In addition to the anti-sanctions law, China also issued a Data Security Law yesterday, which includes some good news and some not-so-good news.
I will start with the good news:
1. The law explicitly mentions in two provisions that China will safeguard and promote the free flow of data, which is consistent with China’s new position on data flow in the RCEP;
2. China will actively participate in the making of international rules on data security and standards. This is consistent with China’s active participation in the WTO JSI negotiations on e-commerce, which was analyzed extensively in my paper at ssrn.com/abstract=36953….
Now let me turn to the not-so-good news: 1. In most countries, data protection laws focus on personal data. In China, however, there is also the highly ambiguous concept of “important data”, as mentioned in Art. 31 of the Cybersecurity Law.
Now Data Security Law creates yet another type called “core data”, which is more important than important data & subject to the most stringent restrictions. “Core data” includes those on national security, lifeline of national economy, key people's livelihood, public interests.
There seems to be a lot of overlap between "core data" and important data on “critical information infrastructure”, which as I discussed in this paper is a rather vague concept: ssrn.com/abstract=34302…
2. Under Cybersecurity Law, review on data transfer is only required for important data collected and generated by operators of critical information infrastructure.
Under Data Security Law, however, even the transfer of important data collected and generated by other data processors could be subject to security review, subject to the rules to be made by the Cyberspace Administration of China.
3. Data security issues will now be decided and coordinated by the Central National Security Commission of the Chinese Communist Party.
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Xi’s Feb speech to private firms is finally published—and it confirms everything I predicted before the meeting:
Private firms must fully align with China’s strategic competition vs the US.
Xi says private firms’ problems stem from external shocks (tech revolutions, trade restrictions) or internal missteps (over-diversification).
To Xi, the Party is not the problem, it is the solution.
Thus, firms must “unify their thoughts and actions with the Central Committee.”
Xi was even more explicit on measures to boost private firms: they should lead national science & tech projects, access major research infrastructure, and join state-led initiatives.
Exactly what I predicted 3 years ago in my @CIGI essay: private firms must be integrated into
What’s the biggest threat to China’s economy in the 2nd half of 2025?
It’s not the trade war, nor any new government policy. It’s a judicial interpretation from the Supreme Court.
On July 31, the Court issued Interpretation on Applicable Law in Trying Labour Dispute Cases (II).
Article 19 states:
“If the employer agrees with the employee, or the employee promises the employer, that there is no need to pay social security premiums, the people’s court shall find the agreement or promise invalid. If the employer fails to pay social security premiums in
accordance with the law, and the employee requests the termination of the labour contract in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 38 of the Labour Contract Law and demands economic compensation, the people’s court shall support the claim.”
The new tariff numbers confirm what I wrote 4 months ago in my @commonplc piece “The Art of a Trade Deal”:
1. I stressed that these negotiations aren’t just about trade-security alignment would be a key factor. This is now explicit in the executive order, which repeatedly cites
security considerations in setting final tariff rates.
2. I predicted countries would be grouped based on key criteria. That’s exactly what we see: broadly speaking, there are three groups—friends (10–15%), enemies (30%+), and frenemies (19–25%).
3. I anticipated aggressive transshipment controls targeting China. The executive order includes just that.
4. Perhaps most tellingly, the order hints what China—the last holdout from the Liberation Day Tariffs—is likely to face: at least 40%, matching the rate applied to
The US-UK trade deal is out—and it confirms most of my predictions in my @commonplc piece “The Art of a Trade Deal” 4 weeks ago:
1. Tariffs: The 10% tariff remains in place for now, but contrary to some interpretations, this doesn’t mean the UK failed to negotiate it down. The
Agreement explicitly states that both sides will enter negotiations to reduce tariff rates. As I noted, the likely landing point is around the US’s 3.4% rate-if the UK is willing to match it.
2. Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs): Just as I anticipated, NTBs is central to the next phase
For a developed country like the UK, the focus is on overregulation—technical barriers to trade, SPS measures, and similar restrictions—all explicitly referenced in the Agreement.
3. Supply Chains: I flagged this as a key issue, and the Agreement confirms it. It addresses supply
Today’s front page of People’s Daily features the Central Peripheral Work Conference—a major development, given this is only the second such meeting in the PRC’s 76-year history.
The first such meeting was in Oct 2013, when Xi launched the BRI, which
was elevated to a national strategy at the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee held the following month.
As I argued in this @trade_review article 3 years ago, the BRI was China’s strategic response to US containment through the TPP, where the cambridge.org/core/journals/…
@trade_review US tried to “make sure the US—and not countries like China—is the one writing this century’s rules for the world’s economy.”
But the TPP was killed.
Now, as @realDonaldTrump tries to rewrite the rules of global trade through the Reciprocal Tariff Policy, China is striking back.