1/ Out today! “#GlobalChina: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World” is a current, broad-scope, and fact-based resource for understanding China — no longer a “rising power,” but rather a global actor. brook.gs/3iFfXf9
.@RepAdamSchiff applauds the “clear set of recommendations” and “insights from an impressive array of experts” discussed in our forthcoming title, #GlobalChina: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World. brook.gs/3iFfXf9
3/ In the new edited volume #GlobalChina, @ProfTalmadge argues that competition in the U.S.-China nuclear relationship is intensifying.
Read her analysis and suggestions for policymakers as the relationship heats up: brook.gs/3iFfXf9
4/ .@AngelaStent examines the rationale for the growing relationship between China & Russia and potential implications for the United States.
5/ According to @MichaelEOHanlon, China’s escalating skirmishes in the gray-zone could lead to military escalation.
See O’Hanlon’s recommendation for a policy of asymmetric defense in the new edited volume #GlobalChina
6/ .@SophieHRW discusses China’s impact on the UN Human Rights Council and suggests that member-nations concerned about human rights need to coordinate thoughtfully to limit Chinese influence there.
7/ This is a small sampling of the 37 chapters of the book that address the full range of issues relating to China's rise, from global governance to economic issues, technology, great power relations, regional issues, and so much more.
8/ The book is designed to be comprehensive and diverse, both in the issues examined and the viewpoints expressed. We hope the book contributes to understanding of what kind of global power China will be and how its rise will impact the US and others.
1/ While there are exceptions, there appears to be a trend of America's traditional allies derisking from United States. As an American who long has viewed the US global alliance network as one of its asymmetric strengths, I take no satisfaction in this observation. (short 🧵).
2/ The flow of leaders to China is striking. French, Canadian, Irish, British, Korean, Finnish, and soon German leaders visiting Beijing in recent weeks. Beijing isn't making its offering more attractive or growing less aggressive. It is presenting a predictable alternative.
3/ The EU-India trade deal is another example of efforts underway to derisk from US. There will be more examples along these lines. Canadian PM Carney's Davos speech broke through in part because it gave definition to a trend that is gathering pace.
1/ China's response to Trump's invitation for Beijing to join the launch of his shambolic Board of Peace was direct - they're not interested. Officially, they cited their fidelity to the centrality of the UN as the reason for their denial. (short 🧵).
2/ Unofficially, Beijing likely did not want to give a boost to a US-led global initiative through its own participation. This has been a longstanding position. The US also typically withholds its participation and endorsement for Chinese-led initiatives.
3/ Privately, I expect Chinese leaders were bemused by the outcome of Trump's effort. He assembled a rogue's gallery of leaders for his launch, and in the process, advertised how much connectivity the US has lost with its closest allies and partners.
1/ As details emerge about the US capture of Maduro and his wife, there will be an impulse among foreign policy analysts to draw analogies to Taiwan and to warn about Trump setting a precedent Beijing could use against Taiwan. I would caution against that impulse. (short 🧵).
2/ Beijing will be unsentimental about events in Caracas. They will move to secure their interests in Venezuela and broader region. They also will condemn US actions and aim to draw a sharp contrast with US actions by presenting themselves as committed to upholding intl law.
3/ Privately, I expect Beijing will emphasize to Washington it expects to be given the same latitude for great power exemptions to international law that the US takes for itself. In other words, Beijing will request the US mute its invocations of intl law in SCS and elsewhere.
1/ I'm glad Bill (@niubi) is exploring this question. It's important and often misunderstood. The US has refrained from opposing Taiwan independence (or unification) out of deference to the principle that the US isn't the arbiter of Taiwan's future political status. (short 🧵).
2/ Instead, the US traditionally has maintained a posture of opposing unilateral changes to status quo and supporting any peaceful resolution of cross-Strait disputes that enjoys support of people on both sides of Strait. (At times, the US has said "...support of Taiwan people.")
3/ Historically, US policy has insisted on non-violent, non-coerced outcome to cross-Strait disputes while leaving it to leaders in Taipei and Beijing to determine formula. If US moves to opposing TW independence, it would begin deciding what outcomes it would/wouldn't accept.
1/ I've noticed a fair bit of commentary and discussion in PRC and Taiwan media recently around whether views in the US policy community are shifting on America's support for Taiwan. As someone who lives in this community and its debates, here are a few quick reflections (🧵):
2/ I think it's fair to observe that US-Taiwan relations are evolving under Trump. The same could be said about America's relationships with virtually all its partners. Trump is de-prioritizing shared values and demanding partners contribute more to security, including Taiwan.
3/ I also think it's fair to observe that Trump's iconoclastic approach to foreign relations has opened space for debate in the US about America's role in the world. For some, Trump's approach will prod allies to become more capable and thus will strengthen US partnerships.
1/ The Chicago Council published new findings on American attitudes toward China and US-China relations. The results are notable, showing that America's broader social and political divisions are now also being reflected in sentiment toward China. (🧵). globalaffairs.org/research/publi…
2/ The findings show the bipartisan consensus (on China) "no longer seems to hold among the American public. Republicans and Democrats now hold distinctly different views on a range of China-related questions. Republicans are more confident in US power...Democrats less so."
3/ Republicans "favor decoupling from China, and favor containment over cooperation. By contrast, Democrats don’t see China as a top threat, oppose decoupling, and favor cooperation over containment, especially on issues of common concern like arms control and climate change."