1/ Welcome to the bull run of 2020/2021. It’s up only (was), valuations are at ATH, and your favorite influencer can be a VC.
New funds pop up on a weekly basis yet at the same time invest/incubate a billion projects at once. How are they so efficient you might ask?
👇👇👇
2/ Let me introduce you to Moonrock Capital.
In 2018 Johnathon Habicht & Simon Dedic founded Blockfyre; a blockchain advisory firm based in Germany. In 2020 this was acquired by Tixl. In between that period in 2019 Moonrock Capital was formed by them.
3/ After the Scott Melker incident someone close to the team at Moonrock & Blockfyre messaged me about the firm and all that went on.
Let’s dive into two of the projects ($POLK & $PMON) incubated by Moon Rock Capital a bit deeper to see if they did set the “standard”.
4/ Polkamon ($PMON)
As one of the largest marketing failures this bull run the chart exemplified suspicious activity.
In doing so I reviewed the entire transaction history from launch to June. Below is a brief summary of my findings.
5/ It’s clear the only thing that MoonRock helped them succeed with was pump investors/insiders funds and dump on retail.
Below is the typical lifecycle of the “Moon Rock incubation standard”.
6/ Polkamarkets ($POLK)
As another incubation you might think $PMON was a one time event.
Below is a graph with all of the largest (cumulative) sells in the first 4 weeks. Many of the wallets received tokens from other IDO’s as well.
7/ Now you’re starting to see the pattern? If you’re still not convinced here are some other projects that they invested in.
I’ve included the investment announcement date, token launch date, and ATH date in the chart.
($KYL, $DAFI, $LKR, $CGG)
8/ All your favorite CT influencers work with the VC’s and Marketing firms for a collective shilling campaign. Many do not disclose they were compensated in some capacity. They are placed into groupchats organized by people like Danny Les (for $PMON & $POLK)
9/
Perhaps you think that the teams at $PMON & $POLK were taken advantage of. A couple of the founders on the $POLK & $PMON team worked at Tixl which Blockfyre was acquired by. All of who Moon Rock worked closely with previously.
10/ Other VC’s have sprung up and do the exact same thing.
The larping VC model includes: little to no vesting period, shilling campaign, use noob friendly buzzwords, ponzi tokenomics designed to benefit VC’s at launch.
11/ Here are possible solutions that hopefully more VC’s should follow.
⁃Dont share the cap table with larping VC’s that dump instantly
⁃Make transparency status quo
⁃Regulation
This will help wash out the bad actors that give the crypto space a bad name.
12/ Follow for more threads in the future!
13/
A huge thanks to the team at @LedgerQL for providing me with the entire history of DEX trades for $POLK & $PMON. Can’t wait for the fully functioning site to be live.
Also a thanks to @mathieu_ouioui for helping give me a second eye by reviewing my analysis .
14/ Sources:
Refer to the files below for data dumps for Polychain Monster (Polkamon) & Polkamarkets.
1/ Meet @WheresBroox (Broox Bauer), one of the multiple @AxiomExchange employees allegedly abusing the lack of access controls for internal tools to lookup sensitive user details to insider trade by tracking private wallet activity since early 2025.
2/ Axiom is a crypto trading platform founded by Mist & Cal in 2024. After going through Y-Combinator's Winter 2025 batch, it quickly became one of the most profitable companies in the space, generating $390M+ in revenue to date.
I was retained to investigate allegations of misconduct at Axiom after receiving reports.
3/ Broox is a current Axiom senior BD employee based in New York.
In the clip Broox states he can track any Axiom user via ref code, wallet, or UID and claims he can "find out anything to do with that person".
He also describe researching 10-20 wallets initially and slowly increasing over time "so it does not look that suspicious"
In a separate clip from the same recording, Broox sets ground rules for how to request lookups from him and then says he'll send the full list of wallets.
The full recording is a private call of the group members strategizing.
1/ Meet the threat actor John (Lick), who was caught flexing $23M in a wallet address directly tied to $90M+ in suspected thefts from the US Government in 2024 and multiple other unidentified victims from Nov 2025 to Dec 2025.
2/ Earlier today John got into a heated argument with another threat actor known as Dritan Kapplani Jr. in a group chat to see who had more funds in crypto wallets.
In 'The Com' this is known as a band for band (b4b).
However the entire interaction was fully recorded.
3/ In part 1 of the recording Dritan mocks John however John screenshares Exodus Wallet which shows the Tron address below with $2.3M:
TMrWCLMS3ibDbKLcnNYhLggohRuLUSoHJg
1/ Meet Haby (Havard), a Canadian threat actor who has stolen $2M+ via Coinbase support impersonation social engineering scams in the past year blowing the funds on rare social media usernames, bottle service, & gambling.
2/ On Dec 30, 2024 Haby posted a screenshot in a group chat showing off a 21K XRP ($44K) theft from a Coinbase user.
rN7ddvk4DrGHZUrBfNARJEEAbPkky9Mwcz
3/ On Jan 3, 2025 Haby posted a screenshot from his Exodus wallet showing his Telegram & IG accounts.
I matched up the historical balances to the screenshot and found the XRP address linked to two other Coinbase user thefts for ~$500K total.
1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.