1/ Out today! “#GlobalChina: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World” is a current, broad-scope, and fact-based resource for understanding China — no longer a “rising power,” but rather a global actor. brook.gs/3iFfXf9
.@RepAdamSchiff applauds the “clear set of recommendations” and “insights from an impressive array of experts” discussed in our forthcoming title, #GlobalChina: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World. brook.gs/3iFfXf9
3/ In the new edited volume #GlobalChina, @ProfTalmadge argues that competition in the U.S.-China nuclear relationship is intensifying.
Read her analysis and suggestions for policymakers as the relationship heats up: brook.gs/3iFfXf9
4/ .@AngelaStent examines the rationale for the growing relationship between China & Russia and potential implications for the United States.
5/ According to @MichaelEOHanlon, China’s escalating skirmishes in the gray-zone could lead to military escalation.
See O’Hanlon’s recommendation for a policy of asymmetric defense in the new edited volume #GlobalChina
6/ .@SophieHRW discusses China’s impact on the UN Human Rights Council and suggests that member-nations concerned about human rights need to coordinate thoughtfully to limit Chinese influence there.
7/ This is a small sampling of the 37 chapters of the book that address the full range of issues relating to China's rise, from global governance to economic issues, technology, great power relations, regional issues, and so much more.
8/ The book is designed to be comprehensive and diverse, both in the issues examined and the viewpoints expressed. We hope the book contributes to understanding of what kind of global power China will be and how its rise will impact the US and others.
1/ PRC diplomacy often is very active during periods when Beijing judges the US is distracted or consumed by its own issues. This current moment may offer another data point, while US confronts conflicts in Europe and Middle East amid an intense election period (short 🪡🧵).
2/ In reviewing recent PRC statecraft, a few themes stand out:
-> Active efforts to stabilize relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and the UK;
-> Stalled progress with EU;
-> Xi's involvement in diplomacy with Russia, Iran;
-> Premier Li Qiang's busy diplomacy.
3/ On US, Beijing has largely played for time as it awaits outcome of election. For example, the presidential phone call Jake Sullivan previewed during his trip to Beijing never materialized. PRC seems content to defer leader-level contact until after US election, perhaps G-20.
1/ I highly recommend this book review by @CSISFreeman Jude Blanchette. Jude uses two recent books on Xi Jinping to explore what makes Xi tick, whether Xi is a true Marxist, and the ambitions that animate how Xi wields power. A few highlights (🧵). thewirechina.com/2024/10/17/is-…
2/ Jude cautions that "labeling Xi Jinping as a “Marxist” should come with deep qualifications, as his governance agenda shows little commitment to the kind of radical economic and social transformation that Marx originally envisioned."
3/ Jude observes that Xi's pronouncements on Marxism are fairly vapid and lack any advancement in theoretical thought. Xi's governance agenda has not prioritized Marxist ideals, instead privileging themes like anti-corruption, military modernization, and domestic strengthening.
1/ I have spoken with experts from both sides of the Taiwan Strait in recent days. I have been struck from these conversations by the gap between how each side viewed President Lai's 10/10 national day speech and the PRC military exercise that followed. (short 🧵)
2/ PRC experts focused their frustration on President Lai's characterization of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as separate, sovereign entities. They took exception with Lai's framing of the ROC constitution as only covering the territory under jurisdiction of Taipei.
3/ Taiwan experts, by contrast, noted Lai's speech was largely focused on domestic issues, with an emphasis on winning support from Taiwan's youth for Lai's agenda. They highlighted Lai's comments about Taiwan becoming more calm and confident in face of international instability.
1/ This is an interesting scoop by @dimi, @leahyjoseph. My experiences from being in meetings with Xi is that he rarely is casual with comments. They're usually calculated for effect. The desired effect often is open to interpretation. Here's how I read the comments (short 🧵).
2/ Xi's reported message seems to carry mix of threat + reassurance. On reassurance side, Xi seems to be signaling that he does not presently prefer to use force to achieve PRC goals on Taiwan. He blames the US for trying to draw him into a trap and suggests he won't fall for it.
3/ Blaming America for having a nefarious plot and vowing to resist it is a pretty safe way for China's leaders to inoculate themselves internally and justify why they will not take an action that some inside the system might be agitating for.
1/ While many experts in Washington debate whether China's power is peaking, there appears to be a bit of a mirror conversation in Beijing about the United States. This is one of several gaps that have emerged in perceptions of each other in recent years. Short thread 🧵...
2/ During a recent trip to Beijing and exchanges in DC with visiting PRC officials and experts, I've been struck by repetition of discussions around "rise of the east and decline of the west." A former Chinese official said this framing is consensus view of PRC leaders.
3/ As always, there is more art than science involved in determining how much these efforts are designed to inform vs influence. I suspect there would be less effort made to stress "rise of the east and decline of the west" if it already was broadly accepted, including in China.
1/ After having had an opportunity to privately compare notes with counterparts on both sides of Taiwan Strait in recent days on President Lai's inaugural address, I am struck by the scale of the disconnect that exists between both sides. A few brief observations (🧵)...
2/ PRC counterparts I have been in touch with acknowledged being surprised by the tone and content of Lai's speech. They indicated Beijing felt it needed to dial up its response to set down a marker with Taipei and Washington, including via sharp rhetoric and military exercises.
3/ Many Taiwan counterparts I have spoken with hoped Beijing would register Lai's goodwill gestures in his speech and not overreact. All Taiwan counterparts I have spoken with expected Beijing to react ("that's what the PRC does," one said), but hoped it wouldn't be too dramatic.