We appear to be in the “try to force it into Gmail” lifecycle phase of Google’s latest chat app.
This will be followed by two name changes and removal from Gmail, before Google kills it and we start the cycle over in about 18 months.
What even is this.
“Milk”, formerly known as “Hangouts Milk”, will replace “Google Hangouts Milk” which will still be offered to consumer Gmail accounts as “Google Mylk”.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
This is an amazing paper. It implies (with strong statistical evidence) that the design of a major mobile-data encryption algorithm — used in GPRS data — was deliberately backdoored by its designer. eprint.iacr.org/2021/819
The GPRS standards were extensions to the GSM (2G/3G) mobile standard that allowed phones to use data over cellular networks. This was before LTE. For security, the standards included encryption to provide over-the-air security for your data. 2/
As is “normal” for telephony standards, the encryption was provided by two custom ciphers: GEA-1 and GEA-2. While there were strong export control regulations in place for crypto, there’s little overt indication that either of these ciphers was deliberately weakened. 3/
This is where we’re at. The responsibility for fighting surveillance abuse falls to tech companies, because nobody even pretends that the Federal government and courts are functional moral actors.
I have to assume that right now Apple and other tech companies are developing procedures to identify subpoenas that are aimed at Congress, on the assumption that the DoJ can’t be trusted to tell them.
“Well, we only handed over metadata, not content.”
You handed over a list that could contain every phone number House Intelligence Committee members ever spoke to or texted with, and you think that makes it ok?
Also I think it’s amazing that in five years we’ve gone from “if you haven’t committed a crime you don’t need encryption” to “US opposition lawmakers have their texts searched.”
Quick reminder: Apple could fix this in a heartbeat by adding an “end to end encryption for iCloud backup” setting (the tech is already in place), but they don’t. Even for those who want it.
I’m going to forget about TLS here for a moment, and point out that the best way to mitigate a lot of these attacks is just to replace cookies entirely.