The so called #printerbug allowed an attacker to get the NetNTLM hash of the affected server. Depending on the computer account privileges, this could lead to full domain compromise: dionach.com/blog/printer-s…
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By design, some systems need to have local administrator privileges to the other, like on the Exchange Trusted Subsystem group. No SMB signing + printerbug + ntlmrelayx = Exchange server compromise, which basically means a full compromise due to exchange group privileges.
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If you run legacy apps, you probably have NTLMv1 supported on the DCs. Using printerbug, you can get the NTLMv1 hash of the domain controller, from which you can get the NT hash using services like crack.sh. NT hash of a DC = DCSync = compromise.
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If multiple DCs exposed the print spooler and one was vulnerable to CVE-2019-1040, you could relay between them and exploit Kerberos delegation to get DA as detailed in dirkjanm.io/exploiting-CVE…
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If you have an account with SeImpersonatePrivilege (e.g. a service account), you can use the named pipe to escalate your privileges to SYSTEM. This is essentially what PrintSpoofer and other tools are doing. github.com/itm4n/PrintSpo…
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After compromising a forest, an attacker could use the printer bug to jump to another forest as detailed in harmj0y.net/blog/redteamin…
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Looks like the #KB5004945 patch stopped printerbug from working remotely, however if you have local access to a server as a low priv user (RDS farms anyone?) you can still abuse some of these depending on the server privileges.
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