NGSW RECAP (Thread)
The felt recoil of prototype weapons for the US Army's NGSW program is significantly higher than for legacy 7.62 mm weapons. But the recoil of 7.62 mm weapons, which is difficult to control when firing bursts, was partly why NATO switched to 5.56 mm.
1/20
A 2nd problem is that NGSW weapons have a muzzle velocity of 3,000 f/sec (914 m/sec) and chamber pressure of 80,000 psi versus 45,000-55,000 psi for 7.62 mm. This is going to cause serious barrel and parts longevity issues. NGSW reports suggest < 3,000 round weapon life.
2/20
Such performance is based on the need to penetrate Level IV body armour at 600 metres. The result is an ammunition that's as powerful as .300 Winchester Magnum, which has ~ 20% more energy than the .30-06 cartridge on which 7.62 mm NATO is based. (Image: The Firearm Blog)
3/20
The challenge of teaching male and female soldiers to shoot so they can accurately hit targets in combat at distance, when fatigued or under stress, will be much greater. I can see 6.8 mm NGSW being a specialist DMR cartridge, but a standard infantry calibre? Really?
4/20
So, the first question to ask is whether the task of taking out enemies wearing body armour at 600 metres is better left to snipers equipped with .338 / 8.59 mm precision rifles? Second, could the range at which Level IV armour needs to be defeated be reduced to 300 metres?
5/20
My view is that the large number of 7.62x51 mm NATO weapons and 7.62x54 mm Russian weapons still in use around the world means that any future NATO calibre must at least match these two legacy cartridges in range and terminal effectiveness. NGSW certainly does this.
6/20
But the equally important challenge is to reduce the dismounted soldier's weight burden. If 6.8 mm NGSW replaces 5.56 mm ammunition at squad level, its increased weight will do the opposite. (The SIG hybrid case, for example, is close in weight to 7.62 mm NATO brass.)
7/20
Polymer cased 6.8 mm NGSW ammo has potential to match 5.56 mm weight, but is unlikely to be less. Ultimately, the challenge is to configure 7.62 mm performance in a 5.56 mm package. In fact, the US Army Marksmanship Unit did a great job with its .264 USA cartridge (centre).
8/20
More recently, another cartridge has become a firm favourite of SOCOM operators. This is the 6.5 mm Creedmoor. Shown below centre in SIG's hybrid case, it significantly overmatches 7.62 mm beyond 500 metres. Unfortunately, its power also impacts barrel and parts longevity.
9/20
More recently, US ammo company Hornady produced the 6 mm Advanced Rifle Cartridge. This is basically a 6 mm version of the 6.5 mm Grendel and offers significant long-range performance. It fits the action length of legacy 5.56 mm weapons, but it isn't clear how lethal it is.
10/20
Any discussion of future calibre choices wouldn't be complete without consideration of the 6.5 mm Grendel. With same overall length as a 5.56 mm NATO cartridge, it can be used in re-barrelled AR15s. The problem is it needs a 24" barrel to achieve 7.62 mm performance claims.
11/20
To summarise, if NGSW proves to be too powerful, an obvious solution is to package the 6.8 mm EPR bullet in a 6.5 mm Creedmoor case. The goal would be to achieve Level 4 penetration at 300 metres. (The image below shows the NGSW 6.8 mm EPR-style bullet.)
12/20
If the notional "6.8 mm Creedmoor" is still too powerful, another option would be to reduce the calibre to 6 mm or 6.35 mm. Hornady has already developed a 6 mm Creedmoor round. This has exceptional long-range performance, less weight and less recoil than its big brother.
13/20
Ultimately, to deliver the required Level IV defeat at 300 metres, we're probably looking at a calibre of between 6 mm and 6.5 mm in a 45 mm to 51 mm case with a bullet weight of 6 to 7 grams. A brass cartridge would weigh around 16-18 grams and a polymer one 12-14 grams.
14/20
The truth is that while 5.56 mm is best at ranges below 300-400 metres, you don't need to go much bigger to deliver vastly better long-range performance and lethality in the same lightweight package. Britain and the US showed this in the 1970s with 6.25 mm and 6 mm SAW.
15/20
Looking ahead, the need to defeat body armour remains important, but if it imposes significant weight & recoil penalties, while reducing the total number of rounds that can be carried for a given weight, it'll be a retrograde step. So requirement setting must be realistic.
16/20
The Textron and GD-OTS NGSW weapons both validate polymer cased cartridges, although cased-telescoped ammo is likely to be risky and expensive, especially as 5.56 mm will still be retained for non-infantry units.
17/20
The SIG NGSW offering features a clever hybrid ammunition design that combines steel and brass. It sensibly recognises that brass ammo still makes a lot of sense.
18/20
It isn't clear what will happen with NGSW, even though the US Army is on track to complete testing this year with a view to selecting a winner this year and commencing fielding next year. My bet is that it may want to revisit the ammo specification for whatever weapon wins.
19/20
Lastly but not least, the most significant aspect of NGSW is the active reticle fire control optic. This truly impressive technology combining a ballistic computer, laser range finder and wind sensor will revolutionise combat marksmanship more than the weapon or ammunition.
/END
It was right to retire the British Army's Thales Watchkeeper WK450 UAS. It took far too long to bring it into service and by the time it arrived, newer and better systems were available. It was also difficult to operate. The question is what do we replace it with? (1/6)
An obvious choice is General Atomics Mojave, which is optimised for STOL operations from austere locations. This has a larger payload, double the range and better ISR sensors. It can also carry up to 16 Hellfire missiles for strike tasks. Crucially, it is harder to jam. (2/6)
Mojave, which is a modified version of General Atomics' MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS, weighs 1½ tonnes and has a reinforced undercarriage. Technically, it compares well to Watchkeeper while also being considerably less expensive to purchase and operate. (3/6)
The @GD_LandSystems M10 Booker is not a derivative of the ASCOD platform, but an all-new design. The hull has well-sloped armour, an 800 hp diesel driveline and @Horstman_Group hydro-pneumatic struts. The 105 mm gun based on the UK ROF L7 and is mounted in an Abrams-based turret.
As impressive as the vehicle itself is the acquisition approach. 12 prototypes from two companies were down-selected. These were tested extensively. A winner was chosen and awarded a LRIP contract for 26. Now that all issues are resolved a full production contract can be issued.
At each stage of the process, risk was managed. The onus was on @GD_LandSystems to resolve any issues in order to move the program to the next stage. Brigadier Glenn Dean, who has assumed overall responsibility for MPF deserves credit for doing a fantastic job.
Over the last 15 months, @LockheedMartin's M270 & HIMARS rocket launchers have performed extremely well, obliterating Russian targets while reducing collateral damage at ranges of 70 km, which is beyond the enemy's capacity to return effective counter-battery fire.
Ukraine's success with HIMARS confirms what we already believed, that precision-guided deep fires rockets and missiles enable smaller armies to deliver an effect that belies their size relative to larger, less capable adversaries.
Before the Russo-Ukrainian War, the USA had already initiated an upgrade programme to increase GMLRS range from 70 km to 150 km, while the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) can hit targets at 499 km, versus the existing ATACMS with a 150 km range. This is a significant upgrade.
The British Army's Protected Mobility Pipeline (PMP) programme will see 14 platforms merged into 5. Three PM platforms (light, medium, & heavy) will replace Foxhound, Mastiff, Ridgeback, Wolfhound, Husky, Foxhound, and Panther. This will streamline through-life support.
As good as Boxer is, only 4 infantry battalions will be equipped with it. So having a larger fleet of lower cost PMVs will be essential. Also, the way in which they're being used in Ukraine, as battlefield taxis that move infantry out-of-contact, points to a new way of operating.
For some roles, it makes sense to purchase an off-the-shelf solution from abroad (e.g., Oshkosh JLTV) where the price is lower than domestically produced vehicles can match. But for others, British industry is perfectly capable of producing a state-of-the-art 4x4 or 6x6 PMV.
When it comes to properly regenerating NATO forces, a prevailing view is that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict will be long over before any new capabilities ordered today are delivered, so any uplift in defence spending is pointless. THIS VIEW IS TOTALLY WRONG. Here's why...
While the conflict has resulted in the comprehensive degradation of Russia’s land force capabilities, Russia is not yet a spent force. Vladimir Putin has not accepted defeat, nor has he relinquished his territorial ambitions.
Even if the conflict is resolved in the short-term, either through the voluntary withdrawal or forced eviction of Russian forces from Ukraine, Putin is likely to use any peace agreement as an opportunity regenerate his army.
I've been analysing the British Army's overall structure in anticipation of the Defence Command Paper Refresh. It'll be interesting to see how it will be reorganised to accommodate the headcount reduction from 77,000 to 72,500.
Since many units are already operating below their permitted headcount, or are reliant on the Army Reserve to deploy, we could see much leaner units across the Army. Will 450 person infantry battalions be fit for purpose?
I am sure those responsible for reconfiguring he Army will be trying all kinds of models to make the new structure work. But I fear a bold correction may be necessary to ensure the combat units we do intend to field have sufficient potency and resilience in terms of headcount.