To begin, despite my work on free banking and all that, I'm not concerned here to argue against any government regulation of money whatsoever. I think, indeed, that we are long past the point of being able to dispense with it: the switch to fiat makes such control inevitable.
What I utterly reject is the notion that an adequate case for such control can consist solely of an appeal to the idea that controlling money is "fundamental to being an independent polity" or somehow "central to the state."
To me, such thinking is reminiscent of the once popular view that every government needed its own airline, or telecommunications monopoly, and is wrong for the same reason those arguments were: for a state need be no less legitimate without these embellishments.
True, control of money is a much older sovereign "prerogative," with roots in ancient times. But that shouldn't necessarily make it more venerable. On the contrary: the further back one goes, the longer the list of princely "prerogatives" gets.
Yet most have long since been rejected as relics of absolutist government, unfit for modern, democratic societies. Indeed, the very idea of "sovereign prerogatives" strikes many, and I think ought to strike more of us, as an anachronism.
In ours and other modern states sovereignty ultimately resides with the people. That should mean that the choice of whether or not government should control money, and how, resides with the people: that control it should not be considered a "given."
A truly independent polity may just as well elect to do without it as some elect to do without a national airline. And some countries have done just that, by electing to dollarize or to establish currency zones or to join multinational currency systems.
Nations do not become less sovereign by making such choices, in so far as the choices are themselves exercises in popular government.
Likewise, the legitimacy of our present government-controlled fiat U.S. dollar rests, or ought to rest, on popular will. That is, it should be understood as a choice, where a different choice, based on the same will, would be no-less legitimate.
By the same token, the people may decide what sorts of private substitutes for fiat dollars to tolerate, and how to regulate them if they're tolerated. Tolerating such substitutes does not make them any less an "independent polity."
What I've argued boils down to this: questions like whether we should tolerate stablecoins or other private currencies or grant the government of digital currency monopoly should be answered by appeal to the likely consequences of the different alternatives.
The question should be "which option will make people better off." That is, it should be the same sort of question we ask in making other policy choices. To ask instead whether an option would somehow undermine the government's sovereign authority makes no sense in a democracy.
For the sovereign authority in a democracy rests with the people, and the people exercise it most responsibly by asking what is best for themselves, and nothing else. To suppose that they must recognize some inviolable gov't money "prerogative" is to cling to a medieval notion...
...which, as I said earlier, ought long ago to have gone the way of salt and soap monopolies and other feudal arrangements that were swept away by the Statute of Monopolies. The money prerogative somehow survived. It's long overdue for joining the others.
The big one, though, was financial instability. Far from achieving a "stable means of exchange," the Civil War interventions set the stage for the great currency panics of 1884, 1893, and 1907. It was owing to these that the gov't went about reforming the currency all over again.
Robert glides over this inconvenient part of history, saying only that "In time – after a half-century, more or less – we ended up migrating the Greenback to a new central bank, hence today’s still-green Federal Reserve Notes." (For "greenback" again read "national banknotes.")
Of course his limited space but also, one supposes, his aims, wouldn't let him mention the politics behind the FRA"solution" to the problem of financial instability, including the way better options were passe up to please the big NYC banks. cato.org/publications/p…
Let's by all means see if history can teach us anything about the merits of private vs gov't currencies, digital or otherwise. But doing so means knowing that history--not just the bogus myths that circulate (so to speak) concerning it!
Of antebellum currency-issuing banks, Robert writes, "If you liked this sort of thing – you wouldn’t – you called the banks ‘free banks’ and their currencies ‘free banknotes.’ ...If you were more sensible... you called the banks ‘wildcats’ and their notes ‘wildcat currencies’."
That dichotomy misleads in all sorts of ways. First, it misleads by confusing antebellum banks in general with (so called) "free banks." Second, it misleads by confusing "free banks" with "wildcat banks."
It's worth noting that the paradox that an inconvertible, non-interest-bearing exchange medium should command value today despite the certain knowledge that it will eventually cease to be valuable, has long puzzled monetary economists.
In _Logik des Geldes_ (1912), Bruno Moll called it "the problem of the end." _The Value of Money_ by Dutch economist Tjardus Greidanus (cdn.mises.org/The%20Value%20…) has a nice discussion of it. Here's an excerpt, starting w/ a quote from Moll:
"The certainty of the individuals to be able to pass on the money rests in the end on the trust-whether conscious, half conscious or unconscious-that even the last owner of the money, who cannot pass it on, has in his possession something of value."
The fundamental flaw in @nntaleb's "proof" that Bitcoin is "really" worthless consists of his utter failure to recognize what Keynes called "bootstrap" equilibria, in which agents' prophesies, however badly founded at first, become self fulfilling. jstor.org/stable/4180201…
Such equilibria can be perfectly stable; indeed, in so far as they rest on powerful network effects, they can be extremely..."antifragile." Many models of fiat money treat its postive valuation as such an equilibrium, so this is not some esoteric notion in monetary economists.
And it makes no difference what the basis is for agents initial expectations. That enough of them believe that X will become money may suffice to make it so. (The same idea is implicit in Menger's theory of commodity monies.)
Having asked this question, but not having gotten an answer, I will answer it myself, and invite criticisms. To anticipate: I conclude that, if one wants an "optimum quantity of money," a corridor system, not a floor system, is the way to go.
Let's start with the original Friedman-rule ideal: a rate of deflation sufficient to reduce the nominal interest rate on "bonds" to zero. Such deflation, Friedman argued, would eliminate the opportunity cost of money holding, thereby leading to "optimum" money holdings.
For those who consider deflation undesirable in itself, Friedman's solution is obviously unappealing. (I don't wish here to get into the merits of this view.) But there's an alternative that's theoretically equivalent: have money bear the same nominal interest rate as bonds.
Anyone who thinks the Fed didn't hasn't started tightening has been hoodwinked.
Despite having switched to a "floor" operating regime in October 2008 (and permanently in January 2019), and thereby all but ending interbank lending on the fed funds market, the Fed continued to maintain the pretense of "targeting" the fed funds rate.
But in reality, it no longer used open-market operations to keep a freely-fluctuating interbank funds rate close to its targeted value. Instead, it adjusted its policy stance by altering the interest rate it paid on bank reserves (IOR rate).