#MoldovaVote2021: This thread will cover today's snap elections. In short, there are 23 electoral competitors. The electoral authorities have cast ~ 3.2 million votes, of which ~ 750,000 votes were sent abroad for the diaspora (150 voting sections). Let us begin: ⤵️
1) So far, 10% or approx 285,000 voters have cast their votes. As always, the elderly population is an early riser and voted in greater numbers. 👇
2) Voters in Germany and Italy, where there is a high concentration of Moldovan and diaspora immigrants, line up to vote.
3) Voters in the breakaway region are lining up at some sanctions. Some 30,000 voted in the second round of the 2020 presidential elections. Overall, there are 41 polling stations open in the controlled territory of the country for these voters.
4) Below is a table on the participation dynamic provided by ADEPT (specialized think-tank from a moldova) based on data from the electoral authority. It can be seen that turnout in these elections seems to be higher in the first half of the day.👇
5) Competitors have spent around 1.8 million euros. 4 parties each spent between 5 and 13 million MDL (€ 233k-500k): the Renato Usatii Block (“wild card”); PAS (President Sandu’s party); Communist-socialist tandem (the pro-Russian basis); Shor Party (fugitive oligarch’s party).
6) The main political leaders have voted. These elections are about the battle of "yellow" (President Sandu/PAS) against "red" (the Bloc of Communists and Socialists.
7) The electoral process continues. Meanwhile, my brother sent me the screenshot of my intervention for @VOANews (from my office at the university) about the elections.
8) Half a million have voted so far. The improvement in the epidemiological situation (less than 100 cases for weeks), on the one hand, but also a very active electoral campaign, on the other, favors high participation. By my estimates it should reach at least 55%. Let's see.
9) One of the “wild cards” of these elections, Renato Usatii, has voted in Germany (Munich) along with the diaspora. He is expected to enter parliament with 5-10% of the total votes.
10) The voting stations abroad where the risk of running out of ballots (5k per section) is high are the following: Mentreuil (1.5k already voted); Bologna (1.6 k); Parma (1.6 k). Other voting stations in the UK, Italy and Germany run the same risk, though to a lesser extent.
11) The diaspora is so important that Moldovan politicians travel abroad to vote in the electoral stations opened for the diaspora. After Renato Usatii, who voted in Munchen, one of the leaders of the right-wing AUR party, former mayor Dorin Chirtoaca, traveled to Frankfurt.
12) I am at the polling station in Frankfurt. Loud music. Nobody wears a mask (outside). Nothing comparable to the stress I experienced last year during the presidential election.
13) Very well organized voting this year (@MoldovaMFA). It took less than 5 min. to vote. In 2020, I queued for > 2 hours. Some trained singers entertain the voters. More people are coming. Young families with children, etc. I’m leaving to continue monitoring the elections.
14) There are almost 6 hours until the end of the voting day (8:00 p.m.) and 7 hours abroad (9:00 p.m.). So far, 30% have showed up to vote.
15) By the way, an interesting observation is that at the polling station voters were able to take a photo with this very traditional background. Only the orthodox Christian icon is missing (the use of religious symbols at the electoral stations is prohibited by law).
16) Turnout seems to stabilize at the level of the 2019 legislative elections. At that time, 50% of registered voters cast their vote.
17) Local observers have reported repeated cases of alleged bribery of voters from the breakaway region, along with organized transportation. President Sandu's party indicated to the pro-Russian bloc of Communists and Socialists. The latter rejected all the accusations.
18) President Sandu made critical comments towards the electoral authorities, probably referring to the alleged irregularities related to voters in the Transnistrian region (See point 17). She asked them to ensure correct elections or they will be sanctioned later (how?!).
19) Moldovans have 4 more hours to vote and only 36% voted. This is less than in 2019. My previous estimate that the overall share will reach 55% after all makes quite uncertain. A more realistic goal should be 50%. The reasons for the slowdown in participation are unknown.
20) In less than 1 hour, the voting stations in Moldova will close & the turnout is worrying. Everyone, I say this knowingly, everyone expected a great mobilization. President Sandu asked the people to vote, the pro-Russian forces did too. But clearly this didn't really work.
21) The stations are closed in Moldova. The voting continues abroad (Europe and the US).
22) The vote abroad exceeded the psychological barrier of 200,000. But there are ~ 60k to go to repeat the results of the second round of the 2020 presidential elections.
23) Exit polls (by telephone) show that President Sandu's PAS party would win the elections with 55%. More information on the final results will be available soon.
24) Important details about the exit poll (by phone): 32% refused to answer! Certainly, President Sandu’s party won the elections, what we do not know for sure is whether or not it can govern alone.
25) It’s an important element. About an hour before the end of the vote, President Sandu used her Facebook platform (268k followers), asking people to convince their friends and relatives to go vote. This happened while many wondered about the slowdown in participation.
26) 67% of votes counted: President Sandu / PAS - 46.8%; Communists and Socialists - 30%; Shor Party - 7.3%.
27) After counting 77% of the votes 👇
28) ~ 94% of the votes counted👇
29) Here is the estimated distribution of seats in parliament. 👇 source: ADEPT/e-democracy.md
30) Apart from President Sandu’s party, another sort of winner is the Party of the Communists that returns into the big politics after many years of absence. Many interesting developments will unfold after these snap elections.
31) 98% of the voted counted: 👇
32) President Sandu's party will hold at least 61 of the 101 seats in the newly elected parliament. Source: ADEPT/E-democracy.md
33) Here is everything you should know about the outcome. It was a long day and night for me. 👇
#Geopolitics: The abduction of Maduro and his wife by the US, together with the CIA's admission that it had prepared the operation since mid-December, prompted my curiosity about the role of the intelligence services in reshaping US foreign policy in the hemisphere. Given the well-known vicissitudes surrounding US pressure on Venezuela, I would like to highlight several key aspects that indicate the interaction between intelligence and US decision-makers. A long🧵:
1) Firstly, the CIA is the world's leading intelligence agency regarding Latin America, due to its interest in the region since the late 1940s and during the Cold War. That's why, to contain the Soviet risk of spreading left-wing regimes in what, since the Monroe Doctrine, was labelled as the "backyard" of the US sphere of influence, the CIA (and, briefly before that, the FBI) was involved in covert and espionage operations across Latin America. The academic literature provides ample detail on how the US utilised its intelligence services to advance its strategic interests in Guatemala, Ecuador, Argentina, etc. (Gates, 1987; Becker, 2020; and Mistry, 2021 - instrumental reading, if no AI is used). ⤵️
2) Secondly, because of the granular knowledge of Venezuela since before the Cold War, it took only a couple of weeks for the US to organise the abduction of Maduro. This operation was different from what the CIA had organised in the region in the past - coups d'etat to remove governments, leading to military dictatorships and crimes against humanity committed by them during the Cold War. Since the opposition in Venezuela doesn't have the resources to rise against the military, which Maduro groomed for years to secure loyalty, the US didn't even consider engaging with it (something confirmed by D. Trump during today's press conference). Instead, the CIA carried out a plan according to which Maduro had to be brought to the US, serving the urgent needs of domestic (mobilising the Republicans and the rest of the society, including among the leftist segments - to tame "the Mandami effect") and foreing policy of the US (projecting power, especially against China, which just finished conducting drills in the proximity of Taiwan). ⤵️
#Geopolitics: The events in Venezuela are consequential for the dynamics of the rest of the world: 1) It's right to point out that Trump's moves from "isolationism" to "interventionism" in US foreign policy (both for domestic goals at home and to project power globally). He claims that by intervening in Venezuela, the US aims to dismantle drug-smuggling routes. Fearing invasion, Maduro's government proposed cooperation in this field, but Washington refused the offer;⤵️
2) The EU has been reluctant to push back against the US military interventionist agenda. No statement has been issued by the EUDEL in Caracas or in Brussels on the current US interventions in Venezuela. "Wait and see" by the EU in Venezuela might be explained by the strategic prioritisation of Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait. Individually, France has condemned the move by the US, considering it against international law (such interventions can be approved only by the UN Security Council);⤵️
3) Ukraine's stance is a mixture of support for removing an illegitimate Venezuelan leader by the US and support for international law for the follow-up after the capture (sequestration) of Maduro and his wife by the US. The UN officials called the episode a dangerous precedent because it's based on no international mandate. The unknown risks are for the further decisions of the US, which could also be on a military invasion, seeking to oust the regime and bring the opposition to power. Such a scenario could spark a military confrontation, including a civil war, unless Maduro's regime does not capitulate;⤵️
#EU: Orban's ability to persuade Trump to meet Putin in Hungary highlights several points of interest (in addition to what was underscored by @alemannoEU): 1) Both Trump and Putin aim to further peace talks, but they face overlapping manoeuvring hurdles. Trump cannot persuade the EU to accept peace conditions under the current status quo (occupied territories, non-NATO membership, etc.). Putin's main limit is Brussels' desire to support Ukraine by using Russian assets to finance the country;⤵️
2) Speaking from Budapest will reinforce the negative perception of Orban as not being an EU guy, yet Trump and Putin hope to support Orban's political survival. With weak support in surveys, Orban needs to garner legitimacy from abroad. While Brussels supports his electoral rival Magyar, Orban can rely on Trump (a leading voice of the Western sovereignist movement) and Putin (who opens the door to the Global South); 3) The EU will not be at the table, but Orban's gesture again challenges the EU's unity. It's likely that Orban may try to attract other leaders from CEE to travel to Budapest by inviting them to Trump's visit (however, the Polish president has recently met Trump in DC). Putin's visit will again demonstrate that Hungary does not intend to implement the Rome Statute, which would imply arresting Putin under the ICC arrest warrant;
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4) Trump wants to signal to the EU on European soil that peace talks are a priority for the US administration. This doesn't necessarily mean that Trump intends to favour Putin. In all circumstances, Trump is self-centred. And when meeting with Putin, he seeks to project strength over Russia; 5) Putin will be unable to travel directly to Hungary; his itinerary will likely include Turkiye and Serbia (neither of which has confirmed Putin's visit in the upcoming weeks), the only two significant players in the EU's neighbourhood where Russia has some leverage
#Moldova: The elections on 28 September will reveal the country's future direction. To truly understand what is at stake, a binary analysis is not very helpful. Here is my take on these critical elections: 1) PAS has been leading in the polls, but the "Patriotic" Bloc, which advocates restarting strategic dialogue with Russia, is not far behind; 2) The leaders of these political forces have used the narrative of "war" to rally voters. PAS utilised videos from Ukraine showing attacks from the Russian side. The "Patriotic" Bloc has also invoked the war, accusing PAS of intending to provoke a conflict in Transnistria.⤵️
3) The Moldovan authorities, which are politically subordinate to PAS, are closely monitoring the actions of opposition forces. More than 250 searches have been carried out in the past few days, with over 100 individuals being investigated. All of these targeted opposition forces; 4) The "Great Moldova" Party was excluded today, mainly due to a hidden alliance with the political parties of Ilan Shor ("Victory" Bloc). The votes for this party (ranging from 5-10%) could shift towards the "Patriotic" Bloc.⤵️
5) Another political party likely to be excluded is the "Heart of Moldova," which belongs to the "Patriotic" Bloc and is suspected of illegal financing (no final court decision has been made). Whether the Central Electoral Commission will decide to exclude the entire Bloc remains to be seen. However, by doing so, PAS risks facing adverse assessments from international observers, which could affect the legitimacy of the elections;⤵️
#EU_Enlargement: It was back in 2023, when I argued that Hungary was pursuing a strategy of "blockades and unconditional support" within the framework of the EU's eastern enlargement policy: ⤵️
1) Orbán wielded his veto power over Ukraine. He even organized a multi-week referendum (accompanied by a powerful propaganda) to cement the Hungarian public's negative vote on Ukraine's EU accession (anti-Ukraine legitimacy among the Hungarians); ⤵️
2) Initially, Orbán spoke out against alleged violations of the Hungarian minority's rights and then warned that Ukraine was too large and problematic to be absorbed into the EU. ⤵️
#EU: The outcome of the Romanian elections highlighted several risks for the EU: 1) Both exponents of the US-based MAGA movement and Russia have supported, in one way or another, the far-right candidate, George Simion; ⤵️
2) Fear and revenge are two key emotional factors that can have a tremendous impact on voter behavior within EU member states, using all big platforms (but mainly X, Facebook and TikTok); ⤵️
3) Disinformation and propaganda were present in the Romanian elections, used both to mobilize voters and to fuel speculation about interference by external state actors in favor of one of the candidates (either Russia or France and Moldova); ⤵️