In addition to the anti-sanctions law, China also issued a Data Security Law yesterday, which includes some good news and some not-so-good news.
I will start with the good news:
1. The law explicitly mentions in two provisions that China will safeguard and promote the free flow of data, which is consistent with China’s new position on data flow in the RCEP;
2. China will actively participate in the making of international rules on data security and standards. This is consistent with China’s active participation in the WTO JSI negotiations on e-commerce, which was analyzed extensively in my paper at ssrn.com/abstract=36953….
Now let me turn to the not-so-good news: 1. In most countries, data protection laws focus on personal data. In China, however, there is also the highly ambiguous concept of “important data”, as mentioned in Art. 31 of the Cybersecurity Law.
Now Data Security Law creates yet another type called “core data”, which is more important than important data & subject to the most stringent restrictions. “Core data” includes those on national security, lifeline of national economy, key people's livelihood, public interests.
There seems to be a lot of overlap between "core data" and important data on “critical information infrastructure”, which as I discussed in this paper is a rather vague concept: ssrn.com/abstract=34302…
2. Under Cybersecurity Law, review on data transfer is only required for important data collected and generated by operators of critical information infrastructure.
Under Data Security Law, however, even the transfer of important data collected and generated by other data processors could be subject to security review, subject to the rules to be made by the Cyberspace Administration of China.
3. Data security issues will now be decided and coordinated by the Central National Security Commission of the Chinese Communist Party.
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Today’s front page of People’s Daily features the Central Peripheral Work Conference—a major development, given this is only the second such meeting in the PRC’s 76-year history.
The first such meeting was in Oct 2013, when Xi launched the BRI, which
was elevated to a national strategy at the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee held the following month.
As I argued in this @trade_review article 3 years ago, the BRI was China’s strategic response to US containment through the TPP, where the cambridge.org/core/journals/…
@trade_review US tried to “make sure the US—and not countries like China—is the one writing this century’s rules for the world’s economy.”
But the TPP was killed.
Now, as @realDonaldTrump tries to rewrite the rules of global trade through the Reciprocal Tariff Policy, China is striking back.
China today released a white paper titled “China's Position on Some Issues Concerning China-US Economic, Trade Relations.”
No, it’s not about setting the record straight as it claims.
It’s a retaliation wishlist—and a catalog of Beijing’s deepest trade fears.
1. Retaliation List:
• Banning U.S. services exports
• Halting IP protection for U.S. companies
• Imposing forced tech transfers
• Banning U.S. food and agricultural products
• Limiting access to China’s financial markets
• Devaluing the RMB
2. Fear List:
• Repeal of PNTR status
• Trade and investment restrictions on national security grounds
• Expanded export controls
• Section 301 tariffs
• Section 232 investigations
• Use of trade remedy tools (AD/CVD)
• Ending the de minimis exemption
• Reciprocal tariffs
Why did Trump impose tariffs on Heard & McDonald Islands-home only to penguins, and British Indian Ocean Territory, which is occupied solely by military personnel?
No, it’s not because of internet domain names, as some speculated.
The answer is found in today’s People’s Daily
editorial, “Pressure and threats are by no means the right way to deal with China,” which proudly declared that China maintains “import and export records with almost all countries and regions in the UN Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use.”
And guess what? Among
those listed in the UN Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use are the Great Territories of the British Indian Ocean Territory and Heard and McDonald Islands!
Three things you need to know about Liberation Day tariffs:
1. It’s not about the methodology.
The formula has been widely mocked, but that misses the point. The numbers aren’t meant to hold up in a PhD defense—they’re meant to shock, to create leverage. The more extreme the
figure, the stronger the incentive for other countries to come to the negotiating table with the U.S.
2. It’s not even about the tariffs.
The real issue isn’t Vietnam’s tariff rates—it’s China’s trans-shipment tactics and its central role in global supply chains.
The aim is to
isolate China and rewrite the rules of global trade. If a country like Vietnam is willing to align with that goal, it doesn’t matter much whether it sets its tariffs for American products at 0%, 5%, or even 9.4% (current rate).
Amid Trump tariff chaos, People’s Daily published an editorial today urging everyone to “Focus on Doing Your Own Things”—a phrase that sums up China’s core strategy. This thread breaks it down.
It begins by acknowledging that U.S. tariffs do hurt, but “the sky can’t collapse.”
That phrase—“the sky can’t collapse”—is notable. Mao used the exact same words in 1962 during a meeting of 7,000 top CCP officials, after a disastrous 13 years marked by the Great Famine and split with a world Superpower - the USSR.
Fittingly, this is also the 13th year of Xi’s
reign—featuring the Great Lockdown and split with a world Superpower - the US.
The editorial offers 5 reasons why “the sky can’t collapse”:
1. China is a mega-sized economy with strong resilience to U.S. pressure. 2. China’s dependence on the U.S. is shrinking: exports to U.S.
So while the tariffs may not make traditional economic sense, they might make strategic sense — as a deterrent against serving as transshipment hubs for China.
In effect: allow transshipments, and your own exports get punished.
Is it crude?
Yes.
But could it be an effective
way to tackle the transshipment issue?
Possibly.
How might these countries respond?
One option — which may be exactly what Trump administration is aiming for — is for them to start rejecting Chinese transshipments, or even imposing steep tariffs on Chinese imports themselves.