How to detect software supply chain attacks with #Sysmon, #MicrosoftDefender, or any other #EDR:
1. You use specific software in your environment.
2. The software is usually installed on a few servers that have privileges across the environment.
3. You probably have a naming convention for your servers. Also, servers have defined IP subnets.
4. Your EDR or Sysmon has "Company" information in the process event or process network logs.
Combining all together:
Without even knowing what kind of software is used in the environment, you can analyze your process event logs to see if your servers have a 3rd party software installed. The same logs provide the computer name and/or the computer IP.
Creating a baseline for servers is easy because they perform the same actions over and over again. So;
1. Create a baseline for network connections for those servers(process connection baseline can be bypassed)
2. Hunt for the anomalies
Baselining might be a bit difficult, but I don't think it requires too much time.

What if the software is installed on all computers(server/workstations)? 🤔
#Kaseya #KaseyaVSA
Here is a quick and dirty #MicrosoftDefender #KQL query that can be used as a starting point:👇
github.com/Cyb3r-Monk/Thr…

#Kaseya #KaseyaVSA #supplychainattack

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More from @Cyb3rMonk

13 Jun
Here is how to hunt/detect 60% (possibly more than 60%) of lateral movement attacks:
On ALL endpoints, look for EID 4624 with LogonType 9 (NewCredentials), and check TargetOutboundUserName field. 1/4
#threathunting #dfir #lateralmovement
Then, check if the TargetOutboundUserName is supposed to be seen on the endpoint. Here is why:
Attackers most likely spawn a new process on the compromised machine with the credentials/tokens they steal. This is done by using "/NETONLY" flag. 2/4
"/NETONLY" flag generates a new logon on the endpoint with the EID 4624 LogonType 9.
LogonType 9 is quite rare in an environment, usually <1% of all logon events. Therefore, it is quite easy to hunt for this event. 3/4
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