#MoldovaVote2021: This thread will cover today's snap elections. In short, there are 23 electoral competitors. The electoral authorities have cast ~ 3.2 million votes, of which ~ 750,000 votes were sent abroad for the diaspora (150 voting sections). Let us begin: ⤵️
1) So far, 10% or approx 285,000 voters have cast their votes. As always, the elderly population is an early riser and voted in greater numbers. 👇
2) Voters in Germany and Italy, where there is a high concentration of Moldovan and diaspora immigrants, line up to vote.
3) Voters in the breakaway region are lining up at some sanctions. Some 30,000 voted in the second round of the 2020 presidential elections. Overall, there are 41 polling stations open in the controlled territory of the country for these voters.
4) Below is a table on the participation dynamic provided by ADEPT (specialized think-tank from a moldova) based on data from the electoral authority. It can be seen that turnout in these elections seems to be higher in the first half of the day.👇
5) Competitors have spent around 1.8 million euros. 4 parties each spent between 5 and 13 million MDL (€ 233k-500k): the Renato Usatii Block (“wild card”); PAS (President Sandu’s party); Communist-socialist tandem (the pro-Russian basis); Shor Party (fugitive oligarch’s party).
6) The main political leaders have voted. These elections are about the battle of "yellow" (President Sandu/PAS) against "red" (the Bloc of Communists and Socialists.
7) The electoral process continues. Meanwhile, my brother sent me the screenshot of my intervention for @VOANews (from my office at the university) about the elections.
8) Half a million have voted so far. The improvement in the epidemiological situation (less than 100 cases for weeks), on the one hand, but also a very active electoral campaign, on the other, favors high participation. By my estimates it should reach at least 55%. Let's see.
9) One of the “wild cards” of these elections, Renato Usatii, has voted in Germany (Munich) along with the diaspora. He is expected to enter parliament with 5-10% of the total votes.
10) The voting stations abroad where the risk of running out of ballots (5k per section) is high are the following: Mentreuil (1.5k already voted); Bologna (1.6 k); Parma (1.6 k). Other voting stations in the UK, Italy and Germany run the same risk, though to a lesser extent.
11) The diaspora is so important that Moldovan politicians travel abroad to vote in the electoral stations opened for the diaspora. After Renato Usatii, who voted in Munchen, one of the leaders of the right-wing AUR party, former mayor Dorin Chirtoaca, traveled to Frankfurt.
12) I am at the polling station in Frankfurt. Loud music. Nobody wears a mask (outside). Nothing comparable to the stress I experienced last year during the presidential election.
13) Very well organized voting this year (@MoldovaMFA). It took less than 5 min. to vote. In 2020, I queued for > 2 hours. Some trained singers entertain the voters. More people are coming. Young families with children, etc. I’m leaving to continue monitoring the elections.
14) There are almost 6 hours until the end of the voting day (8:00 p.m.) and 7 hours abroad (9:00 p.m.). So far, 30% have showed up to vote.
15) By the way, an interesting observation is that at the polling station voters were able to take a photo with this very traditional background. Only the orthodox Christian icon is missing (the use of religious symbols at the electoral stations is prohibited by law).
16) Turnout seems to stabilize at the level of the 2019 legislative elections. At that time, 50% of registered voters cast their vote.
17) Local observers have reported repeated cases of alleged bribery of voters from the breakaway region, along with organized transportation. President Sandu's party indicated to the pro-Russian bloc of Communists and Socialists. The latter rejected all the accusations.
18) President Sandu made critical comments towards the electoral authorities, probably referring to the alleged irregularities related to voters in the Transnistrian region (See point 17). She asked them to ensure correct elections or they will be sanctioned later (how?!).
19) Moldovans have 4 more hours to vote and only 36% voted. This is less than in 2019. My previous estimate that the overall share will reach 55% after all makes quite uncertain. A more realistic goal should be 50%. The reasons for the slowdown in participation are unknown.
20) In less than 1 hour, the voting stations in Moldova will close & the turnout is worrying. Everyone, I say this knowingly, everyone expected a great mobilization. President Sandu asked the people to vote, the pro-Russian forces did too. But clearly this didn't really work.
21) The stations are closed in Moldova. The voting continues abroad (Europe and the US).
22) The vote abroad exceeded the psychological barrier of 200,000. But there are ~ 60k to go to repeat the results of the second round of the 2020 presidential elections.
23) Exit polls (by telephone) show that President Sandu's PAS party would win the elections with 55%. More information on the final results will be available soon.
24) Important details about the exit poll (by phone): 32% refused to answer! Certainly, President Sandu’s party won the elections, what we do not know for sure is whether or not it can govern alone.
25) It’s an important element. About an hour before the end of the vote, President Sandu used her Facebook platform (268k followers), asking people to convince their friends and relatives to go vote. This happened while many wondered about the slowdown in participation.
26) 67% of votes counted: President Sandu / PAS - 46.8%; Communists and Socialists - 30%; Shor Party - 7.3%.
27) After counting 77% of the votes 👇
28) ~ 94% of the votes counted👇
29) Here is the estimated distribution of seats in parliament. 👇 source: ADEPT/e-democracy.md
30) Apart from President Sandu’s party, another sort of winner is the Party of the Communists that returns into the big politics after many years of absence. Many interesting developments will unfold after these snap elections.
31) 98% of the voted counted: 👇
32) President Sandu's party will hold at least 61 of the 101 seats in the newly elected parliament. Source: ADEPT/E-democracy.md
33) Here is everything you should know about the outcome. It was a long day and night for me. 👇
#Georgia: This Sunday's elections will be crucial for the future of the political and social fabric of this country, still a EU candidate state. Both voters and the EU are faced with a dilemma: the continuity of the oligarchic regime or a political rejuvenation. A 🧵:
1) The oligarchic regime of Ivanishvili has not shown any fear of the threats of sanctions from the U.S. and the EU. Nor is the freezing of the EU candidate status perceived as a real risk, as local political interests prevail in the calculations of the Georgian Dream.⤵️
2) Georgian security forces launched investigations into experts from civil society organizations to fuel the narrative that the West would interfere in Georgia's internal affairs. ⤵️
#Moldova: Voting has begun. Around 160,000 voters have cast their ballots in the country (6% turnout so far). Around 15,000 voted in the diaspora. A thread 🧵:
1) The Central Election Commission publishes the turnout for the presidential elections. It is not yet clear whether the figure matches that of the referendum.⤵️
2) Queues are reported at two polling stations in Moscow. At the suggestion of Moldovan intelligence services, only two polling stations were allowed, while the number of people abroad is estimated to be 350,000.⤵️
#Moldova_Elections2024: In 15 days, Moldova will hold presidential elections and a constitutional referendum. Some pro-Russian proxies are vying to enter office. I open a thread related to Russian hybrid interference in Moldovan elections. A🧵:⤵️
1) More than 130,000 Moldovan citizens have received money from Russia through accounts at Sberbank, which is subject to Western sanctions (since 2022). More than 50,000 are directly linked to the Shor Group/“Victory” ⤵️
Bloc (a self-exiled businessman convicted in absentia for the 2010-14 banking fraud). It could mean that another 80,000 people are either Shor supporters or pensioners receiving social payments from Russia;⤵️
#Hybrid: Durov’s arrest in France is suspicious: 1) he knew he was wanted for the quality of content moderation on Telegram platform, used by Russia for spreading disinformation; 2) Durov appears to have deliberately chosen to fly to Paris, even though he was avoiding Western ⤵️
jurisdiction so far; 3) The French arrest warrant was valid only for French territory, which may explain why Durov chose to fly to France and not another European country, where he was immediately arrested; 4) As a French citizen, he will not be extradited, although Russia ⤵️
would like to have him back; 5) One working theory may be that Durov chose to collaborate with the French police, without being clear in return for what, to show that he is not working with Russian states to destabilize France/the West;⤵️
#EU_Neighborhood: The three main narratives employed by the current govts in Georgia, Moldova & Armenia envisage the following: 1) War: The Georgian govt speaks of the risk of the “opening of a second front”, attributed to the West and local opposition forces.⤵️
In Moldova, Russian aggression against Ukraine is at the forefront of govt discourse. Some official narratives in Armenia hint at the danger of a war that could be started by Azerbaijan. 2) External interference: The Georgian govt frequently refers to the “Global War Party”⤵️
(indirectly the West) that gets involved in domestic politics. In Moldova and Armenia, Russia and pro-Russian “proxies” are the usual suspects of interfering to destabilise. 3) European integration: It follows from the Georgian govt narratives that the EU would not be impartial⤵️
#Ukraine_Moldova: They have many things in common, but the most important is the presence of Russian occupation forces. Drawing parallels between the negotiations on the Transnistrian conflict and the peace talks that Kyiv would have to hold with Russia can be misleading. A🧵:
1) Negotiations on the Transnistria conflict in the 2000s were carried out with the mediation of the EU and the US, which rather accepted the terms set by Russian diplomacy (because it is unlikely that both they will be fooled). The conditions were dictated by the context in⤵️
which the West and Russia were looking for platforms on which they could cooperate and the “5+2” format was one of them (not the only one); 2) After the failure of the Minsk agreements and large-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine, neither the West is willing to mediate⤵️