Some notes on the insufficiency of revelation in Parshat Balak
1. "Don't go with them" "Go with them"
While the story paints Balaam as clearly in the wrong, it doesn't pretend he was violating a clear command. The basic thrust of the narrative insists that the command is not
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clear. God's will and revelation are not identical.
2. This leads into the next step of the drama. If revelation does not guarantee access to the divine will, what does? Maybe you should look elsewhere? Maybe *the donkey* knows? This sort of expansive divine will contra
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a more narrow but more explicit revelation is a deep underpinning in lots of texts, perhaps most famously in Hasidut.
3. On a meta-level, the whole idea that "a prophet is the bad guy" is just wild. Many medieval pens were broken trying to argue that this is impossible. But
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as the story would have it, prophets can be bad. Knowing divine truths is does not mean following the divine will. The narrative holds will and knowledge (both human and divine) apart, and will is more important. Ethics trumps ontology.
4. It would take more time to trace out
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all the biblical and rabbinic threads but this lens can be used to resolve issues in the final story, where Moshe gets one command RE the leaders, Pinhas enacts something different RE Zimri, but it still works, etc. Knowing the command vs. an act of will. As political
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theologies go, I don't love it. But it's sort of glaring.
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Theodicy and State Violence: Political Theology & Rav Shagar
THREAD
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Adam Kotsko usefully expands Carl Schmitt's definition of political theology thusly: Political theology deals, writ large, with analogies between the problem of evil and political legitimacy—theological and political *justification*—in a given culture. 2/
At first glance, Rav Shagar would seem to lack any such analogy. In "צחוק המגילה" he discusses both divine and state violence, and both exceed any form of rationale or justification. Yet divine absurdity simply elicits a corresponding human absurdity. 3/ preview.tinyurl.com/yy7z3gpz
There’s an Aggadata in b. Temurah about 3000 halakhot forgotten by Yehoshua (and everyone else) after Moshe died. I’m a fan.
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I usually see it brought up in discussions of Moshe or Yehoshua’s leadership and... yeah, ok. That’s definitely there, but there’s so much more.
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The other main place I see it is discussions of Oral Torah vs. prophecy. It’s the other “Not in Heaven” text but it doesn’t have nearly as much drama as the Akhnai one
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The Moral Arc of the Universe and Maimonides’ Hermeneutics of Accommodation: A Thread
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Maimonides' devotes much Guide for the Perplexed Part III to giving reasons for the commandments. This act is fundamentally hermeneutic, aimed at making sense of the absurd, and I think it has a lot to say to our present moment. (I'll cite chapters, but see III:26–49)
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Maimonides says that many commandments are nonsensical, because they're leftovers from earlier periods of time (III:49). Divine commandments, he says, are always compromises, where Divine Wisdom accommodates the reality of historical conditions (III:32 and more).
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Dialogic Philosophy and the Memory of the Holocaust: A Thread
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I wanted to write this up fully but I won’t have time before Shabbat, so here’s a twitter thread:
Dialogic philosophy, roughly, theorizes dialogue, talking about how it works and using it as a basis for thinking about human existence more broadly.
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A key insight found among the various dialogic thinkers is the foundational distinction between the unique individual and their traits which are common property of all people.
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