Leading Nowhere Profile picture
Jun 27, 2021 19 tweets 8 min read Read on X
Generally don't write about IPOs, but reading a new Red Herring Prospectus is habit. India Pesticides is an agro-chemical company with seemingly mouth-watering financial ratios. But corporate governance markers suggest extreme caution. (1/n)
What set off this inquiry was a disclosure in the RHP, indicating that the Company issued shares at Rs 33.70 to two individuals in February 2021 (4 months ago), who are related to a director. The IPO has recently closed with 23x subscription at Rs 295 per share. (2/n)
These two individuals were collectively alloted 371,380 shares for a consideration of approx Rs 1.25 crore, which would be worth close to Rs 11 crore after the IPO. That's a 775% increase in 4 months or 40,152% ROI annualized, assuming listing date as 05 July. (3/n)
The allottees are owners of a firm that is 'advisor to the offer' in the draft RHP but the reference is omitted in the final RHP. However, they were issued shares at 87% discount 4 months ago, which seems to indicate lack of transparency on the quid pro quo at play here. (4/n)
It is necessary to ask what role did the 'advisor' play in determining the IPO price? Why did the company allot shares at just 3x price-to-earnings barely months before the IPO? Is there a valuation report for the placement? What kind of valuation methodology was adopted? (5/n)
Section 62(1)(c) of the Companies Act and the rules thereunder require preferential issue to third parties to be accompanied by a valuation report from a registered valuer under the Act. This report would have determined the fair value of the shares to be at *least* Rs 33. (6/n)
It seems odd that the registered valuer justified Rs 33 price in February 2021 as fair value when barely 4 months later the Company is justifying its 25x price-to-earnings in comparison with its listed peers. The listed peers existed 4 months ago too. (7/n)
Either the fair value of Rs 33.70 in February 2021 was understated or the IPO price of Rs 275 in June 2021 is inflated. This is a good example why SEBI should mandate disclosure of valuation reports for all preferential allotments in the 12 months leading to the IPO. (8/n)
Questions naturally arise on other details in the RHP. Between Oct 2020 and Feb 2021, the Company saw complete overhaul of the Board. 2 directors joined the board in Dec 2020 and resigned in Feb 2021. One of them is a noted securities lawyer. Why this musical chairs? (9/n)
CEO and CFO are paid peanuts even after having been employees for decades. A 3000 crore market cap company with Rs 700 crore sales upon listing, and the CEO/CFO are cumulatively paid Rs 22 lakh a year. They also have no equity stake in the company. (10/n)
Further, the 800 crore IPO is primarily an offer for sale (700 crore) by the promoters and 80 crore fresh issue of shares (20 crore is likely for 'general corporate purposes'. What does the company get? Working capital. The Company will NOT use the capital for growth.(11/n)
The reason why is apparent from the fact that the Company has already expanded the capacity of high-mergin technical APIs from 10,000 MT in 2019 to 19,500 MT in 2021. While capacity utilization is down from 80% to 75%, EBIDTA margins are up from 21% to 29%. (12/n)
While decreased utilization after expansion is not abnormal, the receivables and inventory have also been increasing, putting pressure on cash flows. Less than 50% of PBT was converted into cash from operations in 2021. Further, lot of receivables are > 90 days old. (13/n)
Other red flags in the RHP - the Company hasn't specified exact address of their plants/factories, only a general locality given. At the same time, company has transactions with promoter entities in related businesses, who are located in the same locality. (14/n)
Company has many litigations for allegedly misbranding its products, and also for environmental issues. The Company's logo is not trademarked and under dispute. Also, 2 family members were paid Rs 1.2 crore in 'professional fees' in 2021, but CEO/CFO paid only Rs 22 lakh. (15/n)
The Company claims to be an R&D driven organization, but its R&D expenditure can only be summarized as a rounding error. Also, the R&D facility is leased from a promoter entity. (16/n)
Overall, India Pesticides has some major issues. Strange allotments to outsiders gifting 775% gains in 4 months. All KMPs and directors installed in last 9 months. CEO/CFO paid peanuts. Negligible R&D spend. Massive capex. Increasing receivables. Declining cash flows. (17/n)
Personally, I find more red flags here than the annual meeting of the Chinese CPC. As always, this is an educational exercise and not a basis for investment or trading decision. (18/n)
2 3
Hat tip to @GhanishtNagpal for helping immensely with merchant banking norms on preparation of these documents..

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Leading Nowhere

Leading Nowhere Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @leading_nowhere

Aug 28, 2023
SEBI finally going after the finfluencer-broker nexus. Right time to point out Zerodha founders have tried all along to whitewash their role by acting holier than thou. One of them was caught cheating in an exhibition charity match with Vishwanathan Anand too. Leopard's spots...
So while on one side you have the founders going around 'cautioning' the retail public on trading and speculation, on the other side you have a massive funnel of fraud finfluencers directing traffic your way, driving the thousands of crores in profits. The house always wins.
The funnel relies on psychological manipulation and relies on a layer of separation (finfluencer)...history of speculation has shown that warnings and data rarely work where greed and manipulation are concerned...behave like a saint and just let psychology do the work for you.
Read 4 tweets
Jul 4, 2023
EKI Energy...a story.

Auditor of EKI Energy resigned in Nov'22, stating emphatically there was no dispute with management, and audit for H1FY23 was completed by them w/ clean limited review report.

But in Q3FY23, new auditor Walker Chandiok trashed the financials.

(1/12)

Management has recognised revenue, AGAINST opinion of auditor, in absence of fulfillment of contractual performance obligations!

In polite words, this seems to be fake revenue. 190 crore sales (~10%) and 110 crore (~40%) PAT. Almost half PAT is possibly...non-existent.

(2/12)
Now, EKI has STILL not released Q4FY23 results. It says this is because Walker Chandiok has to re-audit H1FY23 which was done by previous auditor. Seems like a valid reason, except it begs the question - why wasn't re-audit of H1FY23 being done since Nov'22?

(3/12)
Read 12 tweets
May 6, 2022
1/ A good way to contextualize PE ratio, think it as earnings yield:

5x = 20%
10x = 10%
20x = 5%
30x = 3.3%
50x = 2%

As you go down this scale, you're paying increasingly more for growth + durability + intangible assumptions. If assumptions uncertain, how much would you pay?
2/ If you're worried about inflation and interest rates, just remember:

A 10% bond purchased at FV 100 is at 10 PE.
A 5% bond at FV 100 is at 20 PE.

It is a very simple way to analyze how much extra you'd pay for equity if I could give you a safe 10% bond instead?
3/ Yes, we are in equities for the unlimited upside, but once you spend a few years in the market and experience the realities, you will get a razorsharp focus on wanting to pay less and get more.

A steady-state earnings yield analysis is an excellent way to get perspective.
Read 10 tweets
May 4, 2022
Most scenarios, vertically-integrated = better margins, as long as cost of key inputs becomes small fraction of costs eventually.

If KI are 50-60% cost at final stage w/ sharp price hike = business at sole mercy of end-customer w/ demand destruction.

Observe next few quarters.
In this scenario, commodity producer will not budge as many buyers in the market. Person who gets squeezed is the penultimate link in the chain. If end-customer unwilling to absorb full price hike, manufacturer WILL be holding the bag to keep the relationship.
Especially pertinent for exporters and industries where demand is very price sensitive. During benign pricing scenario you can get more efficient with vertical integration and improve realizations. However, when basic commodities roar, you will bear disproportionate impact too.
Read 10 tweets
Apr 15, 2022
(Thread)

Some thoughts on investing in listed family-owned businesses.

Cobbled together from several years of investing in and observing such companies, and also some professional interactions with business owners.

👇
1) There are immense latent capabilities in family-owned businesses. People in business for 30-40 years, building incrementally. Eg. so many companies spent *decades* for 0-100, 5 years for 100-500, and are now aiming 500-5000 in next 5 (not accurate, but you get the point)
2) Most promoters aren't looking to rip off investors. But, they will put themselves first. Why? For promoter, business is his life's work (no matter how small) but for you it is an investment. Always see it from this perspective and differentiate every situation.
Read 17 tweets
Apr 10, 2022
The 6 buckets of information I look at when analysing a company for the first time.

Most of these tend to be small companies with little coverage but with larger competitors.

A thread 👇 (1/14)
A. Assessing Promoters -> 60% holding preferably (not iron rule), either highly educated or very experienced in the business. Preferably minimal related party transactions, no unlisted entities with significant operations. Do not grudge high salary if otherwise clean. (2/14)
B. Assessing Balance Sheet - Looking for a clean, boring unremarkable balance sheet, not a good one. Preferably low historical share dilution (not including bonus). Preferably with only working capital debt. Share warrants in small quantities not a red flag. (3/14)
Read 14 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(