH -> memecoin -> ETH, atomically making profit and holding only ETH

Jared holds memecoins and will sandwich memecoin -> ETH trades. There is very little competition for this.

Let's look at an example.
Read 13 tweets
May 2, 2023
Introducing simple-blind-arbitrage: an open source bot that blindly but atomically backruns private transactions from MEV-Share Matchmakers.

github.com/flashbots/simp…
simple-blind-arbitrage works by calculating and executing the optimal arbitrage on-chain.

It only requires the pools to attempt to arb as inputs, and does the rest in a smart contract. Image
How does it know which pools to try to arb? By listening to the Flashbots MEV-Share Matchmaker.

The Matchmaker keeps most tx details private to prevent frontrunning, but it shares the pools users are trading on.

Watch it from your browser here: mev-share.flashbots.net Image
Read 9 tweets
Mar 12, 2023
MEV-Boost payments were at an alltime high yesterday, totaling 7691 ETH (!) which is nearly double the previous ATH of 3928 ETH during the FTX fiasco this fall.

A few statistics on MEV on Ethereum yesterday in this thread

(h/t @nero_eth for the data)
You can't compare stats these 1:1, but the ATH for daily miner profit from mev-geth was 6397 ETH in June 2021. That's the *profit* of running mev-geth vs a vanilla mempool mining client.

A similar metric here would be the difference in payment for validators from running mev-boost or not. There's not a great up to date estimate of this out there I think

You could derive it by looking at the value of the mempool builder we submit (0xa1defa) and the winning block
Read 13 tweets
Mar 11, 2023
Brutal & unfortunate. A bad aggregator led to a user getting rekt.

A reason that a competitive MEV market & orderflow auctions are deeply important is that cases like this could potentially be entirely mitigated. The user could be paid back the arb that their wreckage left.
The user's $2m ended up in a Uni v2 pool, which an MEV bot was quick to snatch up for basically nothing of course. They paid a premium to a miner for this $2m but it really wasn't anything (~20 ETH).

The MEV market was strangely uncompetitive in this case. 20 ETH paid to the builder for capturing $2m is an insanely good trade and you'd expect competition to push that 20 ETH much much closer to the value of $2m.
Read 7 tweets
Feb 15, 2023
Introducing MEV-Share: programmably private orderflow that empowers users, redistributes MEV, and takes a step towards decentralized block building

MEV-Share is where transactions and bundles find their perfect match
collective.flashbots.net/t/mev-share-pr…
MEV-Share builds on MEV-Boost by further unbundling the transaction supply chain.

Whereas MEV-Boost enabled collaboration between validators and builders, MEV-Share does the same for searchers and users - empowering users to be paid for their transactions.
With privacy users can bargain for the MEV they create without permissioning searchers. But, programmable privacy allows users to selectively share information to enable optimization and collaboration.
Read 11 tweets

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