So... is this the full list of social conditions for semiconductor firms to access $50 billion in CHIPS Act funding? congress.gov/bill/116th-con…
Also appears Secretary can consider how helpful the firm has been to US national security needs.
Each project is capped at $3 billion, but that can be waived if scale or security concerns surface.
GAO will assess impact of funding on diverse hiring and US chip market share, though nothing in here like the vision of the Biden supply chain review (which envisions card check neutrality for unions, among other conditions)
DOD is authorized to put together consortia of companies to service military semiconductor needs
And State can also disperse funds for "friendshoring" of semiconductors.
Condition there: join the Semiconductor Club, with discriminatory treatment of those not in it.
Inside the club, harmonized approach on export controls, intellectual property, investment screening.
NIST at Commerce will have a new committee tasked with ensuring US R/D dominance in chips.
It'll have an outside advisory committee.
Two notable aspects:
1) Labor won't be included.
2) Federal advisory committee transparency practices (FACA) aren't applicable.
There will also be a public-private "national" lab for semiconductors
Goal will be supporting research into tech, start ups specializing in commercialization of said tech, and an academic pipeline into the labs/industry.
And there's a Buy American Plus requirement that any intellectual property resulting from this R&D investments have its associated production be Made in America.
Aaaand... they're calling in the Defense Production Act (DPA), though focusing on the more "market-like" provisions (subsidies to private companies under the DPA's Title III), rather than the more socialized allocation approach under Title I.
Trump signed the CHIPS Act into law January 1, 2021, as part of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.
There were 13 nay votes - some progressives, some Trumpys. It was a massive bill, so not necessarily CHIPS Act motivated.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
How Industrial Policy Gets Done: Frontline Lessons from Three Federal Officials
I interviewed @katenrg @RonnieChatterji & Satyam Khanna about their time helping set up the offices that are building middle-out economics.
🧵 rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/h…
For arguably the first time since the Roosevelt administration, there's an acknowledged and massive effort to influence the composition and practices of industries operating in the US.
Trillions in public and private capital are moving into communities all over the 🇺🇸.
These industrial policy efforts are not falling from the sky: they're being driven by real people, trying to solve problems in real time.
In this brief, we were interested in one group of said people: the advisors in federal agencies like @ENERGY @EPA & @CommerceGov.
In an election year where both political parties have deployed tariffs as a tool of statecraft, @DemJournal asked @ENPancotti @mattyglesias and me to debate the pros and cons, when tariffs work, and when they are damaging.
🧵 democracyjournal.org/magazine/74/ar…
Liz and I were assigned the "pro-tariff" side of the debate, though we offer caveats.
Our main argument is that it's too easy to put tariffs in a politics/public choice box, when in fact there are long established market failure reasons for their use.
Moreover, having taking the fork in the road towards industrial policy subsidies to internalize positive externalities from decarbonization, it would have been unwise policy/an abdication of fiduciary responsibility to allow imports to wipe out new clean industries.
This is the result of a 4 year review since the beginning of the Biden administration, which has been evaluating whether various Chinese policies comport with US trade laws.
Fantastic panel @HarvardMWC on lessons we can learn from global experiences with industrial policy, with @rodrikdani @straightedge @myrto_kaloup and @rohlamba.
Myrto talking Chinese shipbuilding excess capacity. Has 50-70% market share today.
@Rohan_Sandhu Myrto says Chinese shipbuilding not efficient when taken on their own, but had clear benefits in terms of outward exports / lowering transportation costs / enhancing military capacity. nber.org/papers/w26075
NEW from me @RooseveltFwd: How Biden's comments on US Steel's tie up with Japan's Nippon company indicate what a Foreign Policy for the Middle Class might look like in practice. rooseveltforward.org/2024/04/03/bid…
The idea of reorienting foreign economic policy to build labor power and combat inequality was articulated by @JakeSullivan46 @jennifermharris and others in a series of essays and reports in 2019-20. foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/07/ame…
This doesn't mean that traditional diplomacy has to die out. Indeed, as @dimi and @KanaInagaki report, even after Biden's comments, the US and Japan are slated to make the biggest upgrade to their alliance in 60 years. ft.com/content/df9999…
BREAKING from @AP: @Energy agency announces $6 billion to slash emissions in industrial facilities.
@JenMcDermottAP @anniesartor @SecGranholm @alizaidi46 and me on why this is game changing, and could allow the US to catch up/ lead on industrial decarb. apnews.com/article/climat…
The mix of projects funded here is exciting, including a range of technologies to be deployed by US leader @CLE_CLF, and even projects by Sweden's SSAB. energy.gov/oced/industria…