In addition to the anti-sanctions law, China also issued a Data Security Law yesterday, which includes some good news and some not-so-good news.
I will start with the good news:
1. The law explicitly mentions in two provisions that China will safeguard and promote the free flow of data, which is consistent with China’s new position on data flow in the RCEP;
2. China will actively participate in the making of international rules on data security and standards. This is consistent with China’s active participation in the WTO JSI negotiations on e-commerce, which was analyzed extensively in my paper at ssrn.com/abstract=36953….
Now let me turn to the not-so-good news: 1. In most countries, data protection laws focus on personal data. In China, however, there is also the highly ambiguous concept of “important data”, as mentioned in Art. 31 of the Cybersecurity Law.
Now Data Security Law creates yet another type called “core data”, which is more important than important data & subject to the most stringent restrictions. “Core data” includes those on national security, lifeline of national economy, key people's livelihood, public interests.
There seems to be a lot of overlap between "core data" and important data on “critical information infrastructure”, which as I discussed in this paper is a rather vague concept: ssrn.com/abstract=34302…
2. Under Cybersecurity Law, review on data transfer is only required for important data collected and generated by operators of critical information infrastructure.
Under Data Security Law, however, even the transfer of important data collected and generated by other data processors could be subject to security review, subject to the rules to be made by the Cyberspace Administration of China.
3. Data security issues will now be decided and coordinated by the Central National Security Commission of the Chinese Communist Party.
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Today PLA Daily finally published another editorial on the Zhang Youxia case, which in itself is not surprising. What is striking are the following: 1. The editorial came a full 6 days after the case was first reported, during which time Zhang’s name never appeared at all.
2. Despite the strong rhetoric, there is still no pledge of loyalty from commanders across the various regions.
3. The editorial openly acknowledges the need to “face short-term difficulties and periodic pains,” implicitly admitting that things didn't go as smoothly as planned.
4. It goes out of its way to spell out that the CMC Chairman Responsibility System means "to resolutely follow Xi’s commands, be responsible to Xi, and reassure Xi".
This appears to be a response to arguments that the system means loyalty to the position, not to the person.
Today’s PLA Daily editorial on anti-corruption offers a textbook example of how to read CCP propaganda:
Read it backwards.
The key message is that “a few corrupt elements can’t make any waves.”
1. Is it really just “a few,” when 5 of the 6 CMC members other than Xi are gone?
2. Among the 5 major crimes listed in yesterday’s PLA Daily piece, corruption was only the 3rd. Even then, Zhang and Liu were not accused of corrupting themselves, but of “seriously promoting political and corrupt problems that affect the Party’s absolute leadership of the army.”
Notably, "political" comes before "corrupt" — and promoting corruption is not the same as engaging in corruption.
3. Can they “make waves”?
Perhaps not the generals promoted by Xi.
But Zhang, a veteran commander with deep roots and a long history in the PLA, is different.
Interesting story by @Lingling_Wei & @ByChunHan, but I have several questions:
1. @WSJ reports that the evidence against Zhang came from Gu Jun, former general manager of China National Nuclear Corp. But anyone familiar with the Chinese system knows that a suspect under
@neilthomas123 2. I’m not convinced by the claim that the investigation of Zhang is “a sign of strength, not weakness, for Xi”, esp as the same article notes that the investigation team in Shenyang chose to stay in local hotels rather than military bases!
It has nothing to do with corruption, despite what People’s Daily (and many pundits here) have claimed. The issue is far more fundamental: who controls the PLA.
Art 29 of PRC Constitution states that PRC armed forces belong to the people.
In reality, however, the army belongs neither to the people nor even to the People’s Republic.
It belongs to the CCP.
This principle was established under Mao and has been reaffirmed repeatedly. Most recently, the 2019 CCPCC Decision on Several Major Issues of Adhering to and
Improving the Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics and Promoting Modernisation of the National Governance System and Governance Capacity explicitly calls for upholding the “absolute leadership of the CCP over the army” and for “resolutely resisting wrong political views
China has just revised its Foreign Trade Law, and the signal is unmistakable: Beijing is preparing for a long, tougher trade war with the US—for the next 3 years and beyond.
At the core of the revision is a new willingness to use unilateral trade countermeasures. Under the
revised Article 40, China can restrict or ban trade with foreign individuals or firms that harm China’s sovereignty or development interests, disrupt “normal” market transactions with Chinese entities, or discriminate against Chinese firms.
Crucially, the law also goes after
circumvention. Logistics providers, platforms, and other intermediaries can be penalised for helping firms evade Chinese measures.
This is clearly aimed at the “poison pill” clauses in recent US trade agreements, which try to lock partners into coordinated actions on China.
Finally had time to read this, but I could barely get past the opening pages. Still, I’ll try.
This is how Kuo begins his essay:
“This essay doesn’t rehearse the familiar bill of particulars on China—constraints on political pluralism and independent media; expansive security
powers and preemptive detention; pressure on religious and ethnic expression; and episodes of extraterritorial coercion—not because those concerns are trivial, but because the task here is different.”
This has become the now-standard preface in China-defender discourse:
“the task here is different”, but different in what?
According to Kuo, “the aim here is to confront, with intellectual honesty, what China’s achievements oblige us to reconsider about modernity, state capacity, forms of political legitimacy, and our own complacencies.”