Fischer's analogy to Cold War 1.0 is a red herring. The threat which the Chinese Communist Party poses to peace within and outside 🇨🇳 can not be directly compared to the former USSR. It is a different kettle of fish. What I find worrisome is how Fischer misrepresents the CCP /2
Fischer describes 🇨🇳 as "a market economy under Leninist auspices". This "hybrid character" supposedly explains China's "success story" and its ability to overtake the 🇺🇸 technologically and economically by 2030. The many costs of China's political system do not feature at all /3
Fischer seems unaware of the increasingly predatory nature of the Chinese party-state, with rampant rent seeking and systemic corruption in state & society; business; food industry; education; health care; journalism etc. Neither does me mention Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan /4
But Fischer does not concern himself with the way China is governed. He views 🇨🇳 exclusively through the prism of US-China great power rivalry. He ridicules any attempts to either change or contain CCP-led China and suggests unconditional cooperation as a simplistic solution /5
Fischer justifies unconditional China engagement with reference to climate change & pandemic mitigation. China's over-reliance on and investment in coal isn't mentioned, neither does he seem concerned about the initial cover-up of Covid-19 in Wuhan. He is completely uncritical /6
Fischer could have discussed the systemic competition between democracies & autocracies independently from US-China great power rivalry. This would have required him to critically assess the relationship between 🇩🇪 and 🇨🇳. But he does not comment on this crucial relationship /7
Fischer's silence on Sino-German relations is odd. While he mentions "economic dependencies" on China's market he fails to offer remedies. But doesn't Made in China 2025 directly challenge 🇩🇪's Industry 4.0? Doesn't Covid-19 show the weakness of global supply chains? @Der_BDI /8
And what are Fischer's views on the Chinese Communist Party's hybrid interference in 🇩🇪? What we are witnessing is what Mikael Wigell @MWigell calls a "'wedge strategy' (...) a policy of dividing a target country or coalition, thereby weakening its
counterbalancing potential" /9
We can already see that the CCP's globalised censorship regime leads to self-censorship. 🇩🇪 culture, academia, media & publishing (the CAMP sectors) are all vulnerable to hybrid interference by state and non-state actors under CCP control. Is Fischer unaware of these threats? /10
Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has a special responsibility to inform the public about threats to our democratic system. His op-ed in @China_table is not only ill-informed but also obfuscates the challenge at hand. This undermines our #democratic#deterrence /11
In my @china_table op-ed from 6 April 2021 I argued for a paradigm shift in German China policy (see Twitter 🧵 below). In the following I will add specific policy recommendation for Germany's economic and political relationship with CCP-led China /12
To reduce 🇩🇪 dependency on 🇨🇳's market we need partial decoupling and reshoring of key industries, e.g. pharmaceutical manufacturing. German companies in key sectors like education, health, energy, water, transport & communication should be protected from Chinese takeovers /13
And to dissuade the Chinese Communist Party's hybrid interference in Germany we should heed the advice by @MWigell and develop "counter-measures against the hybrid influencing toolbox of clandestine diplomacy, geo-economics and disinformation" /14 fiia.fi/en/publication…
As @MWigell rightly points out "liberal democratic values (...) can be turned into strengths and tools for a credible deterrence response against hybrid aggressors, all the while making our Western democracies more robust and resilient." /15
Wigell recommends a two-pronged democratic deterrence strategy which relies on "deterrence by denial: improving democratic resilience" and "deterrence by punishment: discovering democratic compellence". They both require a whole-of-society approach & the drawing of red lines /16
Let me conclude. Fischer's op-ed in @china_table is emblematic of the very superficial China discourse among members of Germany's political establishment, both past and present. His musings are also largely divorced from the real-world challenges we face with CCP-led China /End
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Der jüngste Appell von @JohannesVarwick et al warnt vor "Panikstimmung" im Umgang mit Russland und spielt die Bedrohung durch ein radikal-revisionistisches Russland unter Putin herunter. Eine kurze Gegenrede /1 stern.de/politik/deutsc…
Es handelt sich dabei um eine Ansammlung altbekannter Denk- und Redefiguren, die in der Vision von Deutschland als "Zivilmacht" (Hanns W. Maull) verankert sind /2
Die Unterzeichner fordern "Kompromisse". Doch wie sollen Verhandlungen Putin von kinetischen und hybriden Angriffen auf Europa abhalten? /3
Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has upended Europe's security architecture, yet Germany’s moralised, dysfunctional foreign policy discourse traps us in a Groundhog Day loop. Trump II’s alignment with Putin makes it even worse. A short🧵/1
It’s not just cognitive dissonance – it’s a case of what Karl Deutsch called 'pathological learning'. Germany is failing to adapt to new realities. Outdated behaviours or beliefs are being reinforced despite clear evidence of their inadequacy /2
For decades🇩🇪was a ‘civilian power’ (Hanns W. Maull): rejecting militarism, ‘Never again,’ Ostpolitik etc. In 2025, that is not enough to counter mounting threats to our sovereignty and national security /3
Im Herbst 2024 erschienen in der Zeitschrift SIRIUS Rezensionen zu China-Büchern, darunter Oertels neuestes Werk und mein Buch 'Germany and China'. Auffällig war ein Verriss von Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrziks 'China und die Neuordnung der Welt' (Brandstätter Verlag, 2023) /1
Trotz detaillierter Kenntnisse zu Chinas Außen- und Innenpolitik gelänge es der Autorin nicht ein "differenziertes, kohärentes und realistisches Bild von der derzeitigen internationalen Krisensituation und der Rolle Chinas darin zu vermitteln" /2 degruyter.com/document/doi/1…
Konkret bemängelt der Rezensent Krause, dass Weigelin-Schwiedrzik Chinas Position im Ukraine-Krieg als neutral darstelle, obwohl Peking "ein möglichst schnelles Ende des Ukraine-Kriegs will – aber zugunsten Russlands und am besten mit der völligen Unterwerfung der Ukraine" /3
Tomorrow’s German election could be Europe’s most pivotal since Brexit 2016. Can a functioning coalition emerge? Or will Germany turn ungovernable? What’s at stake for Europe’s future? A short 🧵/1
Polls favour @_FriedrichMerz (CDU/CSU) to lead Germany’s next government. Yet preference falsification and @dieLinke's rise in the polls signal a wild card. Tomorrow evening we could be in for a surprising election result /2
@_FriedrichMerz @dieLinke And have a look at this electoral map. The far-right @AfD is set to surge in the East. The centre-right @CDUCSUbt is poised to win big in the West. What does that tell us about the state of German unification thirty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall? /3
Folks need to understand that elite capture / strategic corruption is real: in the 🇺🇸, in 🇪🇺 , wherever you look. For too long we assumed that our democratic institutions could withstand the onslaught of corporate and foreign government lobbying / influence / interference /1
What started with the Schroederisation of politics has now morphed into institutional corruption. This is the inconvenient truth, the 🐘 in the room. We now not only need strengthened 🇪🇺 military capabilities but also national and transnational movements against corruption /2
Self-serving European elites contributed to today’s mess just as much as the true believers of the MAGA movement. Both have major blind spots, just different ones. The resulting #hypernormalisation prevents necessary reforms aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability /3
German strategic culture remains stuck in the outdated paradigm of economic interdependence. Although 'change through trade' has been discredited, no new strategic framework has emerged to take its place. This shift would require not only new ideas but also fresh leadership /1
I was intrigued by Johannes Volkmann @jbvolkmann, a 27-year-old candidate for the German Bundestag. As the grandson of the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, he may come to represent a new generation of German politicians /2 hessenschau.de/politik/johann…
I noted with great interest that he has an academic background in Contemporary Chinese Studies from Oxford, complemented by his year spent in 🇨🇳 at both Tongji University and Peking University. He appears to possess the much-needed 'China competence.' /3 johannes-volkmann.de/uebermich/