Over the years Bellingcat has become increasingly involved with the justice and accountability community, and what's become increasingly clear is how utterly detached most of the online debate about things like chemical weapon use in Syria are from the work of that community.
In recent years there’s been a great deal of interest in the use of open source evidence in a legal setting, and we’ve worked with a range of organisations, including human rights NGOS, academic institutes, bodies like the ICC and others to examine how it can be used.
There’s really a wide range of really important work being done by all those organisations, and great progress has been made over the last few years on understanding how open source evidence can be used in a legal setting without much fanfare.
So when I look at the online “debate” around chemical weapon use in Syria, where there’s been a lot of work done by the justice and accountability community, it becomes quite apparent how totally detached from the work of those seeking accountability it is.
If you spend a lot of time debating these things online you might imagine that’s the entire debate, when in reality it’s barely a circus sideshow in terms of the real work being done towards justice and accountability.
Effectively a lot of it is performative outrage which confuses clicks with real world impact. Getting invited to a UN side meeting to deny war crimes on behalf of Russia might make you feel important, but in terms of serious accountability work it’s not even a blip.
There’s some really great work being done on accountability on a range of issues, including chemical weapon use in Syria, and you should never confuse the online debate with real world efforts to bring war criminals to account and find justice for their victims.
But along with that there’s a lot of empty garbage that’s more about stroking egos than accountability, that confuses social media onanism with activism and page views with impact.
The justice and accountability community has meanwhile focused on putting together cases in various courts, like this one in France in relation to chemical attacks in 2013, and continue its efforts to do it elsewhere. reuters.com/article/syria-…
Probably the best work I've seen on the scale of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and the logic behind it, is by @GPPigppi.net/2019/02/17/the…
They've got a great online portal where you can find lots of information about chemical attacks in Syria, details you'll rarely find anywhere else chemicalweapons.gppi.net
Their data portal contains details of 349 chemical attacks in Syria. Most of nosiest denialists could barely name 5, let alone 349, because ultimately they have an incredibly shallow understanding of the topic. chemicalweapons.gppi.net/data-portal/
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The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) specifically names Bonanza Media in its 2020 annual report as one of the platforms used by the GRU to disseminate disinformation about the MH17 investigation aivd.nl/onderwerpen/ja…
Last November we wrote about how Bonanza Media founder, former Russia Today journalist Yana Yerlashova, was in frequent contact with a GRU officer by phone and email bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-eu…
Bonanza Media became a focal point for the efforts of Dutch MH17 truthers travelling to Eastern Ukraine to interview witnesses who supported their denials of Russia's involvement in Ukraine and publishing documents from the JIT.
The MH17 trial is currently showing part of a Buk missile embedded in part of the debris of the aircraft, so I'm not sure how the conspiracy theorists are going to explain that one (although I'm sure they'll try).
All of those who insisted it was a Ukrainian SU-25 that shot down MH17 for years should really be ashamed of themselves after watching this presentation.
I had years of abuse from those conspiracy theorists, I hope they take this as an opportunity to reflect on their behaviour and apologise.
In the initial days after MH17 was shot down I collected all the photos of the cockpit section crash site and organised them so I had effectively a crowdsourced Google Street View version of the crash site, which helped make the area of impact damage more obvious.
It was very clear at that point where the vast majority of the damage was done, and that it had come from outside the aircraft, so I could confirm very early on it was definitely an external explosion, not a bomb placed on the aircraft.
I remember a little community forming on Twitter and on forums just closely examining every part of the aircraft, trying to figure out which piece of debris fit where. This image was one that came out of those early efforts.
In all seriousness, will @TwitterSafety no longer permit statements claiming Syrian chemical weapon attacks were "false flags"? I'd be interested in seeing whose authority they refer to on that topic, because if its the OPCW then a whole lot of people will be censured.
There's still a community of people who deny the Syrian government's Sarin attack on Khan Sheikhoun, and we've had the OPCW state they were the likely perpetrator of the attack, so will that be what @TwitterSupport uses to make these decisions?
I wouldn't be against that, but keep in mind the OPCW IIT has only laid blame in a handful of chemical attacks in Syria, so the conspiracy theorists could bang on about attacks like Douma that the IIT hasn't reported on if that was the level Twitter required.
New from Bellingcat - US military personnel responsible for US nuclear weapons in European military bases are inadvertently sharing details about their security protocols and weapons storage online via flashcard apps. bellingcat.com/news/2021/05/2…
Dr Jeffrey Lewis (@ArmsControlWonk),Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said that the findings showed a “flagrant breach” in security practices related to US nuclear weapons stationed in NATO countries.
Some flashcards uncovered during the course of this investigation had been publicly visible online as far back as 2013. Other sets detailed processes that were being learned by users until at least April 2021.
So Unit 29155 has now been linked to three attempted assassination attempts using nerve agents, 5 warehouse explosions and one fire to cover up their involvement in the explosions, all in EU counties. Seems like it's time for a serious EU wide inquiry into Russian spy activity.
This doesn't even include things like the Berlin bicycle assassination, or the attempted coup in Montenegro, and all the other stuff we don't know about.
There's also many other trips to locations across Europe that have involved Unit 29155 members where we still don't know why they were there. It's clear they're involved in everything from coups to assassinations, so I think it's fair to assume the worse.